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Executive Summary 
This dissertation contains two studies that analyze the effect of financial incentives on 
fertility and one that analyzes the effect of feedback on overconfident students. Chapter 
1 outlines my motivation for this research. 
Chapter 2 presents a study about the fertility effect of child benefits. The study 
analyzes a German reform that increased child benefits. Increasing a state subsidy for 
children such as child benefits, decreases parents’ price for children. Gary Becker’s 
fertility theory (1960, 1991) predicts that since children are, in economic terms, a normal 
good, demand for children should rise with child benefits, leading to an increase in 
fertility. My coauthor and I test if the German population reacted accordingly. We exploit 
the fact that the reform created different incentives for births of different parity and 
differed by parents’ income level. Since income is endogenous to fertility, we use 
education as a proxy for income to divide the population into treatment and control 
groups. We use a difference-in-difference estimation strategy to test if the educational 
groups show relative increases of fertility for the birth-order at which they benefitted more 
than other educational groups. We use two datasets: the SOEP and the German 
Mikrozensus. We find no fertility effect for first births of low-income couples and some 
evidence for a fertility increase between 9.6% and 22.6% for second births of high income 
couples. 
Chapter 3 presents a study about the fertility effect of cutting child related welfare 
benefits. The study analyzes a German reform that made parental leave benefits 
deductible from welfare benefits. This meant an average decrease of 18% of household 
income for parents of young children who receive welfare. Relying on Becker’s fertility 
theory (1960, 1991) again, I expect this increase in parents’ price for children to cause a 
decline in their fertility. Access to administrative data about welfare recipients from the 
XVI 
 
federal employment agency of Germany supplies me with an exceptionally big and 
detailed dataset about the fertility of welfare receiving women. I construct a panel from 
these data and use a linear probability model to test if welfare recipients decreased their 
fertility after the reform. I find that the reform caused a fertility reduction of 6.8% for my 
sample of welfare recipients. 
Chapter 4 presents a study about overconfident students’ adjustment of study effort 
as a reaction to feedback from a pretest. The phenomenon that students expect to perform 
better than they turn out to do, called student overconfidence, is well established in the 
literature on the economics and the psychology of education (e.g. Murstein 1965, Grimes 
2002, Andrews et al. 2007, Nowell & Alston 2007, Foster et al. 2017, Magnus & 
Peresetsky 2018). I develop a model that explains how students choose the effort level 
they invest to prepare for an exam. This model predicts that overconfident students for 
whom the grade in the final exam is not important will invest less effort for final exam 
preparation if they barely pass a pretest than if they barely fail it. Such a reaction is 
irrational, since the feedback about their performance is only marginally better if they 
barely pass. Irrelevant if they pass or fail, a pretest score close to the passing threshold is 
feedback that retaining their previous effort level puts them at risk to fail the final exam. 
I test if students react as predicted by the model using data from a pretest written at a 
German university. I use a regression discontinuity design to check for a structural break 
in final exam performance at the passing threshold of the pretest. I find no structural break 
for most groups of students. I do find a structural break of the magnitude 27% of average 
exam performance for a group of students who is least likely to care about the grade in 
the final exam. 
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by summarizing in which way my research 
contributes to the economic literature.  
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Kurzzuammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation enthält zwei Studien, die den Effekt finanzieller Anreize auf Fertilität 
analysieren und eine Studie, die analysiert wie Studenten, die sich selbst überschätzen, 
auf Feedback reagieren. Kapitel 1 erläutert die Motivation meiner Forschung. 
Kapitel 2 präsentiert eine Studie über den Fertilitätseffekt von Kindergeld. Die 
Studie analysiert eine deutsche Reform, durch die das Kindergeld erhöht wurde. Eine 
Kindergelderhöhung bedeutet eine Subventionierung der Kosten, die Eltern für ihre 
Kinder tragen müssen. Die Fertilitätstheorie von Gary Becker (1960, 1991) sagt vorher, 
dass, weil Kinder aus ökonomischer Sicht ein normales Gut sind, eine 
Kindergelderhöhung die Nachfrage nach Kindern erhöhen sollte, was zu erhöhter 
Fertilität führt. Meine Koautorin und ich testen, ob die deutsche Bevölkerung 
entsprechend reagiert hat. Wir nutzen dabei die Tatsache, dass die Reform 
unterschiedliche Anreize für verschiedene Einkommensgruppen gesetzt hat, die auch mit 
der Geburtenfolge des betroffenen Kindes variieren. Da Einkommen sich endogen zu 
Fertilität verhält, benutzen wir das Bildungsniveau der Eltern als Proxy für Einkommen 
und unterteilen hiernach die Bevölkerung in Treatment- und Kontrollgruppen. Wir 
wenden die Difference-in-Difference Methode an, und prüfen, wie sich die Fertilität der 
verschiedenen Bildungsgruppen nach der Reform entwickelt hat; ob die Gruppen in dem 
Geburtenrang für den sie am meisten von der Reform profitieren, ihre relative Fertilität 
gesteigert haben. Wir nutzen zwei Datensätze für unsere Analyse: Das SOEP und den 
deutschen Mikrozensus. Wir finden keine Evidenz für einen Fertilitätseffekt für 
Erstgeburten von Paaren mit niedrigem Einkommen und eingeschränkte Evidenz für 
einen Fertilitätsanstieg zwischen 9,6% und 22,6% für Zweitgeburten von Paaren mit 
hohem Einkommen. 
XVIII 
 
Kapitel 3 präsentiert eine Studie über den Fertilitätseffekt der Kürzung 
kinderbezogener Sozialleistungen. Die Studie analysiert eine deutsche Reform, die 
Elterngeld auf Arbeitslosengeld II anrechenbar gemacht hat. Für betroffene Haushalte mit 
Kleinkindern bedeutete diese Reform eine Kürzung von 18% des Haushaltseinkommens. 
Erneut auf Beckers (1960, 1991) Fertilitätstheorie Bezug nehmend, erwarte ich, dass 
diese Erhöhung des von Eltern getragenen Preises für Kinder einen Fertilitätsrückgang 
auslöst. Durch Zugang zu administrativen Daten der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, steht mir 
ein außergewöhnlich großer und detaillierter Datensatz über die Fertilität von 
Sozialleistungen beziehenden Frauen zur Verfügung. Ich erstelle ein Panel aus diesen 
Daten und verwende ein lineares Wahrscheinlichkeitsmodell, um zu testen, ob die 
Fertilität von Sozialleistungsbeziehern nach der Reform gesunken ist. Ich finde starke 
Evidenz dafür, dass die Reform einen Fertilitätsrückgang von 6,8% in meiner Stichprobe 
von Sozialleistungsbezieherinnen ausgelöst hat. 
Kapitel 4 präsentiert eine Studie darüber, wie Studenten, die ihre Leistung 
überschätzen, ihre Leistung als Reaktion auf Feedback durch eine Vorklausur anpassen. 
In der ökonomischen und psychologischen Forschungsliteratur ist es ein etabliertes 
Phänomen, dass Studenten ihre akademische Leistung überschätzen (z.B. Murstein 1965, 
Grimes 2002, Andrews et al. 2007, Nowell & Alston 2007, Foster et al. 2017, Magnus & 
Peresetsky 2018). Ich entwickle ein Modell, das erläutert, wie Studenten ermitteln, wie 
viel Aufwand sie treiben wollen, um sich auf eine Klausur vorzubereiten. Das Modell 
sagt voraus, dass Studenten, die sich selbst überschätzen und denen die Note in der 
Hauptklausur relativ unwichtig ist, weniger Lernaufwand treiben, wenn sie die 
Vorklausur knapp bestehen, als wenn sie knapp durchfallen. Eine solche Reaktion ist 
irrational, weil das Feedback über ihren Vorbereitungsaufwand nur marginal besser ist, 
wenn sie bestanden haben. Egal ob sie bestanden haben oder nicht, ein 
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Vorklausurergebnis nah an der Bestehensgrenze ist Feedback, dass sie Gefahr laufen 
durch die Hauptklausur zu fallen, wenn sie ihr bisheriges Aufwandslevel beibehalten. Ich 
nutze Daten über eine Vorklausur an einer deutschen Universität, um zu testen, ob 
Studierende tatsächlich auf die vorhergesagte Weise reagieren. Ich wende ein Regression 
Discontinuity Design an, um zu prüfen, ob es einen Strukturbruch in den Ergebnissen der 
Hauptklausur, an der Bestehensgrenze der Vorklausur gibt. Für die meisten Gruppen von 
Studenten finde ich keine Evidenz für einen Strukturbruch. Ich finde Evidenz für einen 
Strukturbruch von 27% der durchschnittlichen erreichten Klausurpunkte für eine Gruppe 
von Studenten, für die es wahrscheinlich ist, dass ihnen die Note in der Endklausur 
unwichtig ist. 
Kapitel 5 fasst zusammen, welchen Beitrag zur volkswirtschaftlichen 
Forschungsliteratur meine Forschung leistet. 
 
1 
 
1 Introduction 
 
 “Writers on Political Economy profess to teach, or to investigate, 
the nature of Wealth, and the laws of its production and 
distribution; including, directly or remotely, the operation of all the 
causes by which the condition of mankind, or of any society of 
human beings, in respect to this universal object of human desire, 
is made prosperous or the reverse.” [Mill, 1848, p.57] 
 
The influential utilitarian philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill opens his textbook 
“Principles of Political Economy” (1848) with the above quote. In the mid-19th century 
economics was called Political Economy; thus this quote can be taken as Mill’s definition 
of the science of economics. Translated into modern English, he is saying that economists 
research to understand how wealth can best be generated and distributed. They analyze 
human behavior and society to find causal relationships that help to increase wealth and 
distribute it efficiently, because wealth is universally desired by people.  
The last clause, which I put in italics, could easily be overlooked, but it exemplifies 
Mill’s understanding of the fundamental motivation of economists. They try to 
understand human behavior and society to promote wealth and use it efficiently, because 
people are ceteris paribus better off with more wealth. This entails that promoting wealth 
is not an end in itself; it is a means to promote human wellbeing.  
I open my dissertation with Mill’s quote, because it represents my understanding of 
economics and my motivation to conduct the economic research I present in this 
dissertation. The only remark I want to add to this definition is that my own definition of 
economics extends beyond what Mill considered wealth. Though he was a utilitarian and 
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thus interested in welfare maximization in general, the science of economics (which he 
called Political Economy) did not yet address means of welfare maximization beyond 
material wealth. As my understanding of economics was shaped in the 21st century, it 
includes modern notions of labor and family economics. Starting with the works of Gary 
Becker and Jacob Mincer, economists began to analyze mechanisms that influence human 
capital and demographics. Influenced by their insights and those of their successors, for 
me, economics is not only a study of how to promote material wealth, but rather of how 
to use any resources that are beneficial to human wellbeing efficiently and how to increase 
their availability. 
My aim as an economic researcher is to help increasing the understanding of human 
behavior that is relevant for production and efficient allocation of resources. The hope is 
that my research can be useful for policy makers. Understanding the way humans react to 
incentives helps designing policies concerning the production and efficient allocation of 
resources. This dissertation contains two studies that analyze people’s fertility reaction to 
child related financial incentives and one article that analyzes how feedback influences 
students’ study effort. The rest of the introduction elaborates my motivation to research 
these specific topics. 
The first article in this dissertation analyzes the fertility effect of financial incentives 
on general populations. Understanding this effect is an economic pursuit, because it helps 
to put public resources to an efficient use. Through the proliferation of the contraceptive 
pill, the legalization of abortion and increased opportunity costs of children for women 
(cf. Becker 1993, p.140), children have become a scarce resource in industrialized 
countries. Fertility rates have fallen below the replacement rates in many countries. 
Together with decreased mortality, the low birth rates are problematic for industrialized 
3 
 
countries, because the ratio of working age population to retirees increases. Societies have 
fewer workers to generate resources and more people that need them. 
In this situation, information about the fertility effect of financial incentives is of 
high economic interest. Child benefits, where they exist, cover part of the costs parents 
have to bear to raise their children. If, as Becker (1960) hypothesized, children are a 
normal good and demand for children thus decreases with their price, increasing child 
benefits might help to mitigate the demographic shift. Since Becker formulated his theory, 
many articles found evidence that financial incentives have a positive effect on fertility 
(e.g. Laroque and Salanié 2004, 2014, Cohen et al. 2013, Milligan 2005). Still, in his 
summary of the international literature on family policy effects on fertility Gauthier 
(2007) concludes that the international literature on family policy effects is mixed and 
with small effects. Yet, 30 out of 32 OECD countries pay some form of child benefits 
(OECD 2014). Some of these payments are motivated by the desire to increase the birth 
rate. My motivation for this project is to provide evidence on the effect of financial 
incentives on fertility, because such evidence can help political decision makers to weigh 
the costs against the benefits of such incentives. 
The second article in this dissertation investigates the fertility effect of a decrease 
in child related welfare payments. This topic is much more controversial than the topic of 
the first article. The fertility effect of general child benefits is interesting for political 
decision makers in a context where they consider increasing public spending to motivate 
people to have more children. Concerning child related welfare payments, the public 
debate has the opposite direction. 23 US states specifically introduced laws that denied 
welfare payments to children, to reduce the fertility of welfare recipients. The reasoning 
behind these reductions is to incentivize the parents to work instead of having more 
children (cf. Kearny 2004, Wallace 2009).  
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There are numerous possible negative consequences of such cuts. Reducing child 
related welfare benefits limits the already scarce resources of welfare receiving families 
even further. This can potentially lead to malnutrition or social sidelining of the affected 
children. I research about the fertility effect of cutting child related welfare payments, 
because evidence about the assumed fertility effect can help policy makers to gauge if it 
is sensible to risk incurring the potential costs for the desired outcome. It is important to 
note, though, that evidence on the fertility effect of such cuts can only inform such 
decisions. Deciding on the level of child related welfare benefits involves questions of 
distributive justice beyond the scope of economics. 
The third article in this dissertation analyzes how university students adjust their 
preparation effort for an exam after receiving feedback from a pretest to the final exam. I 
research this topic, because understanding the deliberations of students can help to adjust 
the way courses are taught and exams are posed, to improve their education and to 
increase the skill level they achieve. Increasing the efficiency of education can increase 
society’s human capital. In times of globalization and digitalization, labor markets 
polarize – the wage gap between low- and high-skilled occupations increases. This 
increases the importance of higher education. Higher relative wages for occupations that 
require university education provide an increasingly important extrinsic incentive to 
study. The average share of people with tertiary education among those aged 25 to 34 
rose from 26% in 2000 to almost 40% in 2012 (Cabrales et al. 2019). The share of 
extrinsically motivated students rises. I assume that the study success of extrinsically 
motivated students is especially sensitive to adjustments in teaching and exam conditions. 
Thus, understanding student motivations and deliberations with the aim of increasing 
their human capital is highly relevant today. 
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2.1 Introduction 
As many industrialized societies face the problem of demographic aging and low 
birthrates, it is important to study the determinants of fertility and, in particular, to 
understand the fertility effects of public policies. In this study, we exploit a major reform 
of the German child benefit program to investigate whether child benefits affect fertility. 
As the program combines cash benefits and tax deductions, our analysis is comparable to 
US studies of fertility effects of personal tax exemptions (e.g., Whittington et al. 1990, 
Crump et al. 2011). The measures of the German reform varied by household income, 
which renders it similar to reforms of the EITC (earned income tax credit) in the US and 
the WFTC (working families tax credit) in the UK. Both programs have been studied for 
their fertility effects before (see Brewer et al. 2012, Baughman and Dickert-Conlin 2003, 
or Francesconi and van der Klaauw 2007).  
Child benefits - or family cash benefits - are available in many countries, i.e., 30 of 
32 OECD countries offer such a program (OECD 2014). In most countries, these benefits 
are under review and undergo reforms: Australia introduced a flat rate 'baby bonus' in 
2004 (Guest and Parr 2013). In the UK, the child benefit was recently withdrawn from 
higher income households due to fiscal concerns (HM Treasury 2010). France cut back 
on the 'allocations familiales' in 2015 to reduce expenditures (Reuters 2014). Japan, in 
contrast, reformed its benefit system in 2010 with the intention to increase fertility 
(Suzuki 2013). Therefore, the causal effect of child benefits is of broad and international 
interest. 
 Up until 1995, Germany organized its family benefit system using income 
dependent cash transfers plus a system of tax-exempt child allowances. Critics argued 
that the system disproportionately benefited high-income families. In response, the 
reform considered here introduced a significant increase in cash benefits and the 
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obligation to choose either the benefit or the tax allowance. We investigate whether this 
increase in the subsidy to child raising affected fertility. 
 Germany spends about 33.8 billion Euro annually on child benefits, i.e., more than 
10 percent of the federal budget (STBA 2016). By international comparison, child 
benefits are high and yet Germany remains a low fertility country (BMFSFJ 2008). In this 
situation, the quasi-experiment induced by the 1996 child benefit reform facilitates an 
interesting case study on fertility effects. The change in transfers - paid at least until the 
child reaches age 18 - was substantial for some population groups and negligible for 
others, depending on income and family size. We exploit this heterogeneity to test for 
differences in fertility responses. 
 This study contributes to a broad international literature, which disagrees on 
whether benefits affect fertility. While some causal analyses yield strong positive fertility 
responses to benefit increases, others show small or even negative effects. In the first 
group of studies, González (2013) evaluates the effect of a one-time payout of 2,500 Euro 
after a birth in Spain in 2007. Abortions declined and conceptions increased, resulting in 
an increase of the annual number of births by 6 percent. Cohen et al. (2013) look at 
changes in the Israeli child subsidy for third and higher order births and confirm 
significant fertility responses to child subsidy changes particularly in lower income 
families. Milligan (2005) evaluates the fertility effect of the introduction and modification 
of tax allowances in Quebec. He also finds substantial fertility increases of up to 25 
percent. The effect appears to be largest in high income families. Laroque and Salanié 
(2004, 2014) estimate structural models and simulate fertility effects of benefit increases 
in France. They find substantial fertility responses but do not differentiate by income.  
 Conversely, a number of contributions question positive responses of fertility to 
financial incentives. Crump et al. (2011) revisit the studies by Whittington et al. (1990). 
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Based on richer data and after testing various specifications they reject the hypothesis that 
child related tax benefits affect the level of fertility. Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2009) 
evaluate whether changing incentives in the US EITC program increased fertility, but find 
the opposite response among white women and no significant effects for non-white 
women. Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007) evaluate the UK WFTC program's effect 
on the fertility of lone mothers. Contrary to their hypotheses, they also find negative 
fertility responses.1 Since this reform addressed low income households, heterogeneities 
by household income cannot be evaluated.  
 Two surveys summarize the literatures on welfare and family policy effects on 
fertility:  
Moffitt (1998) covers the literature on welfare in the US and suggests that the 
findings on fertility effects are inconclusive. Gauthier (2007) summarizes the 
international literature on family policy effects on fertility and similarly concludes that 
the evidence is mixed and with small effects at best. 
 The German literature on the fertility effects of child benefits entails two relevant 
yet contradicting contributions: Haan and Wrohlich (2011) estimate a structural, dynamic 
discrete choice model of joint employment and fertility choices for women in couples. 
The authors apply monthly data from the 2000-2007 waves of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) and account for taxes, childcare, child benefits, and out-of-work 
benefits. They find strong fertility responses to changes in child benefits: a hypothetical 
increase in child benefits by 20 percent for children under age three is associated with a 
significant fertility increase by 4.6 percent. The fertility effects are largest among the less 
educated, those in East Germany, and those without children. Rainer et al. (2012) evaluate 
 
1 Brewer et al. (2012) study the same reform and find that the fertility of women in couples 
indeed increased after the reform. 
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the effect of the 1996 child benefit reform using a difference-in-differences approach. The 
authors use annual observations from the 1992-1998 SOEP waves, i.e., the years 
surrounding the 1996 child benefit reform. As the reform impact varied by income group, 
the authors define control and treatment groups based on education as a proxy for income. 
A positive reform effect appears at best among the low educated with no children; 
however, the effect is not robust.2 
 It is interesting that the ambiguous empirical findings on the relationship between 
child benefits and family size go along with indeterminate theoretical predictions. If we 
consider children as a "normal good" the income effect of an increase in transfers should 
be positive and call forth higher fertility. The same positive fertility effect obtains if we 
interpret child benefit increases as a reduction in the own price of children: it should 
increase demand, i.e., fertility. If, however, parents consider child quality and child 
quantity as substitutes (Becker 1991), the fertility effect of a general increase in non-labor 
income depends on whether the income elasticity of child quality exceeds that of child 
quantity. If that is the case, rising child benefits may even reduce fertility and increase 
investments in child quality (Ermisch 2003, Gauthier 2007).3  
 The contribution of this study is threefold: first, we add to the international 
literature by considering the case of Germany as a very low fertility country. As fertility 
patterns are different here, also fertility responses to financial incentives may contrast to 
those in the US or the UK. Second, we present detailed analyses of the reform effects on 
fertility considering heterogeneous incentives by family size. Third, we refine extant 
 
2  Tamm (2010) studies the same reform with a focus on female labor market participation. 
Similar to González (2013) he finds that the increase in benefits caused a decline in maternal 
hours of work. In an earlier contribution using time series methods and data for the period 
1960-1995 Cigno et al. (2003) find positive effects of a broadly defined child benefit on the 
annual total fertility rate in a VAR model. 
3  This argument strictly holds for higher order fertility, only. For first births, an increase in 
benefits does not generate an unconditional income effect because the transfer is conditional 
on having a child. 
10 
 
analyses of the German reform: in contrast to Rainer et al. (2012) our hypotheses 
distinguish reform effect on first and second births. We look at evidence from 
Mikrozensus in addition to SOEP data and thus exploit large samples. Also, we consider 
strict definitions of control and treatment groups and omit observations where the pre- vs. 
post-reform assignment is unclear due to potential anticipation of the reform. 
 Our results confirm the findings of Rainer et al. (2012) in that there are no robust 
fertility effects of the reform for low income couples. We find, however, some support 
for positive fertility effects for higher income couples deciding on a second birth at the 
order of 10 to 23 percent. This finding is in line with our expectations, as the reform 
increased child benefits for second children particularly for high income families. We 
provide various robustness tests, which corroborate our findings.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2.2 describes the 1996 child benefit 
reform and the relevant institutional background; here we derive our two main 
hypotheses. Section 2.3 explains our empirical approach to test the fertility effects of the 
reform. We introduce our data from the German Mikrozensus as well as the SOEP in 
section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents our main results, section 2.6 describes the robustness 
tests, and section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 Background and hypotheses 
The German Constitution mandates that families "shall enjoy the special protection of the 
state" (Article 6). One of the main policy instruments implementing this special protection 
is a transfer program labelled 'child benefit' (Kindergeld). Since the federal government 
established it in 1954, it grew continuously in scope and scale. Initially, families only 
received 25 DM per month for the third child and for children of higher parity. Over time, 
the transfer was reformed in various ways: the benefits started to be provided additionally 
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to families for second children (1961) and for first children (1975), benefit payout varied 
by income (1961-1975, 1982-1995), and transfers were raised and at times complemented 
by allowable income tax deductions for families with children.  
 In 1996, a major reform of child benefits was implemented which resulted in the 
largest increase in these benefits in Germany ever. The German parliament passed the 
reform on October 11, 1995, it came into effect on January 1, 1996 and affected all 
families with children, independent of the date of birth. The reform integrated child 
benefits and the income tax system: prior to the reform, both systems complemented each 
other and applied simultaneously (dual system); since the reform, families have to choose 
between child benefits and tax deductions (option model). It now depends on household 
income whether child benefits or tax deductions are preferable; every household is 
assigned the most beneficial alternative by the tax authorities. As our analysis exploits 
this reform, we now briefly characterize the regulations before and after the reform.  
 In the years prior to the reform, regulations on child related payments contained 
three elements. The first element were child benefits, which amounted to 70 DM per 
month for the first child and varied by family income for higher order children (70-130 
DM for a second child, 70-220 DM for a third child, and 70-240 DM for fourth and higher 
order children). Table 2.1 summarizes the child benefit amounts transferred for children 
of different parity over time. The second element were income tax exempt amounts of 
4,104 DM to be deducted from parental taxable income per child and year. Due to the 
progressive income tax system, this saved parents between 0 and 181 DM per child and 
month; the amount increased with income.4 The third element were supplementary 
payments; they amounted to between 1 and 65 DM per child and month, decreasing with 
 
4  Families with an annual income below 11,232 DM saved nothing, because they did not pay 
any income taxes. Families with an annual income above 244,188 DM paid the maximum tax 
rate of 53 percent and thus saved 4,104 DM*0.53/12=181 DM per month and child.  
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income. They were intended to mitigate the relative advantage the tax exemptions granted 
to high income families. Overall, every family received at least 135 DM per child and 
month, based on a combination of the three elements (Rainer et al. 2012). 
 After the 1996 reform, the supplementary payments were abolished and child 
benefit payments no longer varied by income. The benefits amounted to 200 DM for the 
first and second child, 300 DM for the third child, and 350 DM for the fourth child and 
any further children.5 Furthermore, the reform increased the tax exempt amounts to 6,264 
DM (see Lüdeke and Werding 1996). While parents could receive tax advantages plus 
child benefits prior to the reform, after the reform only one of the two could be realized: 
families with low income benefited more from the child benefit payments whereas the 
tax exempt amounts per child were the more attractive option for higher income 
households due to progressive tax rates.6 
While the reform generally increased the net value of child-related transfers for 
almost all families, the magnitude of the increase varied across the income distribution 
and the number of children. Figure 2.1 a) depicts the total value of net child related 
transfers (i.e., child benefits, child benefit supplement, savings through tax deductions) 
before and after the reform for a first child. The gross income on the x-axis refers to the 
household income of married couples with no children.7 The graph describes the reform-
induced change in financial incentives for couples considering to have a first child.  
 
5  The benefits rose even further in 1997 and again in 1999. By 1999 they had reached 250 DM 
for the first and second, 300 and 350 for the third and fourth child, respectively. 
6  It was not the family but the tax authority, which automatically chose the financially more 
attractive option for each individual family. Generally, gross family annual income for couples 
with one child had to surpass about 146,500 DM after the reform to make the tax exempt 
amounts more attractive (about 153,000 DM for couples with two children). Based on our 
data, fewer than five percent of couple and family households were in this top income bracket. 
Therefore, the vast majority of families benefited from child benefits rather than the tax credit. 
7  As tax and child benefit laws differentiate between married and unmarried couples, the 
patterns for unmarried couples are slightly different. 
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The reform increased the net value of child related transfers almost across the 
entire income distribution. The only exception were couples with annual incomes 
between 143,400 and 152,500 DM, for whom net transfers declined slightly.8 Couples 
with incomes above this interval benefited from the increased tax exempt amounts, 
couples with incomes below this interval benefited from the increased direct transfers. 
Clearly, the largest absolute increase in net transfers occurred for low income couples: 
for couples with an income below 23,232 DM child benefits increased from 1,650 to 
2,400 DM per year, i.e., by 45.45 percent.  
It is noteworthy that also the increased transfers were still below the estimated 
cost of raising children at the time: the income tax exemptions were designed by law to 
cover the minimum of cost of raising children and in 1996 amounted to 4.104 DM 
annually per child, i.e. 342 DM per month. Thus the 200 DM in child benefits did not 
cover even the minimum of the cost of raising a child. 
Figure 2.1 b) shows net transfers relative to yearly gross family income. At a 
gross income of, e.g., 20,000 DM the reform increased potential transfers from 8.15 to 
12.0 percent of income. With rising income, the increase in relative net transfers declines.  
If children are a "normal good", the increase in net transfers should raise fertility. 
Ceteris paribus, the effect should be largest for those with the largest increase in benefits. 
Net transfers for firstborn children increased the most for low-income families, both in 
absolute and relative terms. This leads us to our first hypothesis:  
We expect a positive fertility response to the reform among previously childless 
couples. We expect this positive response to be larger for low-income than for 
high-income couples. 
 
8  Net transfers dropped by between 9.50 DM and 18.85 DM per year, i.e., negligible amounts. 
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The ceteris paribus assumption excludes heterogeneity among childless couples with 
respect to demand for child quality and opportunity costs of child raising. Both 
considerations suggest that a given change in child benefits may result in smaller changes 
in high than low income couples' demand for children if high income couples have a 
higher taste for child quality and their demand for children responds to their higher 
opportunity cost of child raising. This, however, agrees with our hypothesis that the effect 
of a reform which offered even smaller benefit changes for high income couples differs 
by household income. 
Figure 2.2 a) presents the absolute net transfers which couples who already have 
one child could expect from a second born child before and after the reform. For second 
children, the reform implied different shifts in incentives: after the reform, families with 
an annual income of up to 32,000 DM gain only slightly (up to 60 DM per year). Families 
with an income between 32,000 and 62,500 DM lose up to 190 DM per year in terms of 
net transfers for a second child. Couples with an income above the threshold of 62,500 
DM were subject to discretionary income related reductions in child benefits before the 
reform. They gain because the reform abolished these reductions. The increase in net 
transfers amounts to up to 520 DM per year.  
 Figure 2.2 b) depicts the net transfers due to a second child relative to household 
income. In the lower part of the income distribution net transfers declined with the largest 
drop at an income level just below the threshold of 62,500 DM (i.e., at 62,400 DM), where 
it dropped from 4.5 percent in 1995 to 3.85 percent in 1996. The largest relative increase 
in net transfers occurred slightly above the threshold at 63,800 DM, in particular from 
2.94 percent of gross income in 1995 to 3.76 percent in 1996.  
 With its joint effect on benefits for first and second born children, the reform 
increased virtually all families' disposable income (see Figure 2.A.1 in the Appendix 
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2.A). For all families, the increasing benefits for first born children overcompensate any 
benefit reduction for second births. Due to this reduction in the fixed cost of children and 
ceteris paribus, we expect a general increase in second child fertility.9 At the same time, 
the reform changed incentives for second births for low- and high-income families 
differently: the share of net transfers for second born children in household income 
declined for low-income families and increased for high-income families. If we abstract 
from heterogeneity in the demand for child quality and opportunity costs we obtain the 
following second hypothesis:  
 We expect an overall positive fertility response to the reform in terms of second 
born children. We expect this positive response to be larger for high-income than 
for low-income families. 
However, as soon as we allow for heterogeneity in the demand for child quality and in 
opportunity cost it is conceivable that even the larger child benefit increase for higher 
income couples is insufficient to balance these couples' higher shadow cost of child 
bearing.10 The shadow cost of children is higher for higher income couples because they 
forgo higher earnings to raise a child and they tend to invest more in each child. Thus, it 
remains an empirical question whether the larger child benefit increase for second births 
is large enough to balance these family-income related differences in demand for second 
births and which of the countervailing mechanisms dominates.  
Figure 2.3 shows the net transfers for a third child, from the perspective of a 
couple with two previous children. Net transfers increased for most families, but they did 
not rise monotonously with household income. Furthermore, for families with an income 
between about 55,400 and 80,900 DM the income related fertility incentive declined after 
 
9  For a similar argument see, e.g., the discussion of child benefit effects in Cigno (1986, p. 
1042). 
10  Cohen et al. (2013) find smaller responses to a given child benefit increase among high than 
among low income households. 
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the reform. Here, we cannot derive clear income based hypotheses about differential 
fertility responses for high- vs. low-income families. The situation is even more 
complicated for children of fourth and fifth parity. Therefore, we limit our analyses to the 
reform’s fertility effect on first and second births. Appendix 2.B studies the situation for 
third births. 
 Four additional institutional features and changes are relevant for our analyses (see 
Rainer et al. 2012): first, the number of years for which parents could claim child benefits 
increased in 1996 from 16 to 18 years.11 If the child benefit reform yields heterogeneous 
fertility effects, then extending the payout period magnifies these differences across 
income groups. Second, child benefits are considered in the means test for social 
assistance: when child benefits increase, welfare payments decline by the same amount. 
Therefore, the reform does not affect the fertility incentives of welfare recipients and we 
exclude them from our analyses.12 Third, on January 1, 1996 a reform became effective 
that introduced a legal entitlement for a place in a half-day kindergarten for three year 
olds. As this reform had been passed already in 1992 (Kinder- und Jugendhilfegesetz 
1992) we do not expect to see specific fertility responses to this reform at the cutoff date 
of the child benefit reform in 1996. Fourth, a general income tax reform took effect along 
with the child benefit reform starting January 1, 1996. This reform decreased the tax 
burden, mostly for low-income earners.13 Beyond these four institutional features and 
reforms there were no substantial transitions of the German labor market and social policy 
system during our period of observation (see e.g., Luthen 2016, Kluth and Gasche 2015, 
or Caliendo and Hogenacker 2012). In the next section, we describe our empirical strategy 
 
11  If children are in training parents can receive benefits up until age 25. 
12  In principle, welfare recipients constitute an independent control group for the reform. 
However, as our data provide very few births in this subsample (56 overall), we only pursue 
this strategy as a robustness check. 
13 In Figure 2.A.2 in Appendix 2.A we show the reform induced shift in marginal and average 
tax rates. 
17 
 
and explain how our strategy responds to the reforms in childcare and the income tax 
system which occurred simultaneously with the child benefit reform.  
2.3  Empirical strategy and identification 
2.3.1 Empirical strategy 
Our strategy to identify the causal fertility effect of the child benefit reform rests on the 
heterogeneity of the reform's effect for low- and high-income families. We use this 
heterogeneity and apply a difference-in-differences approach. 
 Following Becker (1991), we assume that the cost of a marginal child affects 
parents' desired number of children. Overall, we expect a positive fertility response to the 
reform, because child benefits increased for virtually every family. Regarding first 
(second) births, financial incentives increased most for low-income (high-income) 
families such that we expect a stronger response of that group.14 We analyze reform 
effects separately for families without previous children and for families with one 
previous child.  
 As income is likely to be endogenous to fertility, we cannot use it to define 
treatment and control groups. Instead and in order to proxy for income, we follow the 
literature (e.g., Brewer et al. 2012) and use parents' education, which is arguably more 
exogenous to fertility and consider income only in robustness tests. Couples with low vs. 
high educational attainment make up the treatment vs. control groups in the sample of 
childless couples. For the sample of couples with one child, we reverse the definition of 
treatment and control group, because in this case the high-income or highly educated 
 
14  For second births this is under a caveat. The difference in the benefit change between high and 
low incomes must be sufficient to outweigh the higher shadow price of children for high 
income couples. As discussed in section 3.2, empirical analysis must show whether this is the 
case. 
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couples experienced the largest increase in net transfers. To isolate the treatment effect γ, 
we estimate a linear model of the form: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   .        (1)  
The dependent variable 𝑦 indicates whether couple i in period t had a birth in the 
previous 12 months. The variable 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 denotes whether a couple belongs to the 
treatment group. The variable 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 yields whether the fertility decision occurred after the 
reform. The covariate vector 𝑥 describes, e.g., characteristics of both parents and time 
and year fixed effects. The coefficient of the interaction between 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 and 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 (γ) 
captures the treatment effect, which we estimate by ordinary least squares regressions. 
2.3.2 Identification issues 
In this section, we discuss four relevant challenges to our identification strategy: first, 
fertility responses in anticipation of the reform, second, the childcare reform, third, the 
income tax reform and fourth, the existence of parallel trends between low- and high-
educated couples.   
The first challenge is that couples may have anticipated the reform. If they 
adjusted their fertility already prior to the implementation of the reform on January 1, 
1996, this might bias the estimated reform effect. The German parliament passed the 
reform in October 1995 (Bundeskindergeldgesetz 1995). Thus, children conceived in 
(immediate) response to the new law could not have been born prior to June 1996. We 
carefully separate pre- and post-reform fertility outcomes and take account of an 
intermediate anticipation period.15 
 
15 However, the Bundestag first discussed the reform in March 1995 and its specifics were under 
debate until October. If (potential) parents adjusted their fertility choices already in 
anticipation and conceived a child as early as April 1995, births as early as January 1996 may 
already be in response to the reform. This is an unlikely outcome: first, it is uncommon that 
pregnancies occur immediately and, second, it would be surprising to see parents respond 
already to the possibility of a reform. However, in the unlikely event that parents responded 
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 The second challenge to our identification strategy is the introduction of an 
entitlement to subsidized half-day childcare for children aged three and above. If this 
reform affected the fertility of our treatment and control groups differentially, our 
estimates might conflate the effects of the two reforms. This, however, is unlikely: first, 
while both reforms came into effect the same day, the German parliament passed the law 
introducing the childcare entitlement as early as summer of 1992 (Kinder- und 
Jugendhilfegesetz 1992). Therefore, fertility responses to this reform should have been 
realized already in the three years leading up to the enactment of the childcare reform. 
Second, if the reform of childcare entitlements swayed any parents to have a child, the 
resulting children would have led to increased kindergarten enrollments of three year olds 
once the childcare reform was in effect. As enrollment of three year olds stayed stable in 
the years after the enactment of the reform (BMFSFJ 2005), we argue that the childcare 
reform does not cause fertility responses as of 1996 and therefore does not threaten our 
identification approach.16 
 The third challenge to our identification strategy is the income tax reform which 
parliament passed together with the child benefit reform. The income tax reform increased 
the disposable income of low-income families while high-income families were hardly 
affected (see Figure 2.A.2 and Lüdeke and Werding 1996). Thus, we expect that the 
income tax reform has a positive fertility effect which decreases with income.  
As our identification strategy does not allow us to control for this effect, we obtain 
an upward bias in our estimate of the treatment effect for childless couples. However, the 
estimation of a significantly positive treatment effect would show that the fertility of the 
 
to the reform very early, we were to underestimate the true reform effect because we would 
overestimate pre-reform fertility. 
16  In addition, some studies show that even larger reforms of child care availability did not yield 
fertility effects (e.g. Bick 2016, Fuchs and Schwientek 2016) or only caused informal care to 
be substituted by more formal care arrangements (Havnes and Mogstad 2011). 
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low-income group responds to changes in net income. The largest reduction of the tax 
burden from the income tax reform applied to couples with a taxable income of 24,100 
DM. Their tax reductions amounted to about 2,500 DM while the increase in potential 
benefits from a first child amounted to 780 DM. Thus, 23.8 percent of the potential total 
income increase is conditional on having a first child. Therefore, at least about one quarter 
of any estimated effect is connected to the increase in child benefits.  
The situation is reverse for the analysis of second births: here, the fertility response 
to the child benefit reform among high-income families should exceed that of low-income 
families. A fertility effect of the general tax reduction for low-income families with a first 
child would downward bias the estimated differential effect of the child benefit reform 
on second births. Therefore, difference-in-differences estimates constitute a conservative 
lower bound. 
 The fourth challenge to our identification strategy is to show that fertility for 
treatment and control groups developed along parallel paths in the periods prior to the 
reform (common trends assumption). As aggregate fertility rates are not available by 
parental education and child parity, we use the information provided in the large 
Mikrozensus surveys of 1995 and 1999 to approximate the different birthrates over the 
relevant period.17 The calculation of past birthrates is based on the age distribution of 
children observed at the time of the interview. Based on the observed children in the 
household, we impute a couples' past fertility. We proxy past birthrates by relating the 
number of couples with a birth to those without one. In this approximation, we consider 
only married couples, because for them we know the date of marriage and thus the 
duration of the partnership. Clearly, the approach is imprecise as, e.g., couples with births 
 
17  Exact data are available in the SOEP, as well. However, the small number of observations in 
the relevant groups does not permit informative depictions of the developments; the resulting 
figures jump erratically. 
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in the past may have split, children may not be living in a couple's household, and 
unmarried couples are not considered altogether. Figures 2.4 a)-d) describe the 
development of birthrates for married couples in the treatment and control groups, i.e., 
with high and low education. We show first the development for previously childless 
couples and then for couples with one previous child. We offer two definitions of 
education groups (narrow and broad) which we define in the next section. The figures 
yield parallel developments of pre-reform birthrates, which suggests that the common 
trends assumption holds. In addition to this graphic evidence we tested and confirmed the 
robustness of our main results by allowing for heterogeneous time trends for treatment 
and control groups. 
2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Mikrozensus 
Our first data source is the German Mikrozensus which samples one percent of German 
households. We use the 1995-1999 waves of data. The interviews took place in April of 
each year. The scientific use files provide access to 70 percent of the overall sample.  
 We consider married and non-married cohabiting couples where the woman is at 
least 25 years old, i.e., at an age when most individuals have finished their education.18 
We set the upper age limit for women in the sample to 40 years because fertility rates of 
older women are very small (for similar strategies see Rainer et al. 2012 and Brewer et 
al. 2012). We only consider West Germany because East Germany exhibited very 
 
18  We do not study the behavior of single women because their fertility rates are very low (1.25 
percent among childless and 1.0 percent among those with one child compared to about 10 
percent among couples) and because their economic situation of single mothers is governed 
by different mechanisms: it is affected by the scarcity of child care supply for infants in the 
1990s and social norms that pushed recent mothers out of the labor market. About one third 
of single mothers receive welfare benefits. We expect that the single mothers respond less to 
child benefit reforms than couples. The issue is left for further research.   
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unstable fertility patterns in our observation period, right after unification (Goldstein and 
Kreyenfeld 2011). We use couples where both partners are German nationals to limit the 
impact of heterogeneous fertility cultures (Cygan-Rehm 2014). We exclude welfare 
recipients because the reform did not change this group’s income situation 
(Bundessozialhilfegesetz 1991).  
 The dependent variable describes whether the couple has a child under the age of 
one living in the household.19 We consider the observations from the Mikrozensus waves 
1995 and 1996 as the pre-reform sample. As the interviews took place in April, newly 
born children below age one observed in these surveys must have been conceived by July 
1995 before the reform law was passed. We observe post-reform fertility outcomes based 
on the Mikrozensus waves 1998 and 1999. Again, we consider children below age one in 
the household. The earliest possible date of conception for below one year olds observed 
in April 1998 is July 1996 and therefore well after the reform came into effect. Our sample 
thus covers births from April 1994 to April 1996 as pre- and from April 1997 to April 
1999 as post-reform outcomes. We omit births between April 1996 and April 1997 
because without information on the month of birth we cannot determine whether they 
were conceived before or after the reform (uncertainty gap). 
 We use educational attainment of both partners based on the International Standard 
Classification of Education scale of 1997 (ISCED) to proxy the low- and high-income 
groups which make up our treatment and control groups.20 We apply two definitions of 
low vs. high education in our regressions: a narrow definition offers a precise 
 
19  The Mikrozensus provides the age of all members of the surveyed households. If there is a 
child of age 0 living in the household, we consider this to be a recent birth.  
20  In a robustness test we consider fathers' education only, in order to avoid the potential 
endogeneity of maternal education with respect to fertility choices. Table 2.A.1 in Appendix 
2.A describes the ISCED coding in terms of school and vocational degrees. We present the 
distribution of annual household net income and the income-specific birthrates in Figure 2.A.3 
in Appendix 2.A.  
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approximation of the relevant income groups and a broad definition maintains larger 
sample sizes.  
 The narrow definition labels all couples where both partners have at most ISCED-
level 2 as low education and all couples where both partners have ISCED-level 4 or higher 
as high education couples. Here, the highly educated couples clearly have higher incomes 
than the lowly educated: Figure 2.5 a) shows the income distribution of both groups in 
the narrow definition for couples without children. Figure 2.5 b) shows the same for 
couples with one previous child; the dashed line represents the turning point in terms of 
increasing or decreasing incentives for a second child in terms of net incomes based on 
the child benefit regulations (see Figure 2.2 b)).21 55.2 percent of the low education 
couples have an income below this threshold and 82.3 percent of the high education 
couples have an income above the threshold. 
The broad definition of low and high education labels couples where both partners 
reach at most ISCED-level 3 as low education and couples where at least one partner 
reaches ISCED-level 4 or higher as high education couples. The advantage of this 
definition is that all observations can be assigned to a group. The disadvantage is that the 
incomes of the groups are less distinct than in the narrow definition. Figures 2.5 c) and 
2.5 d) show the income distributions for low and high educated couples in the broad 
definition without children and for couples with one child, respectively. 
 Table 2.2 a) summarizes the sample sizes and birthrates for both definitions and 
for couples without children and with one child for the Mikrozensus sample. We can 
apply analysis samples of 11,385 (7,046) observations in the narrow education definition 
and of 36,304 (33,175) in the broad definition for couples at risk of a first (second) birth, 
 
21  This threshold lies at annual gross household incomes of roughly 63,000 DM. Since we only 
have data on net income in the Mikrozensus, we provide the income distribution in terms of 
net income, for which the threshold is roughly at 43,000 DM.  
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respectively. Births of firstborn children declined after the reform and did so more 
strongly for the lowly educated. Births of second born children increased for all groups 
except the lowly educated in the narrow definition. 
Our estimations consider a vector of control variables. These capture parents' age 
and marital status and (for families with a previous child) years since last birth. We lag 
these variables to the year prior to the birth in order to capture parents' characteristics at 
the time of conception. Furthermore, we control for the survey year, the federal state and 
the size of the community the couple lives in. We show descriptive statistics on the 
covariates in Tables 2.A.2 and 2.A.3. 
2.4.2  German socio-economic panel (SOEP) 
Our second data source is the German Socio-economic Panel, a long running household 
survey (Wagner et al. 1997). 22 The SOEP provides smaller samples than the Mikrozensus, 
but offers full fertility biographies. We use the 1992-1998 survey waves of the SOEP and 
generate a data set, which is comparable to that based on the Mikrozensus.  
 Again, we consider cohabiting couples in West Germany. We exclude couples if 
one of the partners has a migration background.23 We drop welfare recipients and couples 
where the female is outside the age range of 25-40 years. This provides us with an analysis 
samples of 314 (262) observations in the narrow education definition and of 1,224 (1,414) 
in the broad definition for couples at risk of a first (second) birth, respectively. 
 Again, our dependent variable describes couples' fertility outcomes. While in the 
Mikrozensus we observe whether there is a child in the household and impute parental 
characteristics at the time of conception, the SOEP allows us to connect observations on 
 
22  We use the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), data for years 1984-2013, version 30, SOEP, 2014, 
doi:10.5684/soep.v30. 
23  In the Mikrozensus data we dropped non-nationals because there is no information on the 
preferable indicator of migration background. 
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families over time. We combine a couple's characteristics in the year of the interview with 
their fertility outcomes in the following calendar year.  
 Given that the reform was first discussed in March 1995 and the law passed 
parliament in October 1995 to take effect January 1, 1996, conceptions between March 
and October 1995 (i.e., births between about December 1995 and June 1996) fall into a 
transition period (uncertainty gap). In order to assign fertility outcomes correctly to the 
pre- vs. post-reform period we do not use the 1995 interviews and 1996 fertility outcomes. 
We depict our sampling strategy with respect to the assignment of pre- and post-reform 
outcomes and the connection between couples' characteristics and fertility for the 
Mikrozensus and SOEP data in Figure 2.A.4. 
 As before, we define treatment and control groups based on the ISCED education 
scale. Table 2.2 b) summarizes sample sizes and birthrates pre- and post-reform for the 
two different definitions of high and low education. Again, our covariates include parents' 
age, federal state, and marital status and (for families with a previous child) categorical 
indicators of birth spacing. Also, we control for the month and year of the interview. 
Tables 2.A.4 and 2.A.5 show descriptive statistics of all covariates, except for years and 
interview months.  
2.5  Results 
Tables 2.3-2.6 show the estimation results of our difference-in-differences models. 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show results for first and second births based on the Mikrozensus and 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 those for first and second births based on the SOEP data. In each table, 
we describe the findings based on the narrow definition of treatment and control group in 
columns 1 and 2 and based on the broad definition in columns 3 and 4. It is important to 
recall that changes in income tax rates may generate an overestimation of the effects for 
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first births and low income households and an underestimation the effects for second 
births and high income households. 
 Table 2.3 presents the estimation results for couples with no previous children. In 
columns 1 and 2 the coefficients show virtually no change in fertility for the reference 
group of high educated couples in the post-reform period, and a generally lower fertility 
for low compared to high educated couples. Our main interest rests on the coefficient of 
the interaction of low education and post-reform indicators, i.e., the causal effect of the 
higher child benefit increase for low income families. Contrary to our expectation of a 
positive treatment effect, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant in 
columns 1 and 2, i.e., with and without additional controls.  
 We can offer two explanations for this surprising result: first, if low educated 
couples have lower ages at first birth our sample which conditions on the female being at 
least age 25 may overlook some births in the treatment group. When we add younger 
females to the sample the negative effect loses statistical significance (results available 
upon request). A second explanation may be that the treatment group contains a share of 
couples who had migrated from East to West Germany. As East Germans experienced 
vast fertility declines after reunification (total fertility rates dropped from 1.57 in 1989 to 
0.77 in 1994, see Conrad et al. 1996) this might drive the negative effects. Unfortunately, 
the Mikrozensus data do not offer information on individual migration histories.  
 In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.3, again, the coefficient of the interaction term again 
does not yield the expected positive fertility effect for the lower income couples after the 
reform. It is small and statistically insignificant. Thus, the Mikrozensus data yield no 
evidence to support our first hypothesis. Instead, if they suggest anything, it is rather the 
opposite – a negative fertility effect of the reform for first births. While surprising, this 
result is not entirely unheard of in the literature. Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007) 
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find declining fertility among single UK mothers in response to more generous tax credits 
for working mothers. Also, studies based on time-series of birthrates such as Baughman 
and Dickert-Conlin (2009) and Crump et al. (2011) yield falling fertility rates after more 
generous transfers were introduced. 
 Table 2.4 presents the Mikrozensus based estimation results for reform effects on 
the propensity of a second birth. In columns 1 and 2, the estimated coefficient of the post- 
reform indicator is negative and statistically significant. The estimated treatment effect is 
positive and statistically significant. This indicates a general fertility reduction after the 
reform which the reform mitigated for the highly educated. The size of the treatment 
effect appears plausible: after the reform, the fertility of highly educated couples with one 
child remains fairly stable, while that of low educated couples with one child drops by 
4.5 percentage points (see column 2) yielding a positive post-reform effect of 22.6 
percent.24 The estimations for the broad definition of control and treatment groups yield 
smaller coefficient estimates: however, when control variables are considered, the 
coefficient of the interaction term again is statistically significant and positive suggesting 
a 9.6 percent difference in the fertility increase for the treatment group compared to the 
control group. 25 Overall, the results based on the Mikrozensus data agree with our second 
hypothesis.  
 Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the results based on the SOEP data. Here, sample sizes are 
reduced by more than factor twenty compared to the Mikrozensus data. The main effects 
of the reform on the probability of having a first birth (row one in Table 2.5) confirm the 
results from the Mikrozensus: there is no support for the hypothesis that the reform 
 
24  22.6 percent are obtained when dividing the estimate of the reform effect (0.037) by the pre-
reform birth rate for highly educated couples in the narrow definition (0.164), see  
Table 2.2 a). 
25  9.6 percent are obtained when dividing the estimate of the reform effect (0.013) by the pre-
reform birth rate for highly educated couples in the broad definition (0.135), see  
Table 2.2. b). 
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yielded a significant general fertility effect. Again, lower educated couples tend to have 
fewer first births than higher educated couples. However, we find no support for 
hypothesis one as the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms are statistically 
insignificant. Table 2.6 shows the results of SOEP based tests of hypothesis two. While 
the propensity to have a second child increased after the reform we find no evidence that 
the reform yielded a significant positive fertility effect for the high vs. low educated 
couples with one previous child. All estimated treatment effects in Table 2.6 are negative. 
The estimations based on SOEP data confirm the findings of Rainer et al. (2012) who 
find no robust reform effects using this data source.  
 In sum, we obtain no support for hypothesis one and some support for hypothesis 
two based on the Mikrozensus samples. The overall evidence in favor fertility effects is 
weak; however, due to the lack of statistical power available in the SOEP based analyses 
we consider the Mikrozensus results slightly more reliable. Next, we discuss a set of 
robustness tests for these findings. 
2.6  Robustness tests  
We performed numerous robustness tests and discuss five sets of additional results. First, 
Table 2.7 presents the estimation results when we replace the education proxies by 
measures of household income. These results may be inconsistent if the endogeneity of 
income generates, e.g., an upward bias in the fertility-income gradient. Nevertheless, the 
estimates of the reform effects may still yield the correct sign. We contrast couples in the 
lowest income quartile with those in the highest quartile. In the first two columns, we 
consider only couples without prior children; here, the low income couples are the 
treatment group. In columns 3 and 4, we only consider couples with one prior child. Here, 
the high income couples are the treatment group. The results display no general rise in 
29 
 
fertility after the reform and a negative correlation of income with fertility. None of the 
four models yields statistically significant treatment effects, i.e., the estimates of all 
'income by post-reform' interactions are statistically insignificant. This confirms that the 
reform most likely did not yield substantial fertility effects. Performing the same analysis 
with data taken from the SOEP similarly yields no statistically significant estimates of 
treatment effects (see Table 2.A.6 in the Appendix 2.A). 
 In addition to grouping high and low income households based on belonging to the 
first or fourth quartile of the household income distribution, we split the sample based on 
the income cutoff that separated the households with one child into those that lost or 
hardly gained by the reform and those that gained substantially (cf. Figure 2.2 a)). That 
value amounts to gross household incomes of 63.000 DM per year. As the Mikrozensus 
only provides net household incomes, we approximated the gross income cutoff using a 
net income cutoff of 43.000 DM. Table 2.A.7 shows the estimation results based on the 
Mikrozensus data, Table 2.A.8 shows the results based on the SOEP, where we can apply 
the gross income cutoff. The estimates in Table 2.A.7 confirm those in Tables 2.4 and 
2.7 and show a positive and in the specification without control variables significant 
treatment effect on second births at the order of about 9 percent. The SOEP estimates for 
the treatment effect on first births are negative and significant with and without controls. 
This supports the findings from Table 2.5. The coefficients for the effect on second births 
are statistically insignificant.26 
 
26   In further estimations, we considered net household incomes reduced by the female's earnings. 
When considering only male incomes, which are arguable more exogenous, we find significant 
negative treatment effects for low income households regarding first births and significant 
positive effects for high income households regarding second births (see Table 2.A.9). We 
obtain the same results when we consider imputed incomes. In addition, we replaced the 
education proxies that are based on both spouses' education outcomes by focusing on the male 
spouses' education exclusively, as that may be more exogenous than female education. The 
results are robust to this modification. Also, we replaced education outcomes observed for 
adults by educational choices at age 10. In this setting, we do not observe any statistically 
significant treatment effects. 
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 A second set of robustness tests investigates sample selection issues. We originally 
omitted couples from East Germany, immigrants, and those with females younger than 
25 or older than 40. In Tables 2.8 and 2.9 we present the results of estimations based on 
Mikrozensus data for first and second births when these sample restrictions are lifted, i.e., 
we consider all observations of cohabiting couples where the woman is aged 18 through 
49.27 The results for couples without prior children (Table 2.8) confirm the previous 
findings using the main sample: the treatment effect is negative and statistically 
significant for the narrow definition and small and insignificant for the broad definition 
of treatment and control group.  
 Table 2.9 presents the estimates for the reform effect on second births. Columns 1 
and 2 yield the expected positive effect for high education couples, but the effect is 
statistically insignificant and its magnitude is smaller than in the main regressions in 
Table 2.4. The estimated reform effects in columns 3 and 4 are comparable in size to 
those in the main regressions and statistically significant, thus corroborating prior results. 
Thus, we continue to find evidence in favor of a positive reform effect on second births. 
Overall, our results are robust against changes in the selection of the analysis sample.28  
In addition, we tested whether our results hold up when we only consider married 
couples. The estimation results based on the thus reduced samples are very close to the 
results obtained in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 with significantly positive effects for second births 
(see Tables 2.A.10 and 2.A.11 in the Appendix 2.A). 
A different type of sample selection bias can result if our sample of one-time 
parents contains couples who only experienced a first childbirth due to the reform. In 
 
27  We also generated the estimation results when each of the limitations was restricted 
individually. The results are very similar. 
28  We also considered the SOEP data with the extended sample definition in robustness tests. 
Again, the estimates of the treatment effects remain insignificant both for first and second 
births. 
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order to evaluate whether this concern is relevant to our results we re-estimated our 
models for second births after omitting couples from the sample who had experienced the 
first birth in time window that would include post-reform events. We show the estimation 
results when omitting observations within an interval of 3 years after a first birth in Table 
10 for the broad and the narrow definition. The results are very similar to the main 
estimations. Therefore, this potential bias does not affect our findings.  
 In a third set of robustness tests, we compare reform effects for couples with and 
without welfare receipt.29 This is of interest as couples who received welfare were 
unaffected by the reform: any child benefit increase was deducted from their welfare 
payments and net transfers remained constant. In Table 2.11, we study the response of 
parents without prior children. Here, we expect a positive treatment effect in the low 
education group. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.11, we only consider low educated 
households based on the narrow definition and compare the welfare recipients among 
them who are newly added to the sample, to non-recipients. In row 2 we observe that 
compared to low educated welfare recipients the low educated non-recipients generally 
have a significantly higher propensity to have a first birth. Contrary to expectations, the 
estimated treatment effect in row 3 is negative, statistically significant, and quite 
substantial. However, these results are based on a rather small sample which comprises 
only 99 welfare recipients and with only a single birth among them over the entire period 
of observation.  
 In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.11 we repeat this analysis using the broad definition 
of couples’ educational attainment. In this case, the overall sample size increases by factor 
ten and we observe 232 welfare recipients with 13 births. Here, we do not find a 
 
29  This comparison is not plausible for couples with one child where we expect the positive 
treatment effect among those with high income. As high education and high income couples 
are not likely to be on (means-tested) welfare, we do not use the control group of welfare 
recipients to test our second hypothesis. 
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significant treatment effect. In columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.11, we consider all couples 
without children without conditioning on education. We expect that overall the reform 
increased incentives for additional births among non-recipients, while welfare recipients’ 
fertility remained unaffected. However, again all coefficient estimates of interest are 
statistically insignificant which suggests that those affected by the reform do not modify 
their fertility compared to those not affected. 
 In our fourth set of robustness tests we study state level heterogeneities that may 
affect responses to federal reforms. In particular, one might expect different fertility 
responses in states with high and low child care supply or with high and low aggregate 
unemployment. So far, all our models already controlled for federal state fixed effects. 
Now, we considered specifications which add state-level linear and quadratic time trends. 
The main findings are robust to the additional controls. Table 2.A.12 shows the results.  
 Our final set of robustness tests considers the timing and spacing of births. As we 
find some evidence for positive fertility effects on second births for high income 
households, it is of interest whether this truly increases fertility. Alternatively, the positive 
effect might be due to timing, i.e., an earlier second birth in the mothers' life, or to spacing, 
i.e., reduced birth intervals between first and second births. As these analyses use only 
the small subsample of mothers who gave birth in the period of observation, we neglect 
the very small SOEP samples and focus instead on results from the Mikrozensus. In Table 
2.A.13, we present the estimation results when the dependent variable is the age of 
mothers who gave a second birth. If the fertility effect were due to an earlier timing of 
birth, we would expect a significant negative effect of the reform. However, we find the 
opposite: after the reform, higher educated mothers were older than before the reform. In 
order to investigate whether spacing matters, Table 2.A.14 shows estimation results 
where the dependent variable reflects the time between the first and the second birth. If 
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the fertility increase were due to reduced birth intervals, we would expect a negative 
reform effect. However, we observe statistically insignificant effects, which are positive 
in the narrow definition and negative but very small in the broad definition. Therefore, it 
is unlikely that the fertility effect is due to timing or spacing. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that we observe additional rather than earlier second births.30 
2.7  Conclusions 
In this paper, we apply a difference-in-differences approach to identify the causal effect 
of an increase in child benefits on fertility in Germany. We use the heterogeneity of the 
reform across population groups to identify treatment and control groups and to 
differentiate couples who are more and less strongly affected by the reform. From a 
theoretical perspective, an increase in child benefits can be expected to yield positive 
fertility responses. Particularly for low income parents deciding on a first birth and for 
high income parents deciding on a second birth increased transfers reduced the cost of 
additional children. 
 We apply data from the German Mikrozensus and the German Socio-economic 
Panel (SOEP) and approximate treatment and control groups based on educational 
attainment. We do not find a positive treatment effect for low income couples deciding 
on a first child. We find some evidence of a positive fertility effect for higher income 
couples deciding on a second child of between 9.6 and 22.6 percent when we use the 
Mikrozensus data. We identify short run fertility responses to the reform. However, as 
 
30  We also estimated the timing effect for first births. Based on the Mikrozensus data we obtain 
significant negative effects of the reform on maternal age at first birth, which were highly 
significant with the narrow definition of education and statistically insignificant and smaller 
with the broad definition. This suggests that the lack of a positive fertility effect for first births 
is not due to a postponement of births. If the reform brought about a reduced age at 
motherhood, it is possible that the lack of a short-run positive fertility effect for first births will 
be accompanied by a long-run increase in completed fertility. 
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we do not find evidence in favor of countervailing timing and spacing adjustments the 
short run may well be identical to the long run and completed fertility response. Numerous 
robustness tests confirm our findings. The increasing responsiveness of fertility across 
child parity agrees with the observation that the marginal cost of an additional child may 
be declining in family size. Milligan (2005) found for a reform in Quebec that the 
response to financial fertility incentives increase with family size. Our results are in line 
with these findings.  
 However, in contrast to some of the literature, our analysis does not yield evidence 
of a general fertility incentive provided by child benefit payments. This is notable as the 
nominal benefit amount changed substantially from 70 to 200 DM already for first births. 
In principle, the difference of the reform impact for treatment and control groups might 
be insufficient to identify an effect. We can rule out that mismeasurement connected to 
using income proxies drives the lack of a general effect: when we define treatment and 
control groups based on income we do not find significant correlation patterns, either. 
Also, it seems unlikely that the lack of a strong fertility effect is driven by a child quality-
quantity tradeoff where additional income could be invested in the quality rather the 
quantity of children: first, this tradeoff should not affect first births. Second, we do find 
evidence supporting an increase of second birth fertility where the tradeoff in favor of 
quality instead of quantity should matter.  
 While some of the literature which finds positive and significant fertility effects of 
transfers uses fully parametrized structural models (e.g., Laroque and Salanié (2004, 
2014) and Haan and Wrohlich 2011), we identify the causal effect of benefits based on a 
quasi-natural experiment. Also, many prior contributions evaluated the fertility response 
to benefit increases just for low income households (e.g., Brewer et al. 2012, Francesconi 
and van der Klaauw 2007, Baughman and Dickert-Conlin 2009), or only for third and 
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higher order births (Cohen et al. 2013). In contrast, we consider a universal child benefit. 
Our results are in line with Milligan (2005) who finds no fertility effects of general benefit 
increases in the low income population, but positive significant effects for high income 
households. 
Not finding strong fertility effects is an important result for family policy, which 
often relies on cash transfers to secure the financial wellbeing of young families and to 
incentivize childbearing. Given the substantial resources invested in child and family 
support, e.g., in the case of Germany, it is important to know that they are not likely to be 
effective in incentivizing first births and that they are particularly ineffective for low 
income couples.  
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Figures and tables 
Figure 2.1 Net transfer for a first child 
a) Absolute amount by gross income 
 
b) Relative to gross income 
 
Notes: The gross income refers to yearly gross household income. Net 
transfer stands for the combined amount of tax savings, child benefits, and 
child benefit supplements a married couple with no previous children 
would receive if the family had a first child. The vertical line in Figure 
2.1 a) marks the imputed median gross income of the Mikrozensus sample 
of couples at risk of a first birth. The imputation is based on net income 
figures and own calculations.  
Source: Own calculations based on income tax laws and child benefit 
regulations.  
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Figure 2.2 Net transfer for a second child 
a)  Absolute amount by gross income 
 
 
b) Relative to net income 
 
Notes: The gross income refers to yearly gross household income. Net 
transfer stands for the combined amount of tax savings, child benefits, and 
child benefit supplements a married couple with one previous child would 
receive if the family had a second child. The vertical line in Figure 2.2 a) 
marks the imputed median gross income of the Mikrozensus sample of 
couples at risk of a second birth. The imputation is based on net income 
figures and own calculations. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure 2.3 Absolute net transfer for a third child 
 
Notes: The gross income refers to yearly gross household income. Net 
transfer stands for the combined amount of tax savings, child benefits, and 
child benefit supplements a married couple with two previous children 
would receive if the family had a third child. The vertical line marks the 
imputed median gross income of the Mikrozensus sample of couples at 
risk of a third birth. The imputation is based on net income figures and 
own calculations. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure 2.4  Birthrates of married couples by number of children 
and educational groups 
a)  Childless couples in the narrow definition of education 
 
b) Childless couples in the broad definition of education 
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Figure 2.4  (continued) Birthrates of married couples by num-
ber of children and educational groups 
c)  Couples with one child in the narrow definition of  
 education 
 
d) Couples with one child in the broad definition of edu- 
cation 
 
Notes: The sample used to create these graphs is described in Section 
2.4.1. ‘Year’ does corresponds to the Mikrozensus survey dates. The 
vertical line marks the last period that is unaffected by the reform. 
Source: Mikrozensus waves 1995 and 1999, own calculations. 
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Figure 2.5 Income distribution by number of children and 
educational groups 
a) Childless couples in the narrow definition of education 
 
 
b) Couples with one child in the narrow definition of education 
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Figure 2.5 (continued) Income distribution by number of children 
and educational groups 
c) Childless couples in the broad definition of education 
 
 
d) Couples with one child in the broad definition of education 
 
Notes: We report income in net amounts because the Mikrozensus does not 
contain information on gross income. The dashed lines in Figures 2.5. b) and 
d) represent the threshold of 43,000 DM, which is the approximate limit that 
divides one-child families into beneficiaries and losers of the reform in terms 
of increased net transfers for a second child (which lies at 63,000 DM in terms 
of gross income). 
Source: Own calculations based on the Mikrozensus waves 1995, 1996, 1998, 
and 1999.  
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Table 2.1 Level of child benefits over time 
 
Notes: Benefits in DM per month; + marks the years in which the supplement payments 
of up to 65 DM per month were paid to low income families; * marks income dependent 
cuts in child benefits. 
Source: BMF 2008.  
Year 1. Child 2. Child 3. Child 4. Child and further
1992-1993+ 70 70 - 130* 140 - 220* 140 - 220*
1994-1995+ 70 70 - 130* 70 - 220* 70 - 240*
1996 200 200 300 350
1997-1998 220 220 300 350
1999 250 250 300 350
2000-2001 270 270 300 350
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics of births for couples without children and with one 
child by educational group 
a) Mikrozensus sample 
 
 
b) SOEP sample 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Mikrozensus waves 1995, 1996, 1998, and 1999 and 
the SOEP waves 1992-1994 and 1996-1998.  
Couples without children Low High Low High
N 1,567 9,818 16,522 19,782
Births 107 1,104 1,644 2,168
Birthrate prereform 9.01% 11.57% 10.14% 11.15%
Birthrate postreform 5.12% 10.96% 9.75% 10.78%
Couples with one child
N 1,754 5,292 19,429 13,746
Births 146 885 1,859 1,948
Birthrate prereform 9.91% 16.36% 9.43% 13.51%
Birthrate postreform 6.77% 17.05% 9.72% 14.81%
Narrow definition Broad definition
Couples without children Low High Low High
N 42 272 573 651
Births 2 31 61 80
Birthrate prereform 7.14% 13.33% 11.46% 13.21%
Birthrate postreform 3.57% 9.87% 9.82% 11.59%
Couples with one child
N 58 204 832 582
Births 3 29 82 80
Birthrate prereform 3.33% 16.67% 8.43% 13.74%
Birthrate postreform 7.14% 12.28% 11.36% 13.75%
Narrow definition Broad definition
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Table 2.3 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a first child 
based on Mikrozensus data 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is birth in t. Its mean is 0.1063 in the narrow definition and 0.1050 in the broad 
definition. The additional controls are sets of dummies for mother's and partner's lagged age in 
steps of 4 years, lagged marital status, federal state, year of observation, and city size. 
Source: Mikrozensus waves of 1995, 1996, 1998, and 1999, own calculations.  
 
Table 2.4 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a second 
child based on Mikrozensus data 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is birth in t. Its mean is 0.1463 in the narrow definition and 0.1147 in the broad 
definition. The additional controls are sets of dummies for mother's and partner's lagged age in 
steps of 4 years, lagged marital status, federal state, year of observation, city size, and the time 
passed since the woman’s last birth. 
Source: See Table 2.3. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.006 -0.010 -0.004 -0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
Low education -0.026** -0.019 -0.010** -0.011**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
Low educ.* post reform -0.033** -0.024* -0.000 0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 11,385 11,385 36,304 36,304
R² 0.0031 0.0489 0.0003 0.0489
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.031** -0.045*** 0.003 0.002
(0.013) (0.015) (0.004) (0.005)
High education 0.065*** 0.025** 0.041*** 0.030***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
High educ.* post reform 0.038** 0.037** 0.010 0.013*
(0.017) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 7,046 7,046 33,175 33,175
R² 0.0111 0.1302 0.0052 0.1080
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
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Table 2.5 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a first child 
based on SOEP data 
 
Notes: Robust S.E., clustered by person, in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The 
dependent variable in all models is birth in t+1. Its mean is 0.1061 in the narrow definition and 
0.1151 in the broad definition. The additional controls are sets of dummies for mother's and 
partner's age in steps of 4 years, marital status, federal state, and month and year of observation. 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP waves 1992-1994 and 1996-1998.  
 
Table 2.6 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a second 
child based on SOEP data 
 
Notes: Robust S.E., clustered by person, in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The 
dependent variable in all models is birth in t+1. Its mean is 0.1270 in the narrow definition and 
0.1164 in the broad definition. The additional controls are sets of dummies for mother's and 
partner's age in steps of 4 years, marital status, federal state, month and year of observation and 
categorical indicators of birth spacing.  
Source: See Table 2.5.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.035 -0.003 -0.016 0.000
(0.040) (0.074) (0.026) (0.041)
Low education -0.062 -0.061 -0.018 -0.025
(0.069) (0.073) (0.028) (0.027)
Low educ.* post reform -0.001 -0.022 -0.000 -0.001
(0.081) (0.099) (0.036) (0.036)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 314 314 1,224 1,224
R² 0.0086 0.1160 0.0013 0.0823
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform 0.038 0.146* 0.029 0.035
(0.057) (0.086) (0.020) (0.033)
High education 0.133*** 0.143** 0.053** 0.029
(0.049) (0.069) (0.025) (0.026)
High educ.* post reform -0.082 -0.108 -0.029 -0.036
(0.074) (0.087) (0.034) (0.034)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 262 262 1,414 1,414
R² 0.0173 0.1323 0.0049 0.0846
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
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Table 2.7 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a first or 
second child based on Mikrozensus data; treatment and control groups 
defined by household income in the highest vs. lowest quartile 
  
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is birth in t. Its mean is 0.1332 for couples without children and 0.1117 for couples 
with one child. "Low Income" and "High Income" are dummies, indicating that a family is in the 
lowest or highest income quartile in the sample. The middle quartiles are not part of the sample. 
The additional controls are sets of dummies for mother's and partner's lagged age in steps of 4 
years, lagged marital status, educational attainment, federal state, year of observation, and city 
size. Column 4 additionally considers categorical indicators of birth spacing. 
Source: See Table 2.3.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.005
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Low income 0.161*** 0.152*** - -
(0.007) (0.007)
Low inc.* post reform 0.001 0.003 - -
(0.010) (0.010)
High income - - -0.044*** -0.031***
(0.007) (0.007)
High inc. * post reform - - 0.012 0.006
(0.010) (0.009)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 17,850 17,850 16,818 16,818
R² 0.0567 0.1251 0.0038 0.1109
High vs. low income
 No children
High vs. low income
 One child
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Table 2.8  Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a first child 
based on Mikrozensus data with an extended sample 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is birth in t. Its mean is 0.0783 in the narrow definition and 0.0709 in the broad 
definition. The additional controls are sets of dummies for mother's and partner's lagged age in 
steps of 4 years, lagged marital status, federal state, year of observation, and city size.  
Source: Mikrozensus waves of 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999, own calculations.  
 
Table 2.9 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a second 
child based on Mikrozensus data with an extended sample 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is birth in t. Its mean is 0.0847 in the narrow definition and 0.0669 in the broad 
definition. The additional controls are sets of dummies for mother's and partner's lagged age in 
steps of 4 years, lagged marital status, federal state, year of observation, city size and categorical 
indicators of birth spacing. 
Source: See Table 2.8.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Low education 0.001 0.022*** -0.002 0.009***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Low educ.* post reform -0.022*** -0.015** -0.005 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 23,666 23,666 90,673 90,673
R² 0.0007 0.0681 0.0001 0.0729
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.007 -0.009 -0.001 0.006**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
High education 0.007 0.009 0.008*** 0.011***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
High educ.* post reform 0.015* 0.013 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 18,780 18,780 84,719 84,719
R² 0.0007 0.1388 0.0009 0.1232
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
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Table 2.10 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a second 
child based on Mikrozensus data with a reduced sample 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is birth in t. Its mean is 0.1348 in the narrow definition and 0.1037 in the broad 
definition. The additional controls are sets of dummies for mother's and partner's lagged age in 
steps of 4 years, lagged marital status, federal state, year of observation, city size and categorical 
indicators of birth spacing. The sample is the baseline sample reduced by all couples, which had 
a child of three years or less at the time of observation. 
Source: See Table 2.8.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.035** -0.045*** 0.007 0.009
(0.014) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006)
High education 0.058*** 0.011 0.038*** 0.025***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.005)
High ed.* post reform 0.049** 0.050*** 0.010 0.013*
(0.019) (0.018) (0.008) (0.007)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 4,635 4,635 24,572 24,572
R² 0.0138 0.1525 0.0051 0.1229
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
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Appendix 2.A 
Figure 2.A.1 Absolute net transfer for the first two children 
 
Notes: Net transfer stands for the combined amount of tax savings, child 
benefits, and child benefit supplements a married couple receives for their 
first two children together. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Figure 2.A.2  Average and marginal tax rates before and after 
the 1995 income tax reform 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Lüdecke and Werding (1996). 
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Figure 2.A.3 Distribution of household net income and income-
specific birthrates  by parity 
a) Families without children 
 
 
b)  Families with one child 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Mikrozensus waves 1995, 1996, 
1998, and 1999. Unfortunately, the data do not provide information on 
household annual gross incomes.  
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Table 2.A.1 The ISCED 1997-scale 
 
Source: Based on Schroedter et al. 2006 and the ISCED 1997 coding in the SOEP. 
  
School degree
No 
degree
Vocational 
degree
Higher voca-
tional degree
University
degree
No degree 1 3 5 6
Lower or middle secondary 
school diploma
2 3 5 6
Upper secondary 
school diploma
3 4 5 6
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Table 2.A.2 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables: couples without 
children; broad definition of educational groups; Mikrozensus 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Mikrozensus waves 1995, 1996, 1998, and 1999.  
  
Low High Low High
N 16,522 19,782
Married in t-1 50.18% 42.55%
ISCED mother ISCED partner
1 (inadequately) 1.07% 0.06% 1 (inadequately) 0.93% 0.06%
2 (general elementary) 18.98% 3.08% 2 (general elementary) 14.37% 1.24%
3 (upper sec. or voc.) 79.95% 29.72% 3 (upper sec. or voc.) 84.71% 16.21%
4 (upper sec. and voc.) -   ' 21.06% 4 (upper sec. and voc.) -   ' 12.38%
5 (higher vocational) -   ' 11.28% 5 (higher vocational) -   ' 22.27%
6 (higher education) -   ' 34.80% 6 (higher education) -   ' 47.84%
Age of mother in t-1 Age of partner in t-1
<=20 -   ' -   ' <=20 0.16% 0.08%
21-24 -   ' -   ' 21-24 2.71% 1.81%
25-28 35.14% 36.61% 25-28 17.70% 19.21%
29-32 27.16% 31.74% 29-32 25.59% 30.49%
33-36 19.16% 18.30% 33-36 20.14% 21.01%
37-40 18.54% 13.36% 37-40 14.80% 13.48%
41-44 -   ' -   ' 41-44 9.65% 7.24%
45-49 -   ' -   ' 45-49 5.26% 3.92%
>=50 -   ' -   ' >=49 4.00% 2.77%
State of residence
Schleswig-Holstein 5.37% 4.70%
Hamburg 2.40% 3.64%
Lower Saxony 12.00% 10.03%
Bremen 1.03% 0.91%
North Rhine-Westph. 28.76% 28.28%
Hesse 8.23% 9.86%
Rhineland-Palatinate 6.27% 5.57%
Baden-Württemberg 13.12% 14.83%
Bavaria 18.52% 17.05%
Saarland 1.72% 1.31%
Berlin 2.57% 3.82%
Community/City size in thousands
<20 42.79% 33.26%
20-100 27.86% 27.22%
100-500 16.01% 19.05%
>500 13.34% 20.46%
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Table 2.A.3 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables: couples with one child; 
broad definition of educational groups; Mikrozensus 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Mikrozensus waves 1995, 1996, 1998, and 1999. 
  
Low High Low High
N 19,429 13,746
Married in t-1 83.91% 83.54%
ISCED mother ISCED partner
1 (inadequately) 1.12% 0.17% 1 (inadequately) 0.98% 0.05%
2 (general elementary) 21.93% 5.22% 2 (general elementary) 13.06% 1.19%
3 (upper sec. or voc.) 76.95% 39.35% 3 (upper sec. or voc.) 85.95% 15.53%
4 (upper sec. and voc.) -   ' 19.38% 4 (upper sec. and voc.) -   ' 10.78%
5 (higher vocational) -   ' 11.90% 5 (higher vocational) -   ' 32.04%
6 (higher education) -   ' 23.98% 6 (higher education) -   ' 40.41%
Age of mother in t-1 Age of partner in t-1
<=20 - - <=20 0.04% 0.01%
21-24 - - 21-24 0.98% 0.33%
25-28 21.79% 16.62% 25-28 10.39% 7.32%
29-32 28.04% 31.99% 29-32 22.52% 24.23%
33-36 24.09% 28.38% 33-36 23.85% 27.63%
37-40 26.08% 23.00% 37-40 19.85% 20.60%
41-44 -   ' -   ' 41-44 13.97% 12.27%
45-49 -   ' -   ' 45-49 5.67% 5.07%
>=50 -   ' -   ' >=50 2.74% 2.52%
State of residence Time since last birth in t-1
Schleswig-Holstein 4.31% 4.55% 0 years 9.99% 17.27%
Hamburg 1.72% 2.03% 1 year 10.65% 16.14%
Lower Saxony 12.39% 10.93% 2-3 years 16.74% 20.62%
Bremen 0.77% 0.79% 4-5 years 12.90% 11.65%
North Rhine-Westph. 27.40% 26.15% 6-7 years 10.33% 9.12%
Hesse 8.27% 10.35% 8-10 years 13.17% 10.34%
Rhineland-Palatinate 7.36% 6.27% Over 10 years 26.22% 14.87%
Baden-Württemberg 12.80% 15.86%
Bavaria 20.49% 18.70%
Saarland 2.26% 1.75%
Berlin 2.23% 2.61%
Community/City size in thousands
<20 47.21% 42.84%
20-100 27.39% 27.90%
100-500 14.42% 16.46%
>500 10.98% 12.79%
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Table 2.A.4 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables: couples without 
children; broad definition of educational groups; SOEP 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP waves 1992-1994 and 1996-1998. 
  
Low High Low High
N 573     651     
Married in t 56.72% 53.92%
ISCED mother ISCED partner
1 (inadequately) 7.15% 1.09% 1 (inadequately) 7.16% 1.84%
2 (general elementary) 13.44% 5.07% 2 (general elementary) 20.24% 4.45%
3 (upper sec. or voc.) 79.41% 29.49% 3 (upper sec. or voc.) 72.60% 16.28%
4 (upper sec. and voc.) -   ' 14.59% 4 (upper sec. and voc.) -   ' 14.44%
5 (higher vocational) -   ' 20.89% 5 (higher vocational) -   ' 16.59%
6 (higher education) -   ' 28.88% 6 (higher education) -   ' 46.39%
Age of mother in t Age of partner in t
<=24 - - <=24 3.49% 1.38%
25-28 46.77% 38.40% 25-28 23.56% 17.97%
29-32 25.65% 35.18% 29-32 27.57% 33.79%
33-36 13.61% 16.44% 33-36 19.72% 20.12%
37-40 13.96% 9.98% 37-40 10.82% 9.68%
41-44 -   ' -   ' 41-44 8.20% 7.53%
45-49 -   ' -   ' 45-49 3.84% 4.92%
>=50 -   ' -   ' >=50 2.79% 4.61%
State of residence
Schleswig-Holstein 5.06% 4.45%
Hamburg 0.87% 2.30%
Lower Saxony 17.98% 15.67%
Bremen 1.57% 1.69%
North Rhine-Westph. 23.56% 30.72%
Hesse 7.50% 9.37%
Rhinel. Pal.+Saarland 11.87% 6.61%
Baden-Württembert 12.04% 13.67%
Bavaria 19.55% 15.51%
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Table 2.A.5 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables: couples with one child; 
broad definition of educational groups; SOEP 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP waves 1992-1994 and 1996-1998. 
  
Low High Low High
N 832     582     
Married in t 90.38% 89.86%
ISCED mother ISCED partner
1 (inadequately) 2.88% 2.92% 1 (inadequately) 3.12% 1.04%
2 (general elementary) 18.39% 9.62% 2 (general elementary) 15.63% 5.50%
3 (upper sec. or voc.) 78.73% 30.58% 3 (upper sec. or voc.) 81.25% 15.29%
4 (upper sec. and voc.) -   ' 14.09% 4 (upper sec. and voc.) -   ' 11.34%
5 (higher vocational) -   ' 24.57% 5 (higher vocational) -   ' 31.96%
6 (higher education) -   ' 18.21% 6 (higher education) -   ' 34.88%
Age of mother in t Age of partner in t
<=24 - - <=24 1.08% 1.03%
25-28 26.80% 20.10% 25-28 13.58% 8.25%
29-32 29.69% 34.19% 29-32 24.64% 27.32%
33-36 25.36% 26.46% 33-36 21.51% 28.69%
37-40 18.15% 19.24% 37-40 20.19% 19.07%
41-44 -   ' -   ' 41-44 10.82% 9.28%
45-49 -   ' -   ' 45-49 6.01% 3.95%
>=50 -   ' -   ' >=50 2.16% 2.41%
State of residence Time since last birth in t
Schleswig-Holstein 3.85% 3.26% 0 years 10.10% 16.32%
Hamburg 0.96% 1.89% 1 year 10.94% 18.90%
Lower Saxony 13.94% 12.89% 2-3 years 16.95% 22.16%
Bremen 0.84% 0.17% 4-5 years 10.82% 11.86%
North Rhine-Westph. 27.52% 32.47% 6-7 years 0.1106 9.28%
Hesse 6.49% 7.39% 8-10 years 0.149 11.17%
Rhinel. Pal.+Saarland 12.50% 8.42% Over 10 years 0.2524 10.31%
Baden-Württembert 15.99% 15.46%
Bavaria 17.91% 18.04%
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Table 2.A.6 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a first or 
second child based on SOEP data; treatment and control groups defined 
by household income in the highest vs. lowest quartile  
 
Notes: Robust S.E., clustered by person, in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The 
dependent variable in all models is birth in t+1. Its mean is 0.1055 for couples without children 
and 0.1065 for couples with one child. "Low Income" and "High Income" are dummies indicating 
that a family is in the lowest or highest income quartile in the sample. The middle quartiles are 
not part of the sample. The additional controls are sets of dummies for mother's and partner's age 
in steps of 4 years,  educational attainment, marital status, federal state, month and year of 
observation. Column 4 additionally contains a set of categorical indicators of birth spacing. 
Source: See Table 2.5.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.001 0.006 0.017 0.050
(0.040) (0.059) (0.036) (0.051)
Low income -0.009 0.004 - -
(0.041) (0.049)
Low inc.* post reform -0.072 -0.058 - -
(0.050) (0.052)
High income - - -0.065** -0.047
(0.031) (0.034)
High inc.* post reform - - 0.029 0.016
(0.046) (0.046)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 584 584 668 668
R² 0.0120 0.1377 0.0084 0.1122
High vs. low income
 No children
High vs. low income
 One child
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Table 2.A.7 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a first or 
second child based on Mikrozensus data; treatment and control groups 
defined by treatment kink for second births 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is birth in t. Its mean is 0.1048 for couples without children and 0.1144 for couples 
with one child. "Low Income" and "High Income" are dummies indicating that net family income 
is below or above 43.000 DM per year. This value is an approximation of net income which 
corresponds to a gross income of 63.000 DM, which is the relevant kink in the budget constraint. 
The additional controls are sets of dummies for mother's and partner's lagged age in steps of 4 
years, lagged marital status, educational attainment, federal state, year of observation and city 
size. Column 4 additionally considers a set of categorical indicators of birth spacing. 
Source: See Table 2.3.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform 0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Low income 0.125*** 0.133*** - -
(0.007) (0.007)
Low inc.* post reform -0.011 -0.008 - -
(0.010) (0.010)
High income - - -0.023*** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005)
High inc.* post reform - - 0.016** 0.010
(0.008) (0.007)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 34,977 34,977 31,985 31,985
R² 0.0255 0.0772 0.0008 0.1104
High vs. Low income
 No children
High vs. low income
 One child
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Table 2.A.8 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a first or 
second child based on SOEP data; treatment and control groups defined 
by treatment kink for second births 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. clustered by person in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The 
dependent variable in all models is birth in t. Its mean is 0.1165 for couples without children and 
0.1187 for couples with one child. "Low Income" and "High Income" are dummies indicating that 
gross family income is below or above 63.000 DM per year. The additional controls are sets of 
dummies for mother's and partner's age in steps of 4 years, educational attainment, marital status, 
federal state, month and year of observation. Column 4 additionally contains a set of categorical 
indicators of birth spacing. 
Source: See Table 2.5.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform 0.003 0.046 0.026 0.037
(0.022) (0.041) (0.027) (0.035)
Low income -0.015 0.004 - -
(0.031) (0.032)
Low inc.* post reform -0.069* -0.085** - -
(0.039) (0.040)
High income - - -0.008 0.011
(0.025) (0.026)
High inc.* post reform - - -0.009 -0.025
(0.035) (0.035)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 1,157 1,157 1,312 1,312
R² 0.0065 0.1006 0.0014 0.0966
High vs. low income
 No children
High vs. low income
 One child
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Table 2.A.9  Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a first or 
second child based on Mikrozensus data; treatment and control groups 
defined by male income in the highest vs. lowest quartile 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is birth in t. Its mean is 0.0999 for couples without children and 0.1068 for couples 
with one child. "Low Income" and "High Income" are dummies indicating that the male is in the 
lowest or highest income quartile in the sample of couples from the Mikrozensus with no or one 
previous child respectively. The middle quartiles are dropped for this regression. The additional 
controls are sets of dummies for mother's and partner's lagged age in steps of 4 years, lagged 
marital status, educational attainment, federal state, year of observation, and city size. Column 4 
additionally considers categorical indicators of birth spacing. 
Source: See Table 2.3.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform 0.017*** 0.023*** -0.002 -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Low income -0.072*** -0.077*** - -
(0.004) (0.004)
Low inc.* post reform -0.035*** -0.035*** - -
(0.007) (0.007)
High income - - 0.058*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.005)
High inc.* post reform - - 0.020** 0.019***
(0.008) (0.007)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 34,965 34,965 32,786 32,786
R² 0.0200 0.0711 0.0108 0.1097
High vs. low income
 No children
High vs. low income
 One child
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Table 2.A.10 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a first child 
based on Mikrozensus data - married couples only 
 
Notes: See Table 2.3. The mean of the dependent variable is now 0.1624 in the narrow definition 
and 0.1430 in the broad definition. 
Source: See Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.A.11 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a second 
child based on Mikrozensus data - married couples only 
 
Notes: See Table 2.4. The mean of the dependent variable is now 0.1567 in the narrow definition 
and 0.1190 in the broad definition. 
Source: See Table 2.3.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.005 -0.013 0.002 -0.002
(0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009)
Low education -0.077*** -0.048*** -0.037*** -0.028***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007)
Low educ.* post reform -0.030 -0.024 -0.004 -0.002
(0.024) (0.024) (0.011) (0.010)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 4,660 4,660 16,708 16,708
R² 0.0084 0.0541 0.0030 0.0714
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.024 -0.049*** 0.003 -0.001
(0.015) (0.018) (0.005) (0.006)
High education 0.074*** 0.029** 0.044*** 0.032***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.005)
High educ.* post reform 0.032* 0.034* 0.011 0.014*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 5,711 5,711 27,787 27,787
R² 0.0111 0.1356 0.0059 0.1157
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
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Table 2.A.12 Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have first or 
second child based on Mikrozensus data with state specific linear and 
quadratic trends 
 
Notes: See Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The only difference are the added state specific linear and 
quadratic time trends and the reduction in columns. 
Source: See Table 2.3.  
narrow 
definition
broad 
definition
narrow 
definition
broad 
definition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.051 -0.025 -0.042 0.011
(0.033) (0.019) (0.048) (0.024)
Low education -0.019 -0.011** - -
(0.012) (0.005)
Low educ.* post reform -0.024* 0.001 - -
(0.015) (0.006)
High education - - 0.026** 0.030***
(0.012) (0.005)
High educ.* post reform - - 0.035** 0.013*
(0.016) (0.007)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State specific linear 
and quadratic trends
Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11,385 36,304 7,046 33,175
R² 0.0518 0.0494 0.1323 0.1085
High vs. low education High vs. low education
No children One child
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Table 2.A.13 Estimation results: reform effect on maternal age at second birth 
(timing) based on Mikrozensus data 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is mother's age at childbirth. Its mean is 32.23 in the narrow definition and 31.25 in 
the broad definition. The samples are relatively small because only the observations of women 
who gave birth in period t are included. The additional controls are sets of dummies for mother's 
and partner's lagged age in steps of 4 years, lagged marital status, federal state, year of 
observation, and city size.  
Source: See Table 2.3.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.555 0.202 0.342** 0.663***
(0.548) (0.581) (0.145) (0.181)
High education 1.676*** 1.696*** 1.112*** 1.094***
(0.401) (0.394) (0.148) (0.149)
High educ.* post reform 1.282** 1.213** 0.406** 0.374*
(0.587) (0.583) (0.207) (0.207)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 1,031 1,031 3,807 3,807
R² 0.0716 0.1023 0.0500 0.0604
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
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Table 2.A.14 Estimation results: reform effect on time between first and second 
birth (spacing) based on Mikrozensus data 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is time since last birth, which is measured in years. Its mean is 3.45 in the narrow 
definition and 3.87 in the broad definition. The samples are relatively small because only the 
observations of women who gave birth in period t are included. The additional controls are sets 
of dummies for mother's and partner's lagged age in steps of 4 years, lagged marital status, federal 
state, year of observation, and city size. 
Source: See Table 2.3.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.614 -0.681 0.233* 0.130
(0.536) (0.503) (0.134) (0.154)
High education -2.221*** -2.428*** -0.778*** -1.055***
(0.428) (0.402) (0.118) (0.115)
High educ.* post reform 0.790 0.657 -0.050 -0.105
(0.553) (0.507) (0.172) (0.161)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 1,031 1,031 3,807 3,807
R² 0.0763 0.2046 0.0234 0.1600
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
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Appendix 2.B 
The reform of child benefits for third births replaced a highly nonlinear benefit-by-income 
mapping:  
 
Figure 2.B.1 Absolute net transfer for a third child 
 
 
We expect an increase in third child fertility particularly for high income households. The 
incentives in a small segment of the gross household income distribution (65-80.000 DM) 
decline substantially and for the lowest income households the reform generated only a 
small change.  
Table 2.B.1 shows the Mikrozensus based results when applying the baseline 
estimation strategy i.e. separating treatment and control groups based on educational 
attainment. Overall fertility does not rise after the reform and in the treatment group of 
the highly educated we even find a significant negative coefficient estimate which 
suggests a decline in fertility for this group. Table 2.B.2 shows the estimation results 
based on the SOEP data. The coefficients estimates for the treatment effects have large 
standard errors and do not show clear patterns across the two definitions of treatment and 
control groups.  
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As these effects are inconclusive, we investigated the underlying income 
distribution for households with two children already in the treatment (high education) 
and control group (low education) for both datasets. Figures 2.B.2 a) – 2.B.3 b) describe 
the results. Clearly, the income distri-butions particularly based on the broad definitions 
of treatment and control groups are not very distinct. As this may generate a measurement 
error in our estimations, we replaced the education based approach by directly using 
household incomes. First, we inspect the fertility response of two-child-households in the 
bottom and top income quartiles and then we separately consider the group of households 
who lost the most due to the reform, as their third-child-fertility might have declined.  
Table 2.B.3 shows the estimates for income-quartile based regressions for two-
child-households. Here, the Mikrozensus estimates of the treatment effect lose statistical 
significance. In Table 2.B.4 we explicitly consider households as treatment group who 
are located in the critical range between 55.400 DM and 81.0000 DM gross household 
income (39.600-52.800 DM net household income) where we expect to see a drop in 
fertility after the reform. Interestingly, this specification confirms the negative expected 
fertility effect based on the SOEP data. While the sample size of the SOEP sample is 
smaller, it may be more precise in depicting the appropriate income range, because it 
measures income in gross amounts. The net incomes provided by the Mikrozensus might 
be less appropriate, because they are only proxies for the corresponding gross earnings 
and also the limits in net amounts for which the reform has a positive or negative effect 
are approximated. 
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Figure 2.B.2 Income distribution of families with two children 
in treatment and control group – Mikrozensus 
a) Narrow definition 
 
 
b) Broad definition 
 
Notes: We report income in net amounts, because the Mikrozensus does 
not contain information on gross income. The dashed lines represent the 
thresholds of 39,600 and 52,800 DM, which is the approximate range that 
that captures the two-child families for which the reform decreased the 
financial incentives to have third child. 
Source: Own calculations based on the Mikrozensus waves 1995, 1996, 
1998, and 1999.  
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Figure 2.B.3 Income distribution of families with two children 
in treatment and control group – SOEP 
a) Narrow definition 
 
 
b) Broad definition 
 
Notes: The dashed lines represent the thresholds of 55,400 and 81,000 
DM, which is the range that captures the two-child families for which the 
reform decreased the financial incentives to have third child. 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP waves 1992 to 1998. 
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Figure 2.B.4 Distribution of household net income and income-
specific birthrates for third children 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Mikrozensus waves 1995, 1996, 
1998, and 1999. 
 
 
Table 2.B.1  Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a third child 
based on Mikrozensus data 
 
Notes: See Table 2.3. The mean of the dependent variable is 0.0382 in the narrow definition and 
0.0288 in the broad definition. 
Sources: See Table 2.3.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.009 -0.012 0.001 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003)
High education 0.004 0.004 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
High educ.* post reform -0.001 -0.002 -0.006* -0.007**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 8,654 8,654 41,469 41,469
R² 0.0007 0.0249 0.0004 0.0164
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
72 
 
Table 2.B.2  Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a third child 
based on SOEP data 
 
Notes: See Table 2.7. The mean of the dependent variable is 0.0338 in the narrow definition and 
0.0120 in the broad definition. 
Sources: See Table 2.7.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.000 -0.036 0.003 -0.009
(0.000) (0.043) (0.008) (0.013)
High education 0.035** 0.019 0.016 0.018*
(0.017) (0.029) (0.011) (0.011)
High educ.* post reform 0.017 0.065* -0.011 -0.008
(0.027) (0.039) (0.014) (0.014)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 296 296 1,688 1,688
R² 0.0116 0.2202 0.0016 0.0442
High vs. low education
(narrow definition )
High vs. low education
(broad definition )
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Table 2.B.3  Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a third child 
based on Mikrozensus and SOEP data - treatment and control groups 
defined by household income in the highest vs. lowest quartile 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The mean of the dependent 
variable in Columns 1 and 2 is 0.0279. The mean of the dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 
is 0.023. "Low Income" and "High Income" indicate that a family is in the lowest or highest 
income quartile in the sample. The middle quartiles are not part of the sample. The additional 
controls in Column 2 are sets of indicators for mother's and partner's lagged age in steps of 4 
years, lagged marital status, federal state, educational attainment, year of observation, city size 
and a set of categorical indicators of birth spacing. Column 4 contains indicators for mother's and 
partner's age in steps of 4 years, marital status, educational attainment, federal state, year and 
month of observation and a set of categorical indicators of birth spacing.   
Sources: See Table 2.5.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.001 0.002 0.027 0.010
(0.003) (0.004) (0.018) (0.018)
High income -0.008** 0.000 -0.005 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013)
High inc. * post reform 0.001 -0.001 -0.020 -0.015
(0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.023)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 20,951 20,951 786 786
R² 0.0005 0.0179 0.0058 0.1037
High vs. low income
 Two children
Sample: Mikrozensus
High vs. low income
 Two children
Sample: SOEP
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Table 2.B.4  Estimation results: reform effect on the propensity to have a third child 
based on Mikrozensus and SOEP data - treatment and control groups 
defined by household income within the critical range  
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Columns 1 and 2 show the 
results for the Mikrozensus. The mean of the dependent variable is 0.029. The variable Middle 
Income denotes family net incomes between 39,600 and 52,800 DM. This is the approximate net 
income range for which the reform lessened incentives in terms of a third child. Columns 3 and 4 
show the results for the SOEP. The mean of the dependent variable is 0.019. Here Middle income 
marks families with a gross income between 55,400 and 81,000 DM, which is the exact range of 
negatively affected incomes. The additional controls in column 2, are sets of dummies for 
mother's and partner's lagged age in steps of 4 years, lagged marital status, educational attainment, 
federal state, year of observation, city size and a set of categorical indicators of birth spacing. 
Column 4 contains dummies for mother's and partner's age in steps of 4 years, marital status, 
educational attainment, federal state, year and month of observation, and a set of categorical 
indicators of birth spacing.   
Sources: See Table 2.5.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post reform -0.002 -0.000 0.010 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.012)
Middle income 0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.012)
Middle inc.* post reform 0.004 0.003 -0.029** -0.027**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
N 39,853 39,853 1,568 1,568
R² 0.0001 0.0180 0.0034 0.0564
High vs. low income
 Two children
Sample: Mikrozensus
High vs. low income
 Two children
Sample: SOEP
75 
 
3 The Fertility Effect of cutting Child related Welfare 
Benefits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
For decades it has been a political debate whether receiving welfare benefits from the 
state motivates welfare families to have children. Despite a long lasting interest in the 
topic, evidence from economic research has been ambivalent. This paper contributes new 
convincing evidence to the debate. The analysis investigates the fertility effect of a 
German welfare reform in 2011, which made parental leave benefits deductible from 
certain welfare benefits. The reform decreased the household income for the average 
affected family by 18%. The analysis draws on exclusive access to German social security 
data about 463.000 affected women. I find a fertility reduction of 6.8% as a reaction to 
the reform. This implies an income elasticity of fertility of 0.38, which is much smaller 
than the income elasticities the literature finds for general populations. My findings 
suggest that welfare recipients’ fertility reacts less strongly to financial incentives than 
the fertility of overall populations. 
 
 
JEL classification: J13, I38, C54 
 
Keywords: welfare benefits, fertility, parental leave benefits 
 
I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments received at the 2019 conferences of the 
SEHO (Lisbon), the ESPE (Bath Spa) and EALE (Uppsala). I thank Malte Sandner and 
Regina Riphahn for their support. I thank Libertad Gonzales for helpful comments.  
76 
 
3.1 Introduction 
For decades the question whether child related welfare payments encourage fertility has 
been the object of econometric studies. It is of considerable interest to find robust 
evidence about this issue, because it is a factor in legislators’ deliberations for setting the 
amount of child related benefits and the conditions for receiving them. The most tangible 
outcome of such deliberations are the Family Cap policies in effect in 23 US states, which 
cut welfare payments for children born to families while they receive welfare. They were 
explicitly motivated by the concern that welfare payments encourage fertility. 
If child related welfare benefits encourage fertility for welfare recipients, setting 
those benefits too high has two economically undesired implications. First, the more 
children a welfare receiving women has the harder it is for her to reintegrate into the labor 
market and become independent of welfare receipt (cf. Figure 3.A.7). This incurs the 
direct cost of sustaining these families for the welfare state. Second, the ensuing 
prolonged welfare dependency of the whole family potentially leads to inauspicious 
circumstances of growing up for the marginal children and previous children of the same 
mother. This is undesirable from an economic point of view, because children from 
welfare receiving families do worse than children from non-welfare families in school 
and also later in life (cf. Case et al. 2002, Adams & Currie 2011, Adams et al. 2018). The 
worse a child’s educational attainments are, the more likely they become a net burden on 
the social security system over the course of their live (cf. Werding & Hofmann 2006).  
 Cutting child related welfare benefits or setting them too low could have negative 
economic consequences too, though. The negative effects of growing up on welfare might 
be exacerbated because the children might be materially deprived which can lead to 
malnutrition and social sidelining. 
77 
 
 Of course, these economic concerns are not everything at stake when considering 
how high child related welfare should be set. Factors beyond the scope of economics play 
an important role and therefore no econometric study could ever determine optimal 
benefit levels. What I can do with this study is to inform a normative debate with positive 
evidence. 
Despite the political relevance and subsequent academic attention, the evidence 
about the fertility effect of child related welfare payments from the literature is 
inconclusive. Until the 1990’s the literature focused on the US welfare system. Moffit 
(1998) provides a comprehensive overview of these studies. He concludes that the 
evidence is not robust, but points towards a mild positive effect of increased child related 
welfare payments on fertility. Despite continued interest in the question (e.g. Kearny 
2004, Wallace 2009, Brewer et al. 2012), it is still open to debate if child related welfare 
payments encourage fertility. 
 This paper adds new evidence by analyzing a German reform that effectively cut 
the net household income of welfare receiving parents by 18% on average. The reform, 
which came into effect in 2011, changed the status of parental leave benefits (PLB) for 
recipients of unemployment benefits II (UB II). PLB is an income dependent payment 
which all German parents with children from the ages of 0 to 14 months are eligible for. 
The minimum amount is 300 Euros a month. Unemployment benefits II are the lowest 
rung of the social security net, mostly received by the long term unemployed. When UB 
II recipients have income from other sources, this income is almost completely deducted 
from UB II payments. Until the 2011 reform, the 300 Euros PLB were the only income 
source that was exempted from this deduction. The reform made them fully deductible. 
Since the reform raised the price for a marginal child, the economic theory by Becker 
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(1960) predicts that affected families react by reducing their fertility. In this study, I test 
this prediction. 
 This paper can contribute to the international literature for two reasons. First, I am 
the first to analyze the fertility effect of this German reform. The sudden change in 
household income for affected families of 18% is directly linked to fertility and it is bigger 
than the reforms looked at in the previous literature. Second, I am the first to use 
administrative data from the German federal employment agency to analyze the fertility 
of welfare recipients. This data source contains detailed information about 463.000 
directly affected women, of which I have a 12 year long panel of monthly observations. 
Previous studies using micro level data to analyze the nexus of welfare and fertility all 
had to work with less than 10.000 units of observation. Both, the exceptionally big shock 
to household income and the exceptional sample size and data precision are very valuable 
to analyze the question at hand. Since childbirth is a relatively rare event in the life of an 
individual woman, aggregate birth rates over time have a high variance in small samples. 
The big income shock coupled with the administrative data provide this study with an 
excellent opportunity to detect an effect. 
To identify the reform effect I estimate a linear probability model with a dummy 
for giving birth in a given month as the dependent variable. The main coefficient of 
interest is the reform dummy, which marks all months after the reform could have had an 
effect on women’s probability to have a child – 9 months after the reform was announced. 
The estimation sample are a group of highly affected women – those who already received 
UB II before the reform, still received it long after the reform and have at least one 
previous child. These women receive UB II on average about 80% of the 12 years I 
observe them. They are representative of over 926.000 women in Germany in the same 
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situation31 and therefore of 6.2% of all German women in the fertile age range at the time 
of the reform. 
 I find a fertility reduction of 6.8% as an immediate response to the welfare cut. This 
represents an income elasticity of fertility of 0.38,32 which is a much smaller elasticity 
than the literature finds as reactions of overall populations to changes in general child 
benefits (cf. Table 3.1). The finding of a highly significant immediate negative fertility 
response to the reform is very robust across a variety of subgroups and specifications. 
Graphical evidence suggests that the reform also had a long-term impact, as the fertility 
rate stays at a lower level for at least five years after the reform. Furthermore, also women 
who cannot defer their fertility, those aged 38 to 45, reacted in a similar order of 
magnitude like the rest of the sample. This finding and the fact that spacing and timing of 
birth did not increase suggest that the reaction had an impact on completed fertility. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 summarizes the previous 
literature. Section 3.3 provides a description of the relevant institutions. Section 3.4 
formulates hypotheses about the reform effect. Section 3.5 describes the data. Section 3.6 
presents the estimation strategy. Section 3.7 presents the main estimation results. Section 
3.8 conducts robustness checks. Section 3.9 discusses the results and presents the 
conclusions. 
3.2 Literature review 
The literature on the impact of child related welfare payments on fertility until the 1990’s 
focused on the US welfare system. In his comprehensive literature review Moffit (1998) 
 
31  The sample size is 463.000 and it is a 50% random sample of the universe of observations of 
women who ever received UB II. 
32  The elasticity is calculated by dividing the 6.8% fertility reduction by the 18% average 
household income reduction. 
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concludes that the evidence points towards a mild positive effect of increased child related 
welfare payments on fertility. The range of point estimates for the effect varies greatly 
between different studies. All results are highly sensitive to the methodology and the 
estimation sample of the respective studies. Additionally, the studies which use variation 
between different US states and over time suffer from intra-cluster-correlation, which 
they do not adjust for (cf. Betrand et al. 2004). 
The most recent literature about child related welfare payments and fertility in the 
US analyses the effect of the introduction of Family Caps in 23 US states (e.g. Camasso 
et al. 1999, Argys et al. 2000, Jaganathan et al. 2004, Kearny 2004, Wallace 2009). These 
policies reduce or deny welfare payments for additional children that are born while a 
woman receives welfare payments. Two states, Arkansas and New Jersey, monitored the 
introduction of their Family Cap policies with randomized controlled trials. A number of 
studies analyzed these trials, most notably Turturro et al. (1997) and Camasso et al. 
(1999). They find a fertility reduction for newly welfare dependent women. 
Unfortunately, as Loury (2000) points out, the results of these studies are difficult to 
interpret, because they suffer from multiple problems in the experimental design, such as 
selective attrition and selective assignment to treatment (cf. Kearny, 2004). The most 
recent publications on Family Caps by Kearny (2004) and Wallace (2009) use variation 
in the introduction of Family Caps across states and over time to identify the fertility 
effect of Family Caps. Neither study finds a significant effect. 
Apart from the US, the only studies about the nexus between fertility and child 
related welfare payments are from the UK. In 1999 the UK government increased 
spending to support children in low income families by 50%. Two studies examined the 
fertility effect of these reforms so far. Francesconi & van der Klaauw (2007) find no 
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significant effect on the fertility of lone mothers. Brewer et al. (2012) find a fertility 
increase of about 15% for women in couples. 
While the research on the effect of welfare on fertility is inconclusive, the literature 
about general child related public payments and their effect on fertility mostly agrees on 
the positive effect of those transfers on birth rates. Milligan (2005) examines the effect of 
a universal child benefit that was introduced in Quebec in 1988. He uses a difference-in-
differences strategy and uses the rest of Canada as a control group. In two separate 
datasets he finds a significant positive effect that is robust across a number of 
specifications. Cohen et al. (2013) use variation over time and birth parity in the amounts 
of child benefits for marginal children in Israel. They find a fertility decrease of 9.6% as 
a reaction to a decrease of child benefits by about 34$ a month.33 González (2013) 
analyses the fertility effect of the introduction of a one-time payment of 2.500 Euros to 
the parents of new born children which was introduced in Spain in 2007. She finds a 
fertility increase of about 6% in reaction to the policy. Cygan-Rehm (2016) and Raute 
(2018) look at the introduction of parental leave benefits in Germany, which increased 
the costs of children for low income families and decreased them for high income 
families. Cygan-Rehm finds an effect of a consistently lower birth rates for 5 years after 
a previous birth for low income women. Raute estimates a fertility effect of 2.1% per 
1,000 Euro benefit change. Riphahn and Wiynck (2017) examine the effect of an increase 
of child benefits in Germany and find no effect on first births and a fertility increase 
between 9.6 and 22.6% for second births of high income parents. 
 
33  This adds up to 7.344$ for each child, as the change of 34$ applies to every month of the first 
18 years of a child’s life. 
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3.3 Institutions 
This study analyzes a reform that affects the interaction of two benefit programs: 
unemployment benefits II (UB II), which is the relevant welfare payment in this case, and 
parental leave benefits (PLB). The following chapter gives an overview of the features of 
these institutions that are relevant for the analysis and of the reform which changed their 
interaction. 
3.3.1 Unemployment benefits II 
Unemployment benefits II are the basic welfare payments for the unemployed and the 
marginally employed in Germany. They are part of the basic social security net which 
guarantees a minimal income level high enough to just sustain a dignified life and social 
participation. For households without any employable adults, such as disabled people and 
retirees, other rules apply, but the payment amounts are the same. 
Who receives UB II and how much is determined on the household level. The legal 
definition of a household with respect to UB II includes people who live together and 
who are either blood related or have a special care relation for each other. This special 
care relation would be that between spouses or an adult and his spouse’s children.34 Any 
such household is eligible to receive UB II payments under two conditions. First, the adult 
members’ wealth is below an age dependent threshold, which lies around 10.000 Euros 
per employable adult (SGB II §12, 2003). Second, the outcome of a calculation which 
subtracts deductible income from their UB II entitlement is positive (BMAS 2018; SGB 
II §7, 2003). This definition of eligibility implies that households which receive UB II 
and have no other income have the lowest income level possible in Germany. Anyone 
whose income is lower can apply for UB II, too. 
 
34  For example friends who share a flat would not count as one household in this sense. Each 
person in the flat would be a separate household. 
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The UB II entitlement is calculated by adding up three factors: The so-called 
standard rate, rent and additional needs. The standard rate is an amount which differs by 
household position and is designed by legislature to represent the consumer expenditures 
for basic necessities like food, clothes, transportation etc. at the social existence minimum 
(SGB II §20, 2003). Table 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A lists the standard rates by household 
position in 2010 and 2011. The second factor, rent, also includes costs for heating. Only 
rent in the lower range of the local price level are covered, though. The last factor, 
additional needs, are provisions for special circumstances. The most relevant of these are 
single parenthood and pregnancy. 
How much UB II is paid out to a household is determined by deducting other 
sources of household income from the entitlement. Capital income and most state 
transfers are fully deducted. The only exempted state transfers were parental leave 
benefits. The 2011 reform ended this exemption. Most of labor income is deducted as 
well. 
Table 3.2 shows two examples of how UB II entitlements are calculated, how other 
sources of income are deducted, how much UB II is paid out to families and how much 
money they have in total at the end of each month. These calculations are shown for two 
different hypothetical families who receive PLB, if they were living either in December 
2010 or April 2011. The first family consists of a single mother with two children who 
does not work, the second example is a couple with three children, in which the father 
has net earnings of 1.000€ a month. Showing the examples at two different points in time 
emphasizes that, while there were other changes in the UB II system between December 
2010 and April 2011, the deduction of PLB was by far the one with the highest impact on 
families of young children. A 5 Euro increase of the standard rate for adults and a slight 
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decrease in deduction of labor income are negligible in comparison to the cut from the 
reform.  
There is one further complication to these calculations. Households with low 
incomes are eligible for two alternative kinds of benefits which cannot be received 
simultaneously with UB II: Housing subsidies (Wohngeld) and supplemental child 
benefits (Kinderzuschlag). A household could increase its labor income just enough to 
become eligible for these benefits and would thereby leave UB II. This complication does 
not influence my identification strategy though, because the reform I analyze also made 
PLB deductible from supplemental child benefits. Therefore the reform did not make 
changing from UB II to these alternative benefits more attractive. 
3.3.2 Parental leave benefits 
Parental leave benefits are state transfers for parents of young children. They are designed 
as a substitute for forgone earnings for parents who take parental leave to care for their 
child. Parents of children up to the age of 14 months are eligible, if they reduce or stop 
working. Each parent can receive PLB for maximally 12 months. The combined number 
of months for both parents cannot exceed 14 months. The parents can receive PLB at 
separate times or jointly. Single parents can receive PLB for 14 months. The amount of 
PLB is calculated as roughly 67% of the respective parent’s average net labor earnings in 
the 12 months before the child’s birth. There are upper and lower bounds for the amount 
of PLB. Eligible parents who did not work before the child’s birth or had net labor 
earnings of less than 300€, receive 300€ a month. Parents who earned more than 2.769€ 
receive 1.800€ a month (BEEG 2010).  
3.3.3 The reform 
On June 7, 2010 the German government announced austerity measures which became 
necessary as a consequence of the financial and Euro crisis. One of the measures changed 
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the status of the 300€ minimum PLB for UB II recipients (Bundesregierung 2010). The 
reform took effect on January 1, 2011.35 Before the reform the 300€ were paid out to UB 
II recipients, no matter if they worked before child birth or not. Afterwards they were 
fully deducted from UB II if the parent who received PLB did not work before the birth 
of the child. This lead to a cut in benefit receipt of up to 14⋅300€=4.200€. If a parent did 
work before the child’s birth, PLB is not fully deducted from UB II. The amount of PLB 
that corresponds to the average net earnings in the 12 months before birth are deduction 
exempted as far as they do not exceed 300€ (BEEG 2010). This means, if e.g. a mother 
earned an average of 200€ per month in the year before birth, she would receive 300€ in 
PLB and 100€ would be deducted from UB II. If a mother earned an average of 400€ per 
month, she would receive 388€ in PLB and everything exceeding 300€ would be deducted 
from UB II – 88€.  
3.4 Hypotheses about the reform effect 
The theory of Becker (1960) assumes that children are a normal good. Thus, if the price 
for children rises, demand falls.36 For UB II recipients who did not work before child birth 
the reform in question raised the personal price for children by 4.200€, because the 
German state bore that much less of the costs of raising any additional of their children 
in their first 14 months. From an economic point of view, there are three ways UB II 
receiving households who learned of the reform could react to the news:  
First, they could have reduced the number of children they plan to have. Increased 
costs decrease demand. Second, they could have postponed having a child until the adults 
 
35  Section 3.4 discusses the timing of the reform in further detail. 
36  The Quality-Quantity-Trade-Off (QQTO) described by Becker and Lewis in 1973 might also 
apply, which could dampen or even reverse the predictions from the mentioned theory. In 
Appendix 3.B I explain why I consider this unlikely. 
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in the household find adequate employment to become independent of UB II receipt. This 
would avoid the negative consequences of the reform, because those only apply while a 
household receives UB II. These first two reactions could be achieved by increasing the 
use of contraceptives, abortions and abstinence. Third, households could have increased 
labor supply before giving birth. This reaction is also a way to avoid the negative 
consequences, because the full PLB deduction from the reform only applies to recipients 
who receive UB II and had no labor income at all in the 12 months before child birth. 
In principle I would like to test each of these three reactions to the reform separately. 
Unfortunately, I cannot distinguish the effects of a reduction of fertility from that of 
postponing births. The data only provides households’ fertility as long as they receive UB 
II. So, if a household postpones a child’s birth because of the reform the data do not show 
this, because the birth will occur once the household already left UB II receipt. As long 
as the household still receives UB II this deference of the birth will look like a reduction 
of fertility, which I cannot disentangle from the actual fertility reduction. Furthermore, 
the fact that I cannot observe women who permanently quit UB II receipt, means that I 
can only make statements about those women who received UB II after the reform. This 
leads to the following hypothesis which I will test in the empirical section of this paper: 
The reform should decrease fertility for those who received unemployment benefits 
II already before and still after the reform. 
The third reaction I can test separately. If it is true that women increased their labor supply 
in anticipation of a birth ever since the reform was announced, their earnings a year before 
birth should have increased relative to women’s earnings who did not have a child within 
one year of the respective contemporary observation. I test the third reaction in Appendix 
3.C.  
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The government decided to conduct the reform during a weekend cabinet retreat on 
June 6, 2010 and announced it on June 7 (Bundesregierung 2010). It is highly unlikely 
that anyone anticipated the reform before this time, because it was part of a package of 
austerity measures in the wake of the economic crisis. The government coalition of 
Christian Democrats (CDU) and Liberal Democrats (FDP) had a stable majority in 
parliament, therefore it was uncontroversial that the cabinet decision would become 
legislation. Accordingly, all media coverage portrayed the reform as something that will 
happen not as something that might happen (cf. Spieker 2010, SZ 2010). The government 
was so certain about passing this reform that they ordered the unemployment agency to 
send letters to UB II recipients, informing them about the cut before it was even passed 
in parliament (NTV 2010).  
The austerity package which was decided on June 6 was the lead topic in all TV 
news and newspapers on June 7, with many media discussing especially and explicitly 
deducting PLB for UB II recipients, because it was the most controversial item (Nitsche 
2010). The massive media coverage after the cabinet meeting suggests that affected 
families would have learned about this reform in early June 2010. While not everyone 
might have directly seen the news, it is plausible to assume that UB II recipients, 
especially those who plan to have a child or are pregnant already, would have heard about 
the reform. 
Before June 2010, there was no indication that the interaction of UB II and PLB 
would be affected by the austerity measures. The government explicitly motivated the 
reform by austerity concerns. There are no statements from the government or the media 
that part of the motivation could have been to influence fertility or UB II recipients’ work 
incentives. Therefore anticipation effects from adjustment of fertility behavior or labor 
supply before June 2010 are not plausible.  
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Thus, any adjustment in behavior as a reaction to the reform of affected women 
could have started in June 2010 at the earliest. Different reactions could show at different 
points in time. The first reaction that could become visible in the data I use would be an 
increased labor supply of affected women. The affected women would be those who 
receive UB II and are pregnant or want to have a child. They might start increasing their 
labor supply in June 2010. I test this in Appendix 3.C. 
The first reaction in birth rates which could be expected would show in January 
2011. This would be the case if women had had abortions as an immediate reaction to 
learning of the reform in June 2010. Abortions are legal in Germany until the twelfth 
week of gestation. In the most extreme case possible, a women who was in the twelfth 
week of gestation in June 2010 would have heard the news and had an abortion in early 
June. The child this women would not have given birth to because of this abortion, would 
otherwise have been born in early January 2011. So if this had happened in significant 
numbers, a drop in births would start in January 2011. Unfortunately, I do not have access 
to welfare recipient specific abortion statistics and therefore I cannot test the extent to 
which this happened. 
The next possible reaction would show in March or April 2011. It applies to 
households who were trying to have a child or did not try to prevent having a child before 
the reform. Upon hearing about the reform they might have started to increase the use of 
contraceptives, at the earliest in early June 2010. This would influence the birth rate at 
the earliest nine months later - in March or April 2011. 
These deliberations lead me towards specifying the hypothesis of the previous 
subsection to: 
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The reform should decrease fertility for those who received unemployment 
benefits II already before and still after the reform. This decrease should start in 
January 2011 and take full effect in April 2011. 
3.5 Data 
This analysis draws from exclusive access to two administrative data sets from the federal 
employment agency of Germany.37 These data sets provide information about household 
composition, fertility and labor market histories of all UB II-receiving households. The 
data are stored in spell form accurate to a day and a new spell starts every time the value 
of any of the stored variables for a person changes. Between January 2005 and April 2017 
7.4 million women in the fertile age range lived in the observed households. Additionally 
to the exceptionally large number of units of observation, the data sets track those units 
of observation very accurately and with a lot of detailed information. This study is the 
first to use these data sets to study fertility. I use a 50% random sample of these data sets 
to create a panel of monthly observations between January 2005 and December 2016 for 
every woman in the data set born between 1959 and 1998 for the time she is between 18 
and 45 years old - the fertile age range. This panel contains almost 400 million 
observations.  
A number of theoretical considerations I will outline below necessitate that I subject 
the main estimation sample to three restrictions: It contains only women who 1) received 
UB II in January 2010 or earlier, 2) received UB II still or again in December 2016 or 
later and 3) already have at least one child. These restrictions leave a sample 463.000 
 
37 The data sets are called Leistungshistorik Grundsicherung (LHG) and Integrierte 
Erwerbsbiographien (IEB). The LHG tracks benefit receipt of UB II households and the IEB 
is a register of all dependent employment in Germany. I use version 13.00.00 of the LHG and 
version 09.00.00 of the IEB. 
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women of whom the data set contains roughly 46 million monthly observations. Between 
2005 and 2016 they had 285.000 children. This constitutes an average annual birth rate 
of 7.4%. The women in the main estimation sample received UB II about 80% of the 
time. 25.78% have a foreign nationality. Table 3.3 gives an overview of further 
characteristics: education level,38 federal state, nationality, marital status and cohort. 
Table 3.4 summarizes the women’s number of children and the number of births by 
parity. 
I impose the restriction that a woman already received UB II for the first time in 
January 2010 or earlier, because I expect the ones who received UB II for the first time 
after the reform was announced to react weaker or not at all. Since the reform only affects 
women while they receive UB II, those women’s fertility incentives would not change 
abruptly at the time of the reform, but rather at the time they first start receiving UB II. 
This cannot be captured with my estimation approach. I choose January 2010 as the 
relevant month because it is far enough before the announcement of the reform such that 
being part of the sample or not is not affected by the reform. I show in Section 3.8 that 
the results are not affected by the point in time picked for this condition. 
The reason to impose the second restriction – only to include women who received 
UB II in December 2016 or later – is that the original data only tracks a woman’s fertility 
until she receives UB II for the last time. As the dependent variable is thus missing 
afterwards, I have no observations of these women once they leave UB II receipt. If I kept 
their previous observations I would introduce selective attrition, which is correlated to 
the reform, since the suspected reform effect is to reduce fertility and having another child 
 
38  Education is measured by two indicators: Highest secondary school degree and a variable 
which shows if a woman has a vocational degree, a tertiary degree or none. In both variables 
I consider the highest degree ever measured for a woman over the whole time I observe her. I 
do not use the vocational training/tertiary degree in the estimations, because it is probably 
endogenous to the reform. 
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is highly correlated to remaining dependent on UB II receipt. Still, imposing this 
restriction does not get rid of the problem of sample selection. I will discuss this problem 
further in the next section. As the main sample I choose women whom I can observe until 
at least December of 2016. In the robustness checks in Section 3.8 I show that the month 
I pick for this restriction does not change the results. 
The third condition to be in the main estimation sample is for a woman to already 
have at least one child. The reason for this restriction is that a first birth, other than 
subsequent births, is often the initiating reason for UB II receipt. This renders the strategy 
of conditioning on UB II receipt before a certain month infeasible for first births. 
Appendix 3.D explains the problem in further detail.  
3.6 Empirical strategy and threats to identification 
3.6.1 Empirical strategy 
The reform which made PLB deductible from UB II provides a natural quasi-experiment 
in which the reform’s fertility effect can be identified with a linear probability model. 
Because the reform was completely unanticipated before its announcement and 
implemented only 6 months later, the drop in relative household income is exceptionally 
big and directly tied to fertility, it is plausible to assume a sudden and sizeable drop in the 
sample’s birth rate. To estimate the magnitude of this drop I estimate the following model: 
𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑚𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛾3𝑚𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑚𝑖𝑡
2 ⋅ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ 𝜇𝑐𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
12
𝑐=2
+ 𝜆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                           (1)         
birth is a dummy variable indicating the birth of a child by woman i in month t. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 is a 
treatment indicator which is 0 before the reform could have had an effect on the birth rate 
- from January 2005 und December 2010 – and 1 afterwards – starting in April 2011. I 
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exclude observations from January 2011 to March 2011 in the baseline specification, as 
in these months there might be a partial effect on the birthrate, which would be caused by 
abortions. The full effect, which is also from increased use of contraceptives, should set 
in in April 2011. m is a trend variable. In the baseline specification it is included in linear 
and quadratic form, both also interacted with the post-dummy. month is set of 11 month-
of-year dummies which control for seasonality. X is a vector of control variables including 
dummies for the mother’s age in steps of four years, her nationality and the federal state 
of residence. 
The main coefficient of interest from this regression is 𝛽, the coefficient of the post-
reform dummy. It measures the extent of the reform induced structural break in the birth 
rate. If it turns out significantly negative there was a significant immediate reaction to the 
reform. It does not measure the long term reaction, though. The method of identification 
cannot tell us how the longer term fertility trend of the sample would have developed, 
had the reform not happened. There is no adequate control group to provide a 
counterfactual. 
3.6.2 Threats to identification 
The greatest threat to the identification of the true fertility effect in my analysis is sample 
selection. The reform reduced welfare payments for parents of young children. Parents 
who do not receive welfare at the time their child is below 15 month old are not affected 
by it. Therefore women and couples who plan to have a child have an incentive to 
postpone fertility until they leave welfare receipt again – not an unreasonable expectation 
in the benign labor market conditions at the time of the reform and afterwards. Such 
fertility postponement would avoid the income cut from the reform. The data I use only 
provide fertility information about a woman until the last month she receives welfare. 
Hence it is possible that my results are influenced by sample selection – women might 
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have deferred fertility as a reaction to the reform. Since not having another child can 
speed up leaving welfare it also influences the probability of leaving the sample. In the 
results section I test for the influence of sample selection by estimating the main equation 
using subsamples divided by education and number of previous children. If sample 
selection is the driver of the structural break, I should find weaker or no structural breaks 
for groups at high risk of continuous UB II receipt. 
Another threat to identification are contemporaneous reforms that might have 
influenced or caused the effect I identify. I will argue in the following, that none of the 
law changes in 2010 and 2011 are likely candidates to generate significant bias. There 
were no reforms which negatively influenced the German fertility rate at the time in 
question. Figure 3.1 compares the seasonality adjusted monthly birth rate in Germany to 
that of the main sample.39 It shows that the birth rate of the sample is continuously higher 
and without a clear upward or downward trend over time. Then there is the break around 
the time of the reform. The general German birth rate trends upward without anything 
special happening around the years 2010 or 2011. Therefore, if there was any other policy 
change which caused the effect I find, it would have to have been a change which affects 
the sample group, UB II recipients, specifically.  
There were a number of smaller changes in the UB II system other than the reform 
in question, which also became effective in 2011. Two of them could, at first glance, be 
assumed to discourage fertility, because they increase incentives for taking up 
employment and women who work might be less likely to have a child. The first change 
became effective in April 2011.  It became easier for the unemployment agency to enforce 
sanctions on UB II recipients who refuse to take on jobs, quit their current job or refuse 
 
39  The German birth rate depicted in the figure also contains first births, because I have no data 
about parity specific birth rates for Germany as a hole. 
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to participate in training programs (SGB II, §§31-31b 2011). One might suppose that the 
increased coercion to work, generated by this change, decreased fertility. This is not 
plausible, though, because pregnancy is a way out of this coercion. Pregnant women and 
recent mothers are not obligated to work. Therefore the change, if anything, encouraged 
rather than discouraged fertility. It is unlikely that this influenced fertility rates in a 
significant way, but if it did, it rather creates an upward bias to the reform effect estimate. 
This would mean the estimated reduction understates the real negative effect. 
The second change in the UB II system, which also became effective in April 2011, 
was an increase in the labor income amount that is exempted from deduction from UB II. 
Still, also after this change, only a small portion of labor income is not deducted. For 
example, the second exemplary family in Section 3.3 had labor income of 1,000€. Before 
April 2011 775€ were deducted, afterwards 720€ (cf. Table 3.2). Much larger gains from 
the change in deduction rules for labor income were hardly possible. Still, this change 
encouraged employment for UB II recipients. Yet, the changed deduction rules for labor 
income are not likely to discourage fertility, because for women who did work before 
they had a child the reform of the interplay between PLB and UB II means no financial 
loss. The slightly reduced labor income deduction rate for UB II recipients is a minor 
change in women’s opportunity costs of having children, while the reform of interest for 
this paper has a much larger impact on direct costs of children. Furthermore, the 
implementation of this shift in income deduction in April 2011 occurred too late to 
explain the drop in the fertility rate of the sample. 
3.7 Results 
This section will present the results of estimating equation 1 for the full main sample 
followed by estimates for subsamples split up by parity and by women’s level of 
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secondary education. Showing results for different subsamples reveals the degree of 
heterogeneity in the reform effect. Furthermore, it allows conclusions about how far the 
effect might be driven by selection out of the sample and how far by a real reduction in 
births, because the displayed groups differ greatly in their probability to receive UB II. If 
those groups who receive UB II most persistently react as strongly to the reform as those 
who are likely to quit UB II receipt, this suggests that the measured effect is driven by an 
actual fertility reduction rather than sample selection. 
Figure 3.2 shows a residual plot of the monthly birth rate of the full main sample. 
The residuals are taken from a regression that controls for month of year, woman’s age, 
nationality and federal state. The dependent variable is depicted as a residual plot rather 
than raw, because monthly birth rates have a lot of seasonal variation and the aging of my 
sample over time introduces a trend which obscures the reform effect if it is not controlled 
for. Furthermore, the residuals are rescaled to represent a relative deviation from the 
average birth rate in 2010, because the residuals themselves are miniscule numbers which 
are not interpretable intuitively.40 
In 2010 the 349,607 women in the sample at that time had 25,612 babies, which 
constitutes an annual birth rate of 7.6%. The dashed line shows the quadratic pre- and 
post-reform trends as calculated by equation 1. The vertical red lines mark January 2011, 
the month that the announcement of the reform can first affect the birth rate via an 
increased abortion rate and April 2011, the month increased contraceptive measures can 
take full effect. 
 
40  If, instead of the average of 2010, I took the average birth rate of the entire pre-reform 
period as a reference point this would be a misrepresentation. β identifies the 
immediate drop between December 2010 and April 2011, not the mean difference 
between 2005-2010 vs. 2011-2016. Taking only the value from December 2010 would 
be a misrepresentation as well, because it would base the scaling on the value of a 
month of year with low birth rates. 
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The graph shows that there is an immediate drop in January 2011 and a further rapid 
decline which lasts until June 2011. While there is also substantial variation from month 
to month before the reform, the drop in 2011 leads to the lowest birth rate since the 
beginning of the period of observation and remains on a lower level despite an upward 
trend. This pattern is suggestive evidence that the reform permanently lowered the main 
sample’s fertility. The residual plot already starts dropping in January 2011. This early 
drop could either be coincidental, as it lies within the usual range of variation pre-reform 
or it might be influenced by an increase in abortions starting in June 2010. I split the main 
sample by birth parity and education. Figures 3.A.1-3.A.6 in Appendix 3.A show the 
residual plots for the subsamples. They all confirm the pattern displayed in Figure 3.2. 
Table 3.5 shows the results for estimating equation 1 first for the full sample, then 
by birth parity and education. As in all estimation tables that follow, the dependent 
variable is rescaled by dividing it through the average monthly birth rate 2010. This 
simplifies the interpretation of the reform dummy coefficient as it is now directly 
interpretable as the relative percentage change of the birth rate as a reaction to the reform. 
Column 1 shows the estimate for the entire sample. It suggests a reduction in the 
birth rate by 6.76% as a reaction to the reform. Columns 2 and 3 show the results split up 
by birth parity. The sample in Column 2 contains all mothers as long as they have one 
child, the sample in Column 3 all mothers with two or more children. The birth rate for 
mothers with one previous child, thus the birth rate for second children, dropped by 4.9% 
against its 2010 level. The birth rate for third and higher order children dropped by 8.69%. 
This higher responsiveness of higher order birth fertility is in line with previous research 
(cf. Brewer et al. 2012, Laroque & Salanie 2014, Milligan 2005). This increased 
responsiveness could be due to a preference of women with one child to at least have a 
97 
 
second one (cf. Berrington 2004). The desire for further children is less determined and 
therefore more easily influenced by external determinants, such as money. 
Columns 4 to 7 show the results for women with different levels of secondary 
education. The far biggest and most statistically significant effect is that for women 
without any secondary school degree (Column 4). With a birth rate reduction of 12.99%, 
their reaction is about twice as strong as the reaction for the main sample. This result is 
the most statistically significant of all subsamples, even though it is based on the fewest 
observations and the smallest number of individuals. The point estimates for the other 
educational subgroups are all roughly in the same order of magnitude, a reduction of 6%. 
The point estimates for all parity and education groups are of non-negligible size 
and highly statistically significant. This supports the hypothesis that the reform caused a 
fertility reduction. The effect size for the overall sample is very similar to that found by 
González (2013). This seems reasonable given the similar identification strategy of that 
study and the comparable change in payments: In the German case the reduction is 
4.200€, spread over 14 months, in Spain the increase is 2.500€, immediately after birth. 
González’ paper furthermore finds a reduction in abortions by roughly 6% as a reaction 
to the reform in Spain. This finding supports the hypothesis of an increase in abortions as 
an explanation for the early start of the drop also in the German case. 
The reform effect is largest and most statistically significant for women with more 
than one previous child and with low levels of education. The women in these groups 
receive UB II most persistently. Of all women who first received UB II before January 
2010 and have no school degree, 43% still or again received UB II between December 
2016 and April 2017. For the women with a lower, middle and higher secondary school 
degree, this number is 32%, 22% and 19% respectively. Figure 3.A.7 shows how women 
with two or more children consistently have a higher rate of UB II receipt than women 
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with only one child. Figure 3.A.8 shows the same pattern for subsamples split by 
education. The lower a woman’s secondary school degree, the more persistently she 
receives UB II. This is not surprising, as women have increasingly difficult circumstances 
finding a job, the more children they have and the worse their education is. Furthermore, 
households with more children have higher UB II entitlement amounts and therefore it 
would require a larger expansion of labor supply for them to become independent of UB 
II receipt. The fact that these groups, who are less likely to leave UB II receipt, react 
strongest is evidence that the reform effect I find is mostly driven by an actual fertility 
reduction, rather than sample selection. 
3.8 Robustness 
Table 3.6 Panel A shows the results of miscellaneous robustness tests. Columns 1 to 5 
report the results for estimating equation 1 in different functional forms, including 
different polynomials of the trend variables and excluding the separate post trend 
variables. Column 6 includes the months January to March in the estimation as post 
reform observations. Column 7 shows the results for estimating equation 1 without 
control variables and column 8 includes individual fixed effects. Most of the changes 
barely have any effect on the estimated effect size or its statistical significance. The only 
exception is adding a quartic trend, which leads to an estimate of 15.8%. With four 
polynomial terms of the post and the pre trend variable, the likely explanation for this 
deviation is that this model is overfitted.   
Column 9 of Table 3.6 Panel A shows the result for the subsample of all women 
who never lived in a household that had aggregated labor income of more than 300€ a 
month. This specification tests whether the supposed reform effect can be explained by a 
mechanical drop out of UB II receipt. Possibly, working families who receive UB II 
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surpass the income barrier for leaving UB II receipt when their PLB becomes newly 
deductible. Those families would leave UB II receipt, possibly permanently, the month 
they have a child. This mechanism, if it existed, would take these families out of the 
sample. If this caused the effect the previous estimations suggest, then there would be no 
effect for women from households who never earned income, since those would definitely 
not surpass the income barrier because of the reform. As the reform dummy for this 
subsample is even more negative and graphical evidence (cf. Figure 3.A.9) supports this 
finding, this mechanical drop out of UB II cannot be the explanation for the reform effect.  
Though the graphical evidence for the singularity of a persistent drop after the 
reform rather than at any other point over the period of observation is convincing, the 
high levels of statistical significance of the coefficient for the reform dummy might be 
due to the extraordinarily large sample size. To test this, I estimate the baseline model 
with placebo reform dummies, pretending the reform happened at different points in time.  
Table 3.7 reports the results for placebo reforms at times from two years before the 
actual reform until two years after it in steps of six months. The coefficient for the actual 
reform (Column 5) has by far the largest absolute value and is most significant. Most of 
the coefficients for the placebo reforms are small in size and have very large standard 
errors. Only the coefficient for the placebo reform in July 2011 is also highly statistically 
significant and the point estimate is about half as large as that of the actual reform. This 
does not threaten the validity of the main results, though. This coefficient is statistically 
significant because it captures part of the actual reform effect. 
Table 3.8 Panel A shows the results for estimating equation 1 for samples for which 
the condition of the first month of UB II receipt varies. This approach tests the influence 
of the month I pick for this condition on the reform effect estimate. In the baseline 
specification women have to have received UB II in January 2010 or earlier to be part of 
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the sample. In Column 1 this condition is shifted to January 2005, in Column 2  to January 
2006 and so on for each year until 2010 (Column 6, baseline). The point estimate stays 
extremely stable over these shifts. The standard error declines with increased sample size. 
The increase in sample size follows from loosening the condition more and more by 
shifting the relevant month forward in time. Figure 3.A.10 in Appendix 3.A furthermore 
shows that the course of the birth rate residuals is very similar for the different samples. 
This means the results are not driven by women who entered at a particular time. 
Table 3.8 Panel B shows the results for shifting the condition of a woman’s final 
observation. This approach tests the influence of the month I pick for this condition on 
the reform effect estimate. In the baseline specification this is December 2016. Column 1 
shows the results for shifting this condition to December 2011, column 2 to December 
2012 and so on. The point estimate is negative and highly significant over all 
specifications but varies between reductions of 4.47% and 9.46% with the baseline 
estimate of 6.76% lying roughly in the middle. Figure 3.A.11 in Appendix 3.A shows 
the residual plots for the samples with the different restrictions. The course of the residual 
plot and therefore also the birth rate over time stays very similar across the different 
samples.  
Table 3.9 Panel A reports the results of a bandwidth test. Column 1 is the result for 
a bandwidth of 2 years, 1 year before and 1 year after the reform, Column 2 for a 
bandwidth of 4 years, 2 years before and 2 years after the reform and so on until the whole 
period of observation is included in Column 6.41 All estimates of the reform dummy in 
 
41  Apart from changing the bandwidth, the results reported here are estimated with a slightly 
different functional form. It excludes the quadratic pre- and post-trends, because including 
them together with the month of year fixed effects leads to multicollinearity for the bandwidths 
up to 6 years. The results for the estimation including quadratic trends are reported in Table 
3.A.2 in Appendix 3.A. 
101 
 
the bandwidth tests are statistically highly significant, negative and have a comparable 
size to the baseline. 
Table 3.9 Panel B shows the estimates if the main sample is split by age groups. 
The age groups of 18 to 21 and 22 to 25 are shown bundled, because separately they are 
too small for statistically significant estimations and the residual plots move too 
erratically. The two groups have so few observations, because the precondition to be in 
the sample is to have at least one child and this is less common among young women. 
Similarly, the age groups 38 to 41 and 42 to 45 are grouped together, because births are 
such a rare event for them that outlier months render their separated residual graphs hard 
to interpret. Again, all estimates are negative, statistically significant and in a similar 
order of magnitude. The estimates become less precise with age, though, as births become 
rarer and rarer. Graphical evidence displayed in Figures 3.A.12 to 3.A.16 in Appendix 
3.A supports the finding that the reform effect is there for all age groups. Also women 
aged 38 to 45 and therefore unable to postpone fertility, reduced it. This is evidence that 
the reform also affected completed fertility. I further investigate this in Appendix 3.E, 
which tests if the reform increased the age at which women had children or the spacing 
between children. Such an increase could be a sign that the fertility reduction is caused 
by postponement rather than permanent reduction of fertility. Appendix 3.E finds 
suggestive evidence against postponement and for reduction. 
3.9 Discussion and conclusion 
This study investigates the fertility effect of a reform of the German welfare system which 
made parental leave benefits deductible from welfare payments. The reform reduced the 
household income of affected welfare recipients by 18% on average. Using a linear 
probability model I find a fertility reduction of 6.8% for women with at least one child, 
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who were on welfare before and after the reform. The large detailed data sets about 
welfare recipients I have access to, coupled with a large cut of relative income directly 
related to marginal fertility, provide favorable conditions for an analysis of the effect of 
welfare on fertility. I obtain robust evidence from regressions as well as graphical 
evidence which confirms that welfare recipients’ fertility decisions are influenced by 
financial incentives. 
The course of the fertility reaction – a sudden drop almost at the first possible 
moment, with a slight recovery afterwards – suggests that women on welfare were 
relatively well informed about the change. Otherwise the drop would have come later and 
more gradually.  
Graphical evidence suggests that the reform influenced fertility not only in the short 
run. The birth rate remains on a decreased level for years afterwards. The consistently 
decreased sample birth rate suggests that the negative effect also influences affected 
women’s completed fertility. It is plausible to assume that the reform is part of the reason 
for the continuously lower level of fertility in the sample, but I cannot say to what degree, 
because I have no credible way of gauging the birth rate development for a scenario in 
which the reform did not take place.  
Separate analyses of birth timing and spacing show that women who did have 
children after the reform were not significantly older or had longer times between births 
because of the reform. A partition of the sample into age groups shows that the effect is 
similar for women of all ages in the fertile age range. These findings are further suggestive 
evidence for a negative effect on the completed fertility of affected women. 
The results are probably influenced by sample selection, as the reform influences 
the probability of having another child and this probability influences the probability of 
remaining in the sample. For several reasons it is plausible, though, that the bigger part 
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of the effect is driven by an actual reduction in fertility. First, the women with more than 
two previous children and women without a secondary school degree react most strongly 
to the reform. They are also the women who are most persistently receiving welfare and 
who have the hardest time leaving it. Second, the sample selection relevant in this case 
would be driven by women who leave welfare receipt permanently. For people at high 
risk of welfare receipt it is very hard to stay off welfare once they have an additional 
child. 
Generally, this analysis supports those previous contributions to the literature on 
the nexus of welfare and fertility which find a positive effect (e.g. Brewer et al. 2012, 
Turturro et al. 1997, Camasso et al. 1999). This study might also contribute to explaining 
the inconclusiveness of other studies on the topic. While my findings are statistically very 
significant because of the extraordinary sample size of directly affected women, the effect 
size is small compared to those found by studies about general populations – 6.8% fewer 
births as a reaction to household income cut of 18%, which is an income elasticity of 0.38. 
For example, Milligan (2005) estimates a 16.9% fertility increase as response to a 4.3% 
income increase (elasticity of 3.93), Gonzáles (2013) finds a 6% fertility increase as a 
response to a 8.3% income increase (elasticity of 0.72) and Cohen et al. (2013) estimate 
a 9.6% fertility decrease from a 3.3% income decrease (elasticity of 2.91). Thus, while 
there is a fertility response among welfare recipients, it seems to be weaker compared to 
general populations. The smaller an effect, the more statistical power is needed to detect 
it. Accordingly, the scarcity of large data sets focused on welfare recipients might be the 
explanation for the inconclusiveness of former studies. 
My findings provide evidence that welfare recipients react less strongly to financial 
fertility incentives than general populations. This result does not imply a clear policy 
recommendation, because it does not provide a full cost-benefit analysis of the reform in 
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question. Also, it was not mentioned in any official documents or statements that reducing 
welfare recipients’ fertility was an objective of this German reform. Still, the evidence 
from this study has merit for policy makers, because it speaks against the widely held 
assumption that welfare recipients would be excessively motivated by financial concerns 
in their fertility patterns. The opposite seems to be the case. This does not determine what 
the optimal level of child related welfare benefits would be. It does tell us that the concern 
of an excessive fertility reaction should not factor into the deliberations of setting such 
benefit levels. 
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Figures and tables 
Figure 3.1 Comparison of birth rates: Sample vs. German 
 
Notes: Please note that the monthly birth rate of the sample is age adjusted. Since the 
sample ages over time as a consequence of the sample restriction, the unadjusted birth 
rate has a strong negative trend at all times before and after the reform. The German 
birth rate shown here is not age adjusted, because we do not have adequate data for the 
age adjustment. Overall, the average age of the women comprising the German 18-45 
year olds is increasing with time. Thus, an age adjustment would lead to a steeper 
increase of the birth rate over time. Both, the sample and the German birth rate are 
seasonally adjusted.  
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data and federal statistical office 
of Germany.  
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Figure 3.2 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
 
Notes: The residuals are taken from a linear probability model in which the birth 
dummy variable is regressed on age, federal state, month of year and world region 
of origin. The sample is the main estimation sample, meaning women who have at 
least one child and received UB II before Jan. 2010 and after Dec. 2016. The blue 
line shows the mean of residuals of each month. These means are rescaled to 
represent how far they deviate from the birth rate of 2010, which was 7.6% yearly, 
0.63% in monthly terms. The red vertical line marks Jan. 2011, the month the first 
reaction to the reform announcement could show in the birth rate. The black dashed 
line shows the quadratic trend prediction as calculated by equation 1. 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of LHG and IEB data. 
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Table 3.1  Comparison of studies - General populations vs. welfare recipients 
 
Notes: This table gives a very stylized overview. The conditions of the analyzed reforms varied 
between the studies. Many relevant studies are not included, because their findings cannot be 
condensed into the framework of this table e.g. because the studies do not state the income of the 
sample or the findings are too diverse to be displayed in this format. The studies are representative 
in the respect that studies about general populations find higher income elasticities of fertility than 
those about welfare recipients. 
Source: Own calculations based on the respective studies. 
 
  
Author/Year Method Region
Income
Change
Fertility
Reaction
Elasticity
Welfare Recipients
Moffit (1998) Literature review US Varies Varies Varies
Kearny (2004) DiD US ~(-7.9%) - -
Wallace (2009) DiD US ~(-7.9%) - -
Brewer et al. (2012) DiD UK 12.0% 15.0% 1.3
General Populations
Milligan (2005) DiD Quebec 4.3% 16.9% 3.9
González (2013) Pre-post analysis Spain 8.3% 6.0% 0.7
Cohen et al. (2013) IV Israel -3.3% -9.6% 2.9
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Table 3.2 Calculation of UB II payments 
 
Source: Own calculations based on SGB II (2003) and BMAS (2018). 
  
Dec. 2010 Apr. 2011 Dec. 2010 Apr. 2011
Standard rate
Father - - 323 €    328 €    
Mother 359 €    364 €    323 €    328 €    
Child 1: Age 3 months 215 €    215 €    215 €    215 €    
Child 2: Age 2 years 215 €    215 €    215 €    215 €    
Child 3: Age 4 years - - 251 €    251 €    
Cost of Accomodation 400 €    400 €    600 €    600 €    
Additional needs 129 €    131 €      - -
UB II entitlement 1,318 € 1,325 € 1,927 € 1,937 € 
Other income sources
Child benefits 368 €    368 €    558 €    558 €    
Parental leave benefits 300 €    300 €    300 €    300 €    
Labor income - - 1,000 € 1,000 € 
Sum of other income sources 668 €    668 €    1,858 € 1,858 € 
Deductions from UB II
Child benefits 368 €    368 €    558 €    558 €    
Parental leave benefits - 300 €    - 300 €    
Part of labor income - - 775 €    720 €    
Total deductions 368 €    668 €    1,333 € 1,578 € 
UB II paid out 950 €    657 €    594 €    359 €    
Sum of UB II and other income 1,618 € 1,325 € 2,452 € 2,217 € 
Family 1 Family 2
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Table 3.3 Descriptives: Women’s characteristics 
  
Notes: The numbers refer to the main estimation sample of women who have at least one previous 
child and received UB II in Jan. 2010 or earlier and in Dec. 2016 or later. The categories secondary 
school degree and apprenticeship/tertiary degree refer to the highest degree I find in the data for 
each woman. 
Source: Own calculations based on LHG data. 
  
N % N %
Secondary school degree Nationality grouped by cultural-geographic region
No degree 38,733    8.36 Germany 343,933  74.24
Lower secondary 211,315  45.61 Turkey 38,650    8.34
Middle secondary 147,559  31.85 East and southeast Europe 34,251    7.39
Higher secondary 60,102    12.97 North and west Europe 10,205    2.20
Missing 5,554      1.20 Arabic countries 13,743    2.97
Total 463,263  100 Total 463,263  100
Marital status at last observation Federal state of residence
Unmarried 147,831  31.91 Schleswig-Holstein 17,220    3.72
Married, together 149,901  32.36 Hamburg 13,485    2.91
Married, seperated 37,727    8.14 Lower Saxony 45,644    9.85
Divorced 61,445    13.26 Bremen 6,977      1.51
Widowed 3,371      0.73 North Rhine-Westphalia 124,961  26.97
Missing 62,988    13.60 Hesse 30,686    6.62
Total 463,263  100
Total 463,263  100
Missing -         0.00
Cohort
1989-1993 40,579    8.76
1994-1998 9,906      2.14
1989-1993 40,579    8.76
1984-1988 73,473    15.86
1974-1978 75,870    16.38
1979-1983 84,013    18.14
1959-1963 45,035    9.72
1964-1968 63,595    13.73
22,288    4.81
13,949    3.01
55           0.01
19,690    4.25
14,826    3.20
29,040    6.27
29,239    6.31
5,852      1.26
42,006    9.07
30,663    
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
Saxony
Saxony-Anhalt
Thuringia
Missing
Berlin
Apprenticeship/Tertiary degree
Rhineland-Palatinate 16,682    
Total 463,263  100
Apprenticeship
0.00Missing
221         
7,210      
7,705      
69           
-         
US,CAN,AUS,NZL
Central asia, Caucasus
Rest of Asia and Oceania
Unknown
0.05
1.56
1.66
0.01
2,341      0.51Missing
294,319  63.53
160,831  34.72
5,772      1.25
No degree
University degree
3.60
Baden-Württemberg 6.62
1969-1973 70,792    15.28
Total 463,263  100
Latin America and Carribean 1,693      0.37
Bavaria
Saarland
Brandenburg
Non-arabic Africa 5,583      1.21
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Table 3.4 Descriptives: Number of children/Number of births 
 
Notes: The numbers refer to the main estimation sample of women who have at least 
one previous child and received UB II in Jan. 2010 or earlier and in Dec. 2016 or 
later. The Number of children is taken from each woman’s last observation.  
Source: Own calculations based on LHG data.
Number of children N %   Birth parity N %
1 170,158 36.73 Second 144,775 50.78
2 152,168 32.85 Third 80,692 28.31
3 82,877 17.89 Fourth 34,904 12.24
4 35,168 7.59 Fifth 14,209 4.98
5 or more 22,892 4.94 Sixth or higher 10,499 3.68
Total 463,263 100 Total 285,079 100
Average 2.15 -
Maximum 16 -
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Table 3.5 Main estimation results 
 
Notes: Robust SE, clustered by woman, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable 
in all models is birth in t. The two bottom rows list each subsample’s yearly birth rate in 2010, the year before the 
reform, and April 2011 to March 2012, the year after the reform developed its full effect on the birth rate. The 
coefficients of the control variables are not displayed. They are sets of dummies for mother’s age in steps of 4 
years, federal state, month of year, world region of origin and linear and quadratic post- and pre trends. All 
coefficients are rescaled to represent a relative percentage change in comparison to the average yearly birth rate 
2010.  
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data. 
  
Full sample
Second 
children
Third and 
higher 
parities
No sec.
school
degree
Lower sec.
school
degree
Middle sec.
school
degree 
Higher sec.
school
degree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Reform dummy -6.762*** -4.909*** -8.689*** -12.986*** -5.231*** -6.580*** -5.977*
(1.121) (1.654) (1.611) (3.012) (1.657) (2.183) (3.461)
Observations 45,966,533 18,939,651 27,026,882 4,061,654 21,154,196 14,462,735 5,700,001
Units of obs. 463,263 314,250 293,105 38,733 211,315 147,559 60,102
Birth rate 2010 7.60% 9.35% 6.32% 11.15% 7.63% 6.52% 6.55%
Birth rate 2011/12 6.96% 8.76% 5.75% 9.54% 7.17% 5.97% 6.10%
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Table 3.6  Robustness checks – Functional form test and miscellaneous 
 
Notes: Robust SE, clustered by woman, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable in all models is birth in t. The estimation 
sample in all columns but Column 9, is the full main sample of women with at least one child and on UB II before Jan. 2010 and after Dec. 2016. The 
coefficients of the control variables are not displayed. They are sets of dummies for mother’s age in steps of 4 years, federal state, month of year, world 
region of origin and linear and quadratic post- and pre trends (except if otherwise indicated – Column 7). All coefficients are rescaled to represent a 
relative percentage change in comparison to the average yearly birth rate 2010.  
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data. 
  
Linear trend
Quadratic 
trend
Cubic trend
Quartic 
trend
No trend 
interactions
Include Jan.-
Mar. 2011
No controls Women F.E.
Exclude if inc.
ever >300€
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Reform dummy -6.500*** -6.762*** -6.333*** -15.803*** -6.582*** -5.745*** -7.022*** -6.148*** -10.672***
(0.684) (1.121) (1.685) (2.375) (0.683) (1.026) (1.118) (1.127) (2.095)
N 45,966,533 45,966,533 45,966,533 45,966,533 45,966,533 46,982,505 45,966,533 45,966,533 12,760,844
Units of obs. 463,263 463,263 463,263 463,263 463,263 463,263 463,263 463,263 160,049
Linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadradic trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cubic trend No No Yes Yes No No No No No
Quartic trend No No No Yes No No No No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Trend tnteractions Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Women F.E. No No No No No No No Yes No
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Table 3.7  Robustness checks – Placebo test 
 
Notes: Robust SE, clustered by woman, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable and control variables are identical to the 
baseline model (cf. Table 3.5). Small deviations in the number of observations come from the shifting of the placebo reforms. In the original model 
observations from Jan.-Mar. 2011 are dropped. Therefore, for all placebo reforms, I also drop the three following months. The scaling in each month is 
column is analogous to the baseline specification, except that for scaling by the birth rate of 2010, I scale be the birth rate in the year before each respective 
placebo reform. 
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data. 
 
  
Reform 
Jan. 2009
Reform 
Jul. 2009
Reform 
Jan. 2010
Reform 
Jul. 2010
Reform 
Jan. 2011
Reform 
Jul. 2011
Reform 
Jan. 2012
Reform 
Jul. 2012
Reform 
Jan. 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Reform dummy -2.349* 0.065 0.836 -1.541 -6.762*** -3.052*** 0.716 0.267 1.377
(1.275) (1.221) (1.187) (1.152) (1.121) (1.133) (1.192) (1.225) (1.253)
N 45,995,860 45,985,413 45,975,326 45,969,931 45,966,533 45,965,664 45,964,931 45,965,711 45,965,461
Units of obs. 463,263 463,263 463,263 463,263 463,263 463,263 463,263 463,263 463,263
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Table 3.8 Robustness checks – Shifting the conditions of first and last UB II receipt 
 
Notes: Robust SE, clustered by woman, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable 
and control variables are identical to the baseline model (cf. Table 3.5). All coefficients are rescaled to 
represent a relative percentage change in comparison to the yearly birth rate 2010. This birth rate is 
determined for each sample separately, e.g. the yearly birth rate for women who received UB II for the first 
time in Jan. 2009 or earlier is 7.5% where it is 7.6% for the baseline sample.  
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data. 
  
Panel A - Shift condition of first UB II receipt
first obs. 
2005
first obs. 
2006
first obs. 
2007
first obs. 
2008
first obs. 
2009
first obs. 
2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform dummy -6.405*** -6.554*** -6.256*** -7.012*** -6.728*** -6.762***
(1.825) (1.359) (1.258) (1.194) (1.153) (1.121)
N 21,027,040 33,867,457 38,490,311 41,458,319 43,818,061 45,966,533
Units of obs. 209,312 333,688 381,019 412,472 438,373 463,263
last obs. 
2011
last obs. 
2012
last obs. 
2013
last obs. 
2014
last obs. 
2015
last obs. 
2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform dummy -9.460*** -7.119*** -5.851*** -4.469*** -5.095*** -6.762***
(2.001) (1.246) (1.062) (1.023) (1.101) (1.121)
N 61,821,724 63,911,560 66,515,950 62,055,687 49,887,519 45,966,533
Units of obs. 976,619 899,329 847,396 723,958 538,411 463,263
Panel B - Shift condition of last UB II receipt
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Table 3.9 Robustness checks – Bandwidth sensitivity and age groups 
 
Notes: Robust SE, clustered by woman, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent 
variable, control variables and scaling are identical to the baseline model (cf. Table 3.5). The two bottom 
lines of Panel B list each of that Panel’s subsamples yearly birth rate in 2010, the year before the reform, and 
April 2011 to March 2012, the year after the reform developed its full effect on the birth rate. 
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data. 
2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years 12 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform dummy -9.375*** -8.885*** -5.557*** -6.000*** -6.710*** -6.500***
(3.465) (1.462) (1.067) (0.009) (0.764) (0.684)
N 7,096,820 15,143,717 23,083,735 30,881,198 38,517,530 45,966,533
Units of obs. 362,900 386,405 407,817 428,314 446,985 463,263
Age 18-25 Age 26-29 Age 30-33 Age 34-37 Age 38-45 -
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reform dummy -6.963*** -8.737*** -5.594** -5.142* -7.453* -
(2.104) (2.165) (2.451) (3.031) (4.015)
N 7,094,110 7,608,332 8,307,799 8,197,989 14,758,303 -
Units of obs. 171,399 221,152 238,550 236,191 255,292 -
Birth rate 2010 13.21% 12.12% 9.09% 6.31% 1.95% -
Birth rate 2011/12 12.36% 11.13% 8.52% 5.93% 1.77% -
Panel A - Bandwidth sensitivity
Panel B - Age groups
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Appendix 3.A 
Figure 3.A.1 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
      Sample: Women with one previous child 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.2. The only difference between this graph and the one in Figure 3.2 
is that this graph relates to the subsample of women who have one child (excluding 
those who already have more than one) and the residuals are rescaled to display the 
difference to the birth rate 2010 of this subsample. In the following graphs of residuals, 
I will refer to these notes. For them these alterations apply for using the respective 
subsample from the title of the respective figure. 
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data. 
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Figure 3.A.2 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
      Sample: Women with two or more previous children 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
 
Figure 3.A.3 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
      Sample: Women with no secondary school degree 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
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Figure 3.A.4 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
      Sample: Women with a lower secondary school degree 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
 
Figure 3.A.5 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
      Sample: Women with a middle secondary school degree 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
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Figure 3.A.6 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
      Sample: Women with a higher secondary school degree 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
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Figure 3.A.7 Rate of UB II receipt by number of children 
 
Notes: The sample for this figure is the main sample, with the lifted restriction of 
having to receive UB II in/after December 2016. The restriction is lifted, because the 
figure serves to make a point against sample selection. If sample selection were an 
important issue, it would be introduced by the now excluded restriction. My 
reasoning would be circular if I did not lift this restriction. (Side note: The upward 
jump of UB II rates in January 2006 is caused by under-reporting of UB II when it 
was first introduced in 2005.) 
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data.  
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Figure 3.A.8 Rate of UB II receipt by secondary school degree 
Notes: See notes Figure 3.A.7. Source: Own calculations based on LHG and 
IEB data. 
 
Figure 3.A.9 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
      Sample: Women whose HH-income was permanently less 
      than 300€ 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1.  
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Figure 3.A.10 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women on UB II after Dec. 2016 and in or before Jan. 2005,  
  Jan. 2006, Jan. 2007… 
 
Notes: The panels of this figure show the residual plot from Figure 3.2 for six different 
samples. The difference between these samples is that the condition of having received UB 
II for the first time in Jan. 2010 or earlier is shifted. In the top left Panel, this condition is 
altered from Jan. 2010 to Jan. 2005. In the top right panel it is Jan. 2006 and so on. The 
bottom right panel is the residual plot for the base line sample. 
Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
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Figure 3.A.11 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women on UB II before Jan. 2010 and in or after  
  Dec. 2011, Dec. 2012, Dec. 2013… 
 
Notes: The panels of this figure show the residual plot from Figure 3.2 for six different 
samples. The difference between these samples is that the condition of having received 
UB II for the last time in Dec. 2016 or earlier is shifted. In the top left Panel, this condition 
is altered from Dec. 2016 to Dec. 2011. In the top right panel it is Dec. 2012 and so on. 
The residual plots all end in the month after which all women of that sample received UB 
II, because underlying regressions exclude all observations after the respective months, 
since those are months for which the data only provide fertility information for part of the 
respective sample which receives UB II at some later point in time. The bottom right 
panel is the residual plot for the base line sample.  
Source: See Figure 3.A.1.  
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Figure 3.A.12 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
 Sample: Women aged 18-25 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
 
Figure 3.A.13 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women aged 26-29 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1.  
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Figure 3.A.14 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women aged 30-33 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
 
Figure 3.A.15 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women aged 34-37 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1.  
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Figure 3.A.16 Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women aged 38-45 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1.  
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Table 3.A.1  Standard rate by 
household position and 
year 
 
Source: SGB II §20 (2010), RBEG §8 (2011)
Household position 2010 2011
Single adult 359 € 364 €
Adult in a couple 323 € 328 €
Additional adult 287 € 291 €
Adolescent (15-17) 287 € 287 €
Child (6-14) 251 € 251 €
Child (0-5) 215 € 215 €
Monthly standard rate
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Table 3.A.2 Bandwidth tests including quadratic trend variables 
 
Notes: See Table 3.4, Panel C. This table shows the same bandwidth test, with the alteration 
that the estimation includes quadratic pre- and post trend variables. 
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data.
2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years 12 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform dummy -8.328 -13.375*** -11.369*** -6.424*** -5.341*** -6.762***
(621.122) (2.588) (1.834) (1.478) (1.267) (1.121)
N 7,096,820 15,143,717 23,083,735 30,881,198 38,517,530 45,966,533
Units of obs. 362,900 386,405 407,817 428,314 446,985 463,263
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Appendix 3.B 
The idea of the Quantity-Quality-Trade-Off developed by Becker and Lewis (1973) is 
that the price of quantity and quality of children are dependent of each other. For the sake 
of a clear argument they simplify child quality to the amount of money spent on a child. 
Quantity is the number of children. If the parents’ income rises or the price of a child 
falls, e.g. because part of the costs are taken over by the government, this influences the 
demand for quality as well as that for quantity. At first glance one would expect the 
theoretical prediction to be that both demands increase. Becker and Lewis argue, though, 
that this does not necessarily follow. The reason is that the price of quality depends on 
the number children and the price of quantity depends on the desired quality. If a family 
has five children it is more expensive to increase their quality than if the family has only 
two children. If parents want college education for their children it is more expensive for 
them to have another child than if they only aspire high school diplomas for them. 
Therefore, if parents’ income increases or the price of children falls it depends on relative 
size of the price and income elasticities of demand for quantity and quality which demand 
increases and which falls. An example could be parents who have an exogenous positive 
income shock. Now they aspire college education for their children, where before they 
thought they could only afford to support them through high school. They might give up 
on their demand for another child, because the costs for this child might eat up what they 
need to send the other children to college. The same exogenous shock could also lead to 
the conclusion that they can support another child if they cut back on spending for the 
existing children. Which of the two scenarios materializes depends on parents’ income 
elasticities of the quality and quantity of children. 
In the case at hand the affected population is at the lowest possible income level. 
The welfare benefits they receive are calculated in a way to just fulfill the basic needs of 
those families. The PLB was the only additional payment. It does not seem plausible that 
anybody would be motivated to have more children because this additional payment is 
taken away. The considerations these parents face are not if they should send their 
children to college or not or if they can afford music lessons for each child, but rather 
they struggle to keep them fed and clothed properly. If the QQTO were to motivate 
anybody to have additional children, those people’s consideration would go: “Before the 
reform we could afford some additional movie theatre visits with our children or eating 
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out a few times. Now, we cannot afford this for any additional new child and so we should 
have another one, because we will be able to afford less for the new child and this reduces 
my desire to give the other children a treat every once in a while.” I do not expect a 
significant amount of people, if any, to engage in such family planning. 
Appendix 3.C 
As explained in section 3, there was an exemption from the deduction of PLB from UB 
II in the new law. The portion of PLB that women are entitled to because of labor income 
before birth is not deducted from UB II. If a parent worked before birth, average earnings 
in the year before birth up until 300€ are not deducted from UB II (BEEG §10, 2010). 
This suggests the assumption that women who planned to have a child or are pregnant 
already might have reacted to the announcement of the reform in June 2010 by starting 
to work, because this would neutralize the negative effect of the reform for them. In 2010, 
15% of labor income under 400€ was not deductible from UB II (SGB II §30, 2003). This 
means a women who had labor income of 300€ a month effectively kept 45€ of these 
earnings. If the women would be PLB eligible in 2011, additionally, she would get to 
keep 300€ a month in PLB once the child is born. This means, where before she had a 
payoff of 15% per Euro earned, she now had a payoff of 115%. 
Thus, for those who continued receiving UB II, the reform would have provided an 
incentive to increase their labor supply up until they earn 300€ a month on average in the 
12 months before birth. So the second hypothesis I test is: 
The reform should increase pre-birth earnings of women who continued receiving 
unemployment benefits II. 
The analysis of this hypothesis has a sample selection problem, though. For this analysis 
I have to compare the average earnings in the 12 months before birth for the women who 
had a child with the average earnings in the last 12 months for women who did not have 
a child. A relative increase in earnings for the first group could be explained by an 
increase in labor supply of women planning to have another child or by a change in the 
composition of the groups, because women who did not work selected themselves out of 
the group of women who had a child.  
Figure 3.C.1 shows the female labor force participation of the main sample, divided 
into two groups: Women who will give birth within the following 12 months and all other 
women. Generally, women in the year before birth have a roughly 10 percentage point 
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lower labor force participation than the rest. The two lines are set to the same level to 
make them more easily comparable. The vertical red line marks July 2010, the month 
right after the reform that made PLB deductible from UB II was announced. Overall the 
two lines develop somewhat parallel, which would suggests implementing a difference in 
difference analysis to see if there was a reform effect on pregnant women’s labor force 
participation. 
Figure 3.C.1Female labor force participation by time until next birth 
  
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data. 
There is a fundamental problem with this approach, though. The two lines already diverge 
starting 2007. They converge right after the reform, but then overtake each other several 
times. This renders the two groups unfit to be indicators for the counterfactual 
development of one another. There is a slight relative increase in pregnant women’s labor 
force participation right after the reform announcement, but it is not strong and not 
exceptional enough to be counted as robust evidence for the hypothesis. There could be 
several reasons why this is the case. Either women did not know about this opportunity, 
they were unable to expand their labor supply relative to the comparison group or they 
were unwilling. Unfortunately, there is no way to gauge from the data or the 
circumstances which of these reasons applies to what degree. 
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Since there is a sample selection problem and neither a difference in difference 
approach nor an RDD approach promise interesting insights, I do not investigate this 
hypothesis further here and leave it to future research. 
Appendix 3.D 
I separate the analysis of first birth fertility from the rest of the investigation, because it 
requires a different approach than that of higher order fertility in the case at hand. It 
differs, because the course of aggregate first birth fertility changes when I change the 
relevant point in time for the first sample restriction (i.e. when a woman has to have 
received UB II for the first time to be part of the sample). Figures 3.D.1-6 (starting on 
the next page) show residual plots of first birth fertility for which I successively move 
this restriction towards the reform date. In Figure 3.D.1 the sample consists of women 
who received UBII in January 2005 and in December 2016 or later. In Figure 3.D.2 the 
left side restriction is shifted to having received UB II in January 2006 or earlier and so 
on until it is at 2010 in Figure 3.D.6. The left red line marks the time of the restriction in 
each figure. 
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Figure 3.D.1 First Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women on UB II in Jan. 2005 and after or in 
  Dec. 2016 
  
Notes: cf. Figure 3.2. There are two differences between this graph and the one 
in Figure 3.2. First, this graph relates to the sample of women without children 
(these women are not part of the samples in the main analysis). Second, the 
restriction of when a women first has to have received UB II is set to January 
2005 in this sample. The residuals are rescaled to display the difference to the 
birth rate 2010 of this sample (women without children and received UB II 2005 
or earlier). In the following graphs of residuals, I will refer to these notes. For 
them these alterations apply for using the respective subsample from the title of 
the respective figure. 
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data. 
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Figure 3.D.2 First Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women on UB II before or in Jan. 2006 and after  
  or in Dec. 2016 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
 
Figure 3.D.3 First Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women on UB II before or in Jan. 2007 and after 
  or in Dec. 2016 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
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Figure 3.D.4 First Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women on UB II before or in Jan. 2008 and after 
  or in Dec. 2016 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
 
Figure 3.D.5 First Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women on UB II before or in Jan. 2009 and after 
  or in Dec. 2016 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
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Figure 3.D.6 First Birth rate residuals relative to birth rate 2010 
  Sample: Women on UB II before or in Jan. 2010 and after 
  or in Dec. 2016 
 
Notes: cf. Figure 3.A.1. Source: See Figure 3.A.1. 
The figures show that the course of the residual plot is highly dependent on the time to 
which this left side restriction is set. Fertility always peaks shortly before the time of the 
restriction and declines sharply afterwards. The reason for this pattern is that having a 
first child is often what leads to UB II receipt. Women who have to care for an infant 
cannot work and the presence of the child increases the benefit entitlement amount. This 
pattern makes the baseline specification from the main analysis unfit for the analysis of 
first birth fertility for several reasons. 
The point estimate of the reform dummy is the difference between the end of the 
pre-reform trend line and the beginning of the post-reform line. Figure 3.D.6 illustrates 
how the fertility drop is incorrectly captured by the quadratic trend in this case. The 
estimate is really driven by the timing of the restriction. The drop already starts in early 
2010. For estimations of the samples displayed in Figures 3.D.3-4 the estimate of the 
reform effect would even be positive. Therefore, at least the functional form and probably 
the bandwidth would have to be adjusted. It would not be clear though, which left side 
restriction would define the most relevant sample. If the restriction is set to January 2010 
or even 2011 the estimated reform effect would be confounded with the effect from the 
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drop that always follows after the point in time to which the restriction is set. A possible 
solution could be, to set the restriction relatively early in the period of observation. Still, 
any evidence for the reform effect on first births derived from this would not be very 
robust. Therefore I leave the investigation of the reform effect on first birth fertility to 
future research. 
Appendix 3.E 
In this appendix I check if the time between births or the age at which mothers give birth 
increased. If this were the case, the identified permanent fertility decrease could be the 
result of a postponement of births rather than a reduction of the final number of children.  
To gauge if this is the case, I graph women’s average age at birth and the average 
time between births over time. The blue line in Figure 3.E.1 shows the mean age of 
women in the month they give birth over time. The vertical red line marks the time the 
reform sets in. The dashed black line plots the mean age of all women in the sample, 
regardless of giving birth. The sample for both lines is the full main sample. The graph 
shows that the age of women at birth increases at the same rate as the age of the overall 
sample. This is evidence against postponement of births being the explanation for the 
decreased fertility. 
Figure 3.E.1 Mean age at birth vs. mean age sample 
 
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data.  
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Still, it seems curious that mean age increases with a stronger positive trend after the 
reform. The reason for the trend increase lies with the restriction of having received UB 
II for the first time before 2010. This fixes a number of women who can become part of 
the sample that is displayed by each point in the line. Before the restriction sets in, any 
young women who receives UB II and has a child joins the pool. After the restriction sets 
in, the pool of this sample just draws from the same women determined at some point in 
time in the past. There are relatively few women under e.g. 20 who have their first child 
in January 2013 and fulfill the condition of having been on UB II already before 2010. 
So, many of them do not refresh the pool. This leads to the steeper increase in mean age 
after the time of the restriction, in this case 2010. Figure 3.E.2 shows that this trend 
increase sets in earlier, if the restriction is set to an earlier point in time. 
Figure 3.E.2 Mean age at childbirth with different time restrictions 
 
Notes: The six panels of the figure show the mean age at childbirth over time for women 
fulfilling different time restrictions. The top left panel contains only women who received 
UB II as early as January 2005 and still or again in or after December 2016. The top right 
panel shifts the first restriction to January 2006 and so on. All panels contain two vertical 
red lines. The left one marks 12 months after the “first UB II receipt” restriction sets in. 
The right one marks January 2011, the month the reform sets in. In the bottom right panel 
these two lines overlay each other. 
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data. 
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Figure 3.E.2 graphs the average age for six different subsamples over time. The top left 
panel shows the mean age for women in the month of childbirth who received UB II 
already in January 2005 and are still or again receiving it after December 2016. In the 
next panel the first restriction is shifted to January 2006 and so on. All panels contain two 
vertical red lines. The right one marks January 2011, the left one marking one year after 
the restriction sets in. This means, for the sample of women who received UB II already 
in January 2005, this first line marks January 2006. The trend in mean age always changes 
somewhere around the first red line and, except for the main sample, where the two red 
lines coincide, there is nothing noteworthy happening at the line marking January 2011.  
Figure 3.E.3 is generated analogous to Figure 3.E.2, just with “months since last 
birth” as the dependent variable. This variable displays the same general pattern of a trend 
increase roughly a year after the left time restriction sets in. The positive trend with an 
increase at the left time restriction can be explained by the positive correlation between a 
women’s age and her birth spacing. Figure 3.E.4 shows the mean birth spacing by age at 
childbirth and is evidence for this positive correlation. 
Figure 3.E.3 Mean time since last birth with different time restrictions 
 
Notes: See Figure 3.E.2. This figure was generated analogously, just with “mean months 
since previous birth” as the dependent variable instead of mean age. 
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data. 
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Figure 3.E.4 Months since last birth by age 
 
Source: Own calculations based on LHG and IEB data.
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4 An Analysis of overconfident Students’ Reaction to 
Feedback 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Research has shown that students are overconfident. On average, they expect better 
grades than they turn out to achieve and their overconfidence is persistent. They do not 
learn from the experience of exams turning out worse than they expected. In this article, 
I develop a model of how students choose the effort they spend to prepare for a specific 
exam and how feedback from a pretest influences their decision if they are overconfident. 
I expect that students whose effort decision is influenced by the desire not to fail, rather 
than by the desire to maximize their grade, will invest less effort to prepare for the final 
exam if they pass a pretest than if they fail it. I test this expectation using data from a 
German university at which students wrote a pretest. I employ a regression discontinuity 
design to analyze if students who barely passed the pretest performed significantly worse 
in the final exam than those who barely failed the pretest. I find no effect for most 
students. I find a large, statistically significant effect corresponding to a decrease in exam 
points of 27% relative to the average final exam score for a subgroup of students who are 
least likely to care about the grade in the final exam. 
 
 
JEL classification: I21, I23, C51 
 
Keywords: student effort, overconfidence, feedback, regression discontinuity design 
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4.1 Introduction 
The literature on the psychology of education and the economics of education has 
established the fact that students tend to have overconfident grade expectations (e.g. 
Murstein 1965, Grimes 2002, Andrews et al. 2007, Nowell & Alston 2007, Foster et al. 
2017, Magnus & Peresetsky 2018). The literature defines student overconfidence as the 
phenomenon that, when asked before exams, students on average report higher expected 
exam grades than the grades they turn out to achieve. Despite the academic attention on 
the phenomenon, there is no literature that explores the interplay of feedback and 
overconfidence. This study is the first to investigate this by analyzing if overconfident 
interpretation of feedback from a pretest to an exam influenced students’ effort level in 
the preparation for the final exam. 
Overconfidence can cause students to study less than they would have, had their 
expectations been accurate (e.g. Dunlosky & Rawson 2012, Kornell & Bjork 2008, 
Kornell & Metcalfe 2006). This situation can lead to dissatisfaction from disappointed 
expectations for the students or even to failed exams. Failed exams have multiple negative 
consequences. They cause additional work for the student and the university staff. More 
seriously, they endanger the student’s overall study success, leading up to college dropout 
by discouraging her (Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner 2012). Gaining insights into the 
mechanisms behind overconfidence can help develop countermeasures to prevent such 
negative consequences. 
I develop a model that explores the interplay of factors that determine how much 
time a student chooses to devote for exam preparation. The factors I focus on are the 
student’s assumptions about the return to study effort in terms of exam points, her 
preference for a good grade relative to the time she has to give up to achieve a good grade 
and the disutility she assigns to the possibility of failing the exam. In the model, different 
143 
 
combinations of relative preference for good grades and the importance of trying to avoid 
exam failure lead to three types of students: Grade maximizers, for whom it is most 
important to achieve a good grade, risk avoiders, for whom avoiding exam failure 
influences their effort decision and quitters, who decide the time they would have to 
invest to avoid failing the exam is better spend doing something else. Next, I explore how 
the different types of students react to feedback if they are overconfident. 
I apply this model to analyze a quasi-experiment in which students at a German 
university write mock exams in the middle of the semester. What I call mock exams, are 
test runs of the final exam that simulate real exam conditions, but do not count for the 
final grade. My main hypothesis is that passing the mock exam leads overconfident risk 
avoiders to invest less effort into final exam preparation than they would, if their 
expectations were accurate. I base this hypothesis on evidence from the literature on the 
psychology and economics of education, which shows that if a student is overconfident, 
she mostly is persistently overconfident (e.g. Foster et al. 2017, Murstein 1965, Serra & 
DeMarree 2016).  
The overconfident student interprets the feedback from a pretest as an outcome at 
the lower end of possible outcomes given her effort level and expects to perform better 
on average. A student who barely passed a pretest is therefore confident to also pass the 
final exam if she keeps her effort level constant. For a student who failed a pretest it is 
harder to ignore the possibility that her effort level was insufficient to pass the exam with 
some degree of certainty. She is subsequently less overconfident and will increase her 
effort level with respect to final exam preparation. 
I use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to test my hypothesis empirically. I 
test if the students who barely passed the mock exam performed worse in the final exam 
than those who barely failed it. A difference in exam performance would be caused by a 
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difference in preparation effort. I find no structural break in final exam performance for 
most groups of students. I do find a statistically significant and large effect for a specific 
group of students - the academically weak among the business engineering (BE) students. 
The effect corresponds to a decline in grades of 0.7 on a grading scale from 1 (perfect 
score) to 5 (failing grade) and a reduction of exam points by 27%, relative to the average 
exam score in the final exam. The probability to fail the final exam increases by 7.7 
percentage points42.  
It is plausible that I find evidence for an effect especially for this group of students. 
For the BE students the grade in “Introductory Economics” is relatively unimportant. I 
find the effect for the academically weak performing BE students. Both these factors 
increase the probability to be a risk avoider – the type of student I expect to find an effect 
for. The other groups are more likely to be grade maximizers. Their higher preference for 
good grades leads them to take barely passing or failing the pretest as feedback that means 
they should increase their effort, because they do not only want to pass the final exam, 
but also achieve a good grade. 
This study makes three contributions to the literature. First, I develop the first 
economic model about how students choose their effort level for an exam. Second, this is 
the first study to investigate the interplay of feedback and overconfidence. Third, this is 
the first study to find a negative effect of feedback from pretesting. This is valuable 
information for educators. Knowing that students react overconfidently to feedback can 
 
42  The estimate for exam failure is statistically insignificant, because the sample of academically 
weak BE students is relatively small (238 observations) and ‘passing the final exam’ is a 
dichotomous variable with little variation (93.33% of the students in the sample of weak BE 
students passed the final exam). These circumstances make the trend prediction of the 
relationship between mock points and passing the final exam inadequate to predict the final 
exam points (see bottom right panel of Figure A.4.2). Therefore, the RDD estimates are 
imprecise.  
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help to take counteractive measures and thereby avert the negative consequences of 
overconfident reactions. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 4.2 gives a brief overview of the 
literature on student overconfidence and the literature on the effects of feedback on 
students. In section 4.3 I develop a student effort choice model that considers student’s 
reaction to feedback and incorporates student overconfidence. Section 4.4 describes the 
quasi-experimental setting and the data. Section 4.5 lays out the hypotheses, the empirical 
strategy and threats to identification. Section 4.6 presents the results of the baseline 
specification. Section 4.7 shows robustness checks to the baseline specification. Section 
4.8 discusses the findings. Section 4.9 concludes. 
4.2 Literature review 
The literature defines student overconfidence as the phenomenon that students 
systematically expect to perform better on tests and exams than they turn out to do. The 
first scientific contribution that found evidence for student overconfidence was a study 
by Murstein (1965). The study is based on questionnaires filled out by 76 students from 
a course in educational psychology at a university in the US. Among other questions, the 
questionnaires asked before an exam what grade the students expected to achieve. The 
students expected better grades than they turned out to get. This finding was most 
significant for the academically weak performing students. Numerous studies in the 
literature of economics of education and psychology of education have since confirmed 
student overconfidence as a general phenomenon (e.g. Kruger & Dunning 1999, Grimes 
2002, Foster et al. 2007, Andrews et al. 2007).  
Nowell and Alston (2007) surveyed a sample of 753 students from 32 courses 
offered by an economics department, also at a US university. They asked students about 
146 
 
their expected course grade at the end of the semester. At the time of the survey, the 
students had already received feedback on their performance from graded midterm 
exams. The midterm grade on average already determined 47% of the students’ grades. 
Still, about a third of students expected a better grade than they turned out to achieve, 
while only 9% underestimated their performance. The study finds a strong correlation 
between overconfidence and overall academic performance and overconfidence and 
gender, men being the more overconfident sex. Furthermore, it finds less overconfidence 
in exams that count more in the final grade. All studies on overconfidence that consider 
academic performance as a determinant of the level of overconfidence find a strong 
correlation between overconfidence and weak academic performance (e.g. Murstein 
1965, Hacker et al. 2000, Kelemen et al. 2007, Grimes 2002, Foster et al. 2017). The 
evidence for the correlation between overconfidence and gender is weaker. Still several 
studies find similar correlations (cf. Jakobsson 2012, Lundeberg et al. 1994, Magnus & 
Peresetsky 2018).  
Several studies find that students are persistent in their overconfidence (e.g. 
Murstein 1965, Serra & DeMarree 2016, Erev et al. 1994, Klayman et al. 1999). 
Especially the academically weak students do not adjust their expectations, even after 
their grade expectations have been disappointed several times in a row. A good example 
to illustrate this persistence is the study by Foster et al. (2007). They analyze a sample of 
87 students in a course on educational psychology, who write tests about the course 
material every week of the semester. Their expectations are consistently overconfident. 
The students take 13 exams. On average, they expect to score 6.9 percentage points better 
than they turn out to do. The level of overconfidence fluctuates over the weeks but does 
not decrease systematically and is even highest for the last test of the semester. 
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The literature on the effect of feedback on students’ performance is relatively small 
and the findings are mixed. Azmat & Iriberri (2010) analyze a natural experiment in 
which a US high school introduced reporting the average grade of course participants on 
the report card. This informed students about their relative rank in the grade distribution. 
The study finds an improvement of grades by 5%. The study by Tran & Zeckenhauser 
(2012) confirms the finding that relative rank information increases high school students’ 
performance. 
Cabrales et al. (2019) find a reversed effect for university students. They conduct a 
randomized controlled trial at a Spanish university in which they follow 1,000 students 
for four years. They give the treatment group information on their relative grade rank in 
their cohort after every semester. The control group only had information about their own 
performance. The study finds that the treatment significantly decreases students’ average 
grades by 0.05 standard deviations after students learn their relative rank for the first time. 
The effect deteriorates afterwards. 
The only contribution to evaluate the effect of absolute rather than relative rank 
feedback on student performance is a study by Bandiera et al. (2015). They analyze the 
administrative records of a university in the UK, in which the departments differ in their 
information policy. Some departments only tell the students their grades after they 
completed their one-year graduate degree program. Other departments reveal the exam 
grades to the students as soon as the exams are graded. This is shortly before students 
start writing a research essay that is worth 25% of their final grade. The study finds that 
receiving feedback increased the essay grade by 0.13 standard deviations. In a quantile 
regression Bandiera et al. (2015) find no effect below the 30th quantile of students by test 
score. Only the students above the 80th quantile show a statistically significant reaction to 
feedback. 
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4.3 Student Effort Choice Model 
There is no established economic or behavioral theory that models students’ time 
allocation to exam preparation. I develop a model based on the general effort-leisure 
choice model (cf. Pencavel 1986). The student in the model has to write an exam and 
must choose how much of the time she has left until the exam she wants to devote to 
study for it. I will call the time devoted to studying for the exam in question effort. The 
model considers four basic factors involved in her effort choice. First, the rate at which 
she assumes her effort converts into exam points – her assumed productivity. Second, the 
value she attaches to good grades. Third, the negative consequences if she fails the exam. 
Fourth, the value she attaches to using her time for something else than studying for the 
exam in question – her opportunity cost. 
In the following I will outline how a student’s expectations about the productivity 
of her effort can be converted into an assumed exam-point production function with effort 
as the input. This production function yields her budget constraint. Next, I outline how 
the value a student attaches to good grades and not failing the exam relative to her 
opportunity cost yield a utility function. The utility function can be rearranged to form an 
indifference curve and calculate the optimal effort level, which maximizes the student’s 
utility. This is the effort level at which budget constraint and indifference curve have the 
same slope. I start by laying out this effort choice for a perfectly rational student. Later I 
introduce the reaction to feedback and overconfidence.  
The model has two purposes, one narrow and one wide. The narrow purpose is to 
motivate the hypotheses I have about overconfident students’ reactions. I expect that 
certain overconfident students react differently to feedback from a pretest if they passed 
the pretest than if they failed it. The model explains how the value a student attaches to 
good grades and the disutility she attaches to failing the exam influence this differential 
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reaction. The wide purpose of the model is to offer insights to students’ effort-choice. The 
model offers many possibilities to be augmented. Exploring the possibilities for the 
narrower purpose of motivating the hypotheses is one example of how the general model 
can offer insights. These insights can be tested empirically. Understanding students’ 
effort choice better can help develop strategies to mitigate irrationalities in the decision 
process. 
4.3.1 The rational student’s effort choice 
The student in the model has a certain amount of time between her decision on her effort 
level for exam preparation and having to write the exam. I normalize this amount of time 
to one. Thus, the student faces the following budget constraint: 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓 + 𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑓 = 1 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 stands for the part of available time individual 𝑖 spends studying for the exam 𝑓. 
𝑎𝑡𝑢 stands for “alternative time use” – the part of the time until the exam individual i 
spends doing something else.43 To determine her effort choice, the student must first 
determine which exam outcome she can expect at which effort level. She considers the 
following production function for exam points, with effort as the input: 
𝑃𝑖𝑓 = sin (𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓 ⋅
𝜋
2
) ⋅ (𝛽𝑖𝑓 + 𝜖𝑖𝑓) + 𝜂𝑖𝑓 
All variables and parameters are indexed ′𝑖𝑓′, because they vary between individuals (𝑖) 
and for each individual, between exams (𝑓). The outcome variable 𝑃, expected achieved 
exam points, is normalized to range between zero and one to represent the percentages of 
expected correct exam answers. The functional relationship between 𝑃 and 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 is 
assumed to have the form of the first radian interval of the sine function, because this 
 
43  𝑎𝑡𝑢 is somewhat equivalent to leisure in the classical effort leisure choice model. I refrain 
from calling it leisure here, because an important factor in the choice between effort and 𝑎𝑡𝑢 
is the need to study for other exams. Calling the variable leisure would be misleading. 
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functional form offers two advantages in this setting. First, in the chosen interval the sine 
function is concave, which models diminishing returns to study effort. Second, other 
transformations, like a logarithmic transformation or taking the square root, also create a 
concave curve, but the curve turns infinitely steep as 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 approaches zero. The form 
of the sine function represents the relationship between 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 and expected exam points 
more accurately. 
 The coefficient 𝛽 represents the student’s assumed productivity, i.e. the rate at 
which she assumes her effort translates into exam points. Without a trial run of the exam, 
she has to gauge her productivity from experiences of past exams, her proclivity for the 
subject of the specific exam, judgements about her exam preparation strategies and a 
potentially unbounded number of further factors.44 Since she cannot be certain about her 
productivity, the productivity parameter 𝛽 has an error term, 𝜖. Even if the student knew 
her 𝛽 exactly, she could still not be certain about the exact exam outcome. There are 
random factors independent of her level of preparation, which also influence the realized 
outcome. Even if she is very badly prepared, she might get lucky in the exam and the 
instructor asks just the questions she read the answers to the evening before the exam. 
Alternatively, she might be very well prepared, but falls on her bike just before she writes 
the exam and cannot concentrate during the exam. The error term 𝜂 represents this random 
component of the production function. Both error terms have their own distribution. For 
the purposes of demonstration, I assume all error terms are normally distributed45 with 
mean zero and their own variances (𝜎𝜖
2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝜂
2), which are also individual and exam 
specific.  
 
44  It would be interesting to explore the determinants of the assumed production parameter, but 
for this project, it suffices to leave the formation of β as a black box. 
45  I do not know the actual distribution function of students‘ error terms. I choose the normal 
distribution for convenience. The choice of distribution function makes no differences in the 
conclusions of the model. 
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The blue line in Figure 4.1 shows the course of the production function for a 
representative student - the expected percentage of exam points at each effort level. The 
gray shaded area around the production function is the 99% confidence interval, 
representing the student’s uncertainty about the actual outcome at a given effort level. 
The width of the confidence interval at each effort level is determined by 𝜎𝜖
2 and 𝜎𝜂
2, 
where the influence of 𝜎𝜖
2 grows with effort. The black horizontal line represents the 
passing threshold of the exam, which I label 𝑧.  
The student will choose the effort level that maximizes her utility. She derives 
utility from alternative time uses and from a good exam grade and disutility from failing 
the exam. Her utility function has the following form: 
𝑈𝑖𝑓 = sin (𝛼𝑢 ⋅ 𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑓 ⋅
𝜋
2
) + sin ((1 − 𝛼𝑢) ⋅ (𝑃𝑖𝑓 − 𝑧𝑓) ⋅
𝜋
2
) 
                            −𝜔𝑖𝑓 ⋅ 𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑖𝑓 < 𝑧𝑓|𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓) 
Alternative time uses can bring the student utility for various reasons. The most 
direct conversion of 𝑎𝑡𝑢 into utility comes from using her time for leisure. She could 
derive utility indirectly, e.g., from working for wages or from studying for other exams, 
which would bring utility from the grades of the other exam. A good exam grade can be 
intrinsically valuable to the student or she might want it to get a good GPA, which 
increases her future employability and wages. The grade is expressed in terms of 𝑃 instead 
of actual grades, because this form is more generalizable and, other than the function 
using actual grades, the resulting curve has no kinks. The utility from both, 𝑃 and 𝑎𝑡𝑢, 
enters the utility function transformed into the first radian interval of the sine function. 
As for the production function, this form is concave and thus models diminishing returns 
to both sources of utility and it does not produce an infinitely steep slope as 𝑃 or 𝑎𝑡𝑢 
approach zero. 
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The relationship between 𝑃 and utility is furthermore transformed by subtracting 𝑧, 
the passing threshold of the exam. Within the transformation by the sine function, 𝑃 
therefore only yields positive utility if it is bigger than 𝑧. This models that exam points 
are only worth something to the student, if she passed the exam. If 𝑃 is smaller than 𝑧, 
this generates negative utility as a penalty for choosing an effort level that risks failing 
the exam.46 
The parameter 𝛼𝑢 represents the value of 𝑎𝑡𝑢 relative to the value of exam points. 
𝛼𝑢 is bounded between zero and one. If a student had an 𝛼𝑢 of one, this would mean she 
only attaches value to 𝑎𝑡𝑢 and no value to exam points. The closer to zero 𝛼𝑢 is, the 
higher the student values exam points relative to 𝑎𝑡𝑢. 𝛼𝑢 can be influenced by several 
factors. The more a student likes studying for the exam in question, the lower 𝛼𝑢 will be. 
The more important alternative activities are to her, the higher 𝛼𝑢 will be. Examples for 
factors that would increase 𝛼𝑢 are the presence of other exams she also has to study for 
or a high preference for leisure.  
The parameter 𝜔 represents disutility from failing the exam. This parameter is 
necessary to express disutility from failing the exam independently from the utility 
derived from a good grade. 𝜔 increases with the disutility the student attaches to the 
negative consequences of failing the exam and the student’s degree of risk aversion. For 
example, the student would probably assign a very low 𝜔 to an exam in a voluntary 
elective course and a higher one to the same exam if passing the course was mandatory 
for finishing her degree. In the utility function, 𝜔 is weighted by the probability to fail 
the exam at each effort level. 
 
46  In the rare case where a student assigns no disutility to failing an exam, the disutility from a 
small 𝑃 can be mitigated by assigning a negative 𝜔 (𝜔 being a seperate penalty term for failing 
the exam that usually has a positive value which is subtracted from utility). 
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Rearranging the utility function to isolate 𝑃 on the left-hand side leads to the 
following function, which plots the indifference curve: 
𝑃𝑖𝑓 =
𝑠𝑖𝑛−1 (− sin (𝛼𝑢 ⋅ 𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑓 ⋅
𝜋
2) + 𝜔𝑖𝑓 ⋅ Pr(𝑃𝑖𝑓 < 𝑧𝑓|𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓))
(1 − 𝛼𝑢) ⋅
𝜋
2
 
The indifference curve expresses the student’s rate of substitution of exam points 
in terms of alternative time use. Figure 4.2 depicts curves that show successively how 
the shape of the indifference curve is influenced by different parameters. The blue curve 
in Figure 4.2 is the budget constraint resulting from replacing 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 in the production 
function by 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 1 − 𝑎𝑡𝑢. The red curve is the indifference curve for a student that 
attaches no value to 𝑎𝑡𝑢 and for whom failing the exam would create just as much 
disutility as the utility she derives from the exam score she can achieve if she uses all of 
her time to study. This means her 𝛼𝑢 is zero and her 𝜔 is about 0.95. 
With an 𝛼𝑢 of zero, the indifference curve turns out to be a slightly transformed 
cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the normal distribution, as its shape is 
predominantly driven by the term Pr(𝑃𝑖𝑓 < 𝑧𝑓|𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓). The resulting red curve is 
plotted against the budget constraint of the representative student from the example in 
Figure 4.1. The line shows the (slightly transformed) probability to fail the exam at each 
level of 𝑎𝑡𝑢, indexed on the right y-axis.  
The vertical red lines mark the interval of potential 𝑎𝑡𝑢 choices for which failing 
the exam lies within the student’s 99% confidence interval. In the following, I will call 
this interval of potential 𝑎𝑡𝑢 choices the risk interval. I define it like this, because the 
disutility from failing the exam, represented by 𝜔, only influences the shape of the 
student’s indifference curve in this interval. Outside of the interval, the influence is 
negligible. This is the interval in which the risk to fail influences the shape of the 
indifference curve. 
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Since the student attaches no value to 𝑎𝑡𝑢, she will choose to devote all her 
available time to studying for the exam, which is a combination of 𝑎𝑡𝑢 = 0% and 
expected exam points, 𝑃 ≈ 70%. All combinations of exam points and 𝑎𝑡𝑢 that would 
lead her to the same or a higher utility level lie above her budget constraint and are 
therefore impossible to reach. If it were possible, she would derive the same utility from 
a combination of 𝑎𝑡𝑢 = 1 and 𝑃 = 140%. The slope at each point on the red line is her 
marginal rate of substitution of exam points for the increase in risk to fail from an increase 
in 𝑎𝑡𝑢. The purple curve shows an indifference curve for a student with an 𝜔 half as big 
as the previous student, but otherwise identical to her. The smaller 𝜔 scales her 
indifference curve down in comparison to the red one. This decreases the steepness of the 
positive slope at all points in the risk interval. 
The green curve is the indifference curve for a student with an 𝛼𝑢 of 
1
2
, which is 
otherwise identical to the student represented by the purple curve. For later reference I 
call the student with preferences represented by the green curve the example student. This 
student values 𝑎𝑡𝑢 just as much as exam points. For 𝑎𝑡𝑢 choices to the left of the risk 
interval, a student’s marginal rate of substitution is −
𝛼𝑢
1−𝛼𝑢
, thus the green curve has a 
slope of −1 in this interval. In the risk interval, the slope of the curve bends upwards. The 
reason is that an increase in 𝑎𝑡𝑢 means not only less expected exam points, but also an 
increased risk to fail. This makes giving up exam points relatively more costly. For 𝑎𝑡𝑢 
levels right of the risk interval, the slope of the curve becomes −
𝛼𝑢
1−𝛼𝑢
 again, because the 
risk to fail is already above 99.5% and choosing more 𝑎𝑡𝑢 would only increase the risk 
marginally. Failing the exam is as good as certain already. The example student would 
choose the effort level at which the slope of her budget constraint equals the slope of her 
indifference curve, which is the 𝑎𝑡𝑢 level of 44% and an expected exam score of 62%. 
155 
 
Figure 4.3 shows how changes in 𝛼𝑢 and 𝜔 influence the effort choice and how 
different combinations of 𝛼𝑢 and 𝜔 lead to three different types of students. The green 
curve is the example student’s indifference curve. The orange line represents an almost 
identical student, with the only difference that she has a smaller preference for 𝑎𝑡𝑢, i.e. a 
smaller 𝛼𝑢. This increases the slope of her indifference curve at every point. She chooses 
an 𝑎𝑡𝑢 level to the left of the risk interval. She would not have chosen differently, if she 
would attach no disutility to failing the exam at all. Since she has a small 𝛼𝑢, the slope of 
the budget constraint is already equal to −
𝛼𝑢
1−𝛼𝑢
 at a point to the left of the risk interval. 
The upward bend from trying to avoid the risk of failing plays no role in her decision. I 
label students for whom this is the case grade maximizers. There are two alternative types 
of students: Risk avoiders and quitters. The example student is an example of a risk 
avoider. For her trying to avoid the risk to fail influences her effort choice.  
The pink line represents a quitter. This student differs from the example student in 
two respects: she has higher 𝛼𝑢 and a lower 𝜔. Her 𝛼𝑢 is so high and her 𝜔 so low, that 
the s-bend in the risk interval is never flat enough to equate with the slope of the budget 
constraint before her effort level is so low that she will certainly fail. The preferences of 
this student make it optimal for her not to study at all for the exam. The value of 𝑎𝑡𝑢 she 
would have to give up to pass the exam at an acceptable margin of risk is higher than the 
disutility from failing the exam and the utility she forfeits from the exam points she will 
not earn. 
4.3.2 The rational student’s reaction to feedback 
In the following I introduce feedback from a pretest into the model. How students react 
to such feedback depends in part on the circumstances of the pretest. The feedback I 
introduce in the model mostly has circumstances similar to mid-term exams, the way they 
are written in universities around the world. The students in my example write the pretest 
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in the middle of the semester and it is graded and returned quickly thereafter. The pretest 
asks questions about the contents of the course covered up to that point. The final exam 
in my example will have questions that are similarly difficult to the questions in the pretest 
and the students know this. This circumstance ensures that the students can take the 
feedback from the pretest as a direct indicator for the rate at which their study effort 
converts into exam points. The questions in the final exam will only be about the content 
covered in the second half of the semester and the pretest grade does not count for the 
final course grade. These two circumstances rid the formulas in the model of terms that 
deal with catching up effort from the first half of the semester, in case the student 
performed worse than expected in the pretest. The calculations are easier and more 
intuitive with these circumstances, while the conclusions are the same as if the contents 
of the first semester half were included in the final exam and the pretest would count for 
the final course grade. 
Figure 4.4 shows what happens if the example student receives feedback through 
getting the results from a pretest. The dashed lines are the budget constraint, indifference 
curve and risk interval of the example student before she receives feedback. For the pretest 
the student chose an effort level 56% corresponding to an 𝑎𝑡𝑢 level of 44%. She expected 
to achieve a score of about 62% but turned out to achieved about 52%. Since the student 
knows the questions in the pretest are similar to those in the final exam, the pretest result 
is a better proxy to gauge her productivity parameter 𝛽 than the judgements she relied on 
previously. To approximate her actual productivity parameter, she plugs the information 
from the pretest into her production function and solves for 𝛽. From the experience of the 
pretest she has information about the exam points she achieved, 𝑃𝑃𝑇 , at the  effort level 
she chose, 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑇 (where PT is short for pretest). Her new 𝛽 has the following 
function: 
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𝛽𝑖,𝑓+1 =
𝑃𝑃𝑇 − 𝜂𝑃𝑇
sin (𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑇 ⋅
𝜋
2)
 
For her effort choice regarding the final exam she considers a new production function, 
with the new 𝛽: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑓+1 = sin (𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑓+1 ⋅
𝜋
2
) ⋅ 𝛽𝑖,𝑓+1 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑓+1 
All parameters in this function are indexed ‘𝑖, 𝑓 + 1’, because this is the production 
function for the exam following the pretest, which was indexed 𝑖𝑓. The budget constraint 
resulting from the new production function runs exactly through the effort-outcome 
combination the student realized in the pretest. Since she performed worse than 
previously expected, 𝛽𝑖,𝑓+1 is smaller than 𝛽𝑓. The confidence band around the 
production function is slimmer than the one around the initial production function, 
because 𝛽 is now gauged using evidence, while the old 𝛽 relied on judgements. The new 
production function contains no 𝜖, because this error term represented the uncertainty 
about the own judgement.47 The new 𝛽 is determined from the evidence from the pretest. 
This evidence is not precise though, because the realized outcome in the pretest is in part 
influenced by unknown random factors, represented by 𝜂𝑃𝑇. In the depicted example, the 
uncertainty was much bigger than the assumed influence of random factors, i.e. 𝜎𝜖
𝑃𝑇 >
𝜎𝜂
𝑃𝑇, which should generally be a reasonable assumption. Therefore, relying on evidence 
instead of judgement increases the student’s certainty about her productivity. 
 The dashed green line is the example student’s indifference curve before receiving 
feedback, the full green line is the indifference curve after receiving feedback. The 
adjustment of 𝛽 affected the indifference curve in three ways. First, the budget constraint 
 
47  In case the student considers the uncertainty that she has a different true 𝛽 for the second half 
of the course material, 𝜖 would not disappear. It would probably be smaller than the initial 𝜖, 
but not zero. I abstract from this possibility here, because adding it would complicate the model 
without adding relevant insights. 
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is less steep. Therefore, the indifference curve makes a level shift downwards, 
representing a lower utility level. Second, the decreased assumed productivity widens the 
risk interval and shifts it to the left. The widening is mitigated a bit by the counteracting 
effect of the decreased variance caused by basing the expectations on evidence. Still, the 
leftward shift and widening of the risk interval means that the upward bend in the 
indifference curve sets in at lower levels of 𝑎𝑡𝑢. The effort choice resulting from the new 
indifference curve and the new budget constraint will lie at a higher effort level than 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑇, because choosing 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑇 or less would entail too big a risk of failing the 
final exam. 
4.3.3 The overconfident student’s reaction to feedback 
Now I introduce overconfidence into the model. Overconfidence can be expressed as a 
bias in the production function. An overconfident student’s production function before 
feedback will look like this: 
?̃?𝑖𝑓 = sin (𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓 ⋅
𝜋
2
) ⋅ (𝛽𝑖𝑓 + 𝜖𝑖𝑓) + 𝜂𝑖𝑓 + 𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑓 
Of course, the student herself is not aware of her overconfidence (𝑜𝑐). The bias leads the 
student to a suboptimal effort choice with and without feedback. If she is overconfident, 
she studies less for the exam than would be optimal for her given her actual production 
function. For the situation without feedback, this conclusion does not require further 
explanation. In the situation with feedback, it is necessary to note that research has shown 
that students are persistently overconfident (e.g. Foster et al. 2017, Murstein 1965, Serra 
and DeMarree 2016). They overestimate their performance in the same subject again and 
again, even after receiving feedback repeatedly. This means they perceive the evidence 
of performing worse than they expected as the result of negative random factors – some 
degree of bad luck. They see the realized outcome as an instance in which the outcome 
was below what they can expect on average. Thus, the expected average performance 
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they derive from the feedback is not the actual outcome 𝑃𝑃𝑇, but rather this outcome plus 
an adjustment for bad luck. This adjustment has the value of their overconfidence. 
Therefore, the adjusted average expected performance at 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑇 equals 𝑃𝑃𝑇 + 𝑜𝑐𝑃𝑇. 
Thus, the overconfidence bias also enters the evidence-based production function they 
form after receiving feedback: 
𝛽𝑖,𝑓+1 =
𝑃𝑖𝑓
𝑃𝑇 − 𝜂𝑃𝑇 + 𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑓
𝑃𝑇
sin (𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑇 ⋅
𝜋
2)
 
Figure 4.5 shows the budget constraint and indifference curve of the example student 
after she receives feedback if she is overconfident. The dashed lines depict her budget 
constraint, her indifference curve and her risk interval under rational expectations. The 
full lines depict the situation if the student is overconfident. If the student is 
overconfident, she chooses to invest less effort than under rational expectations, because 
she underestimates the risk to fail the exam. Her risk interval is narrower and lies further 
to the right than it should, because she overestimates her productivity. This puts her at 
risk to end up with the undesirable outcome that she gives up the utility from 𝑎𝑡𝑢 to avoid 
the risk of failing and also having to bear the negative consequences of actually failing 
the final exam. 
The consequences from overconfidence are far less severe for a student who is a 
grade maximizer (the example student is a risk avoider). I demonstrate this in Figure 4.6. 
The figure is analogous to Figure 4.5, with the only difference that the indifference curves 
and effort choices are based on the preferences of a risk avoider, i.e. the degree of 
overconfidence, the assumed productivity and assumed risk intervals are the same as for 
the example student. The grade maximizer’s effort choice before the feedback was a 
combination of 18% 𝑎𝑡𝑢 and 76% exam points. In the pretest she achieved 63% of the 
points. The dashed lines represent how she should have adjusted her expectations, if she 
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were fully rational. The full lines are the adjustment she made with her overconfident 
expectations. Her effort choice is almost identical to the one she would have made under 
rational expectations, because she is more willing to give up 𝑎𝑡𝑢 in exchange for a better 
expected grade. The overestimated productivity leads to a steeper slope of her budget 
constraint than what she could assume under rationality. This means she underestimates 
the relative cost of marginal exam points. Overconfidence will generate disappointment 
for the grade maximizer, because on average she will perform worse than she expects. 
But overconfidence does not lead her to a suboptimal effort choice. 
A student who is a quitter in the absence of feedback, has no negative consequences 
at all from overconfidence. She chooses not to invest any effort into studying for the 
exam, regardless of her overconfidence. Her decision is not influenced by her 
overconfidence and with or without overconfidence, she enjoys the utility generated by 
her 𝑎𝑡𝑢 choice of 100%. At this point it is important to note, that being a grade maximizer, 
a risk avoider or a quitter is not a fixed property of any student. If a student performs 
worse than expected in the pretest, this can turn her from a grade maximizer to a risk 
avoider or from a risk avoider to a quitter in respect to the final exam. The opposite can 
apply, if a student performs better than expected in the pretest. 
4.4 Quasi-experimental setting and data 
4.4.1 Quasi-experimental setting 
In the following, I apply the model described above using data about a pretest and 
subsequent final exam at a German university. This pretest provides a fitting quasi-
experiment, because two different groups of students had to write it: One group for whom 
the final exam grade is more important and one for whom it is less important. In terms of 
the model, the former group should have more grade maximizers and the latter more risk 
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avoiders. I add the assumption that failing the mock exam will lead students to decrease 
their level of overconfidence. In section 4.5.1, the section about the hypotheses, I will 
describe in more detail, why I expect this. Within the model this has the implication that 
overconfident risk avoiders react differently to feedback from a pretest depending on 
having passed the pretest or not. If I find this effect and it is stronger for the group of 
students for whom the exam grade is less important, this would be first suggestive 
evidence for the proposed model. 
The exam subject of the pretest and the final exam is the undergraduate course 
“Introductory Economics”. The course is mandatory for business administration (BA) 
students in their first study semester and for business engineering (BE) students in their 
third study semester. The purpose of the pretest is to familiarize first-semester students 
with exam settings. The business administration program is a lot bigger than the business-
engineering program. Therefore, the majority of the course participants (79%) are in their 
first study semester. 
Since the purpose of the pretest is to familiarize the students with exam conditions, 
it simulates the conditions of the final exam almost completely. Because of this, and 
because the pretest does not count for the final grade, I will henceforth call this specific 
form of pretest “mock exam”. There are two differences between the mock exam and the 
final exam. First, participation in the mock exam is voluntary. There are no negative 
consequences of not taking part. Participation in the final exam is mandatory. The 
university automatically enrolls the students for final exam participation in the semester 
it is on their respective curricula. If signed up students do not show up for the final exam 
it counts as a failed try. The only way to avoid taking the final exam without failing is an 
official sick note from a doctor. The second difference between the mock exam and the 
final exam is that the mock exam only takes half as long, 30 minutes as opposed to 60 
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minutes for the final exam. The maximum amount of points in the mock exam is 30 vs. 
60 in the final exam. The passing thresholds of the two exams are just under 50% of the 
total possible score in each exam - 14.5 and 29.5. The students take the mock exam in the 
middle of the semester. Thus, it only covers the course content up to that point. The final 
exam takes place at the end of the semester and covers the entire course content. 
 The mock exam result does not count directly into the final grade of the course, 
because German law prohibits more than one mandatory exam per module. The instructor 
awards two bonus points for the final exam to students who pass the mock exam to 
incentivize mock exam participation. During grading, the instructor adds the bonus points 
to the “regular” score. For clarity, I will henceforth call the “regular” points from the final 
exam “raw final points”. Students who passed the mock exam therefore already have 
3.3% of the total score in the final exam before answering a single question in it, and 
6.8% of the passing score. 
 The “Introductory Economics” course is only taught in the winter semester. The 
semester starts in mid-October and ends in late February or early March. The students 
write the mock exam on a Saturday in mid-December, around the middle of the semester. 
The students receive the graded mock exams back in mid-January. Figure 4.7 displays 
the timeline over the semester. The students can trace where they made mistakes and 
know their exact score.  
The incentive to achieve a good grade in the final exam differs between BA and BE 
students. The grade of the final exam is the only determinant of the final grade of the 
course. This grade counts in the calculation of the GPA of the students’ Bachelor degree. 
A student’s GPA is calculated as a weighted average of all grades of courses she passed 
during her study program. The grades are weighted by each course’s credit points. To 
complete their Bachelor degree the students in both study programs have to earn 180 
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credit points. The weight for the “Introductory Economics” course differs between BA 
and BE students. For the former it counts 4 credit points (2.2% of the GPA), for the latter 
2 credit points (1.1% of the GPA). This is why I expect BA students to care more about 
their grade than BE students. In terms of the model, this means they have a lower 𝛼𝑢 and 
are therefore are more likely to be grade maximizers. 
The incentive to pass the final exam is the same in both study programs. There is 
no reason to expect a mean difference in 𝜔 between the groups. If a student fails the exam 
she has a second attempt. If she fails a second time, this automatically terminates her 
enrollment in the study program. German law prohibits her to study the subject of her 
Bachelor degree at any German university in this case. Most exams at German 
universities allow three attempts. The incentive to pass the final exam in “Introductory 
Economics” is relatively high. 
4.4.2 Data 
For the analysis I use the scores and grades of the mock and final exams of the winter 
semesters 2008 and 2010 to 2013,48 provided by the course instructor. The sample 
contains 2.872 BA students and 574 BE students. I merged these data with data provided 
by the university administration. The merged data contains information on the following 
characteristics of the examinees: Age, gender, citizenship, study program, year of high 
school graduation and high school GPA49. The data from the administration also provide 
 
48  I omit the data from the winter semester 2009, because the mode of the mock exam differed 
substantially from the other years. While the mock scores were stable across the other 
semesters, the average mock score in 2009 was substantially smaller (BA students: 10.61 vs. 
15.52; BE students: 11.19 vs. 19.38) and students had the additional possibility to earn one 
bonus point for the final exam for reaching a mock score of at least 9.5. I also explored the 
possibilities of analyzing the results from this semester. I do not report those findings here, 
because there were no interesting deviations from the results of the other semesters. Including 
the winter semester 2009 in the main sample does not change the results. 
49  By high school GPA I mean the Abitur grade. This grade is a weighted average of all courses 
during the last two years of secondary education in the highest tier of the German secondary 
schooling system. Having passed the Abitur is the prerequisite to enter most study programs 
at German universities, including the study programs I analyze here. 
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information on each individual attempt a student registered for the “Introductory 
Economics” final exam. The data document whether the student failed the exam before, 
her study semester at the time of the exam, if she attended the exam and if sickness was 
the reason for absence. Table 4.1 gives a descriptive overview of the data split by study 
program. 
As described in section 4.4.1, the two groups of students, BA and BE, differ 
substantially in the circumstances of their exam. Furthermore, they differ substantially in 
their characteristics. The BE students are on average higher achievers. They have 
significantly better high school GPAs and perform significantly better in the mock exam 
and the final exam. Table 4.1 contains a column of t-tests, which confirm significant 
differences between the groups in almost all characteristics. The reason for these 
differences is that the procedure to get into the BE program involves testing and is very 
competitive, while anyone with Abitur 50 can enroll for BA. Furthermore, I only observe 
BE students who stayed in their program until the third semester. I observe the BA 
students in their first semester, when few have yet dropped out. Unfortunately, I cannot 
distinguish how many or which BE students already dropped out of the program before I 
observe them. 
Figures 4.8 a) and b) show the distribution of mock points reached for the BA and 
BE students respectively. The red vertical line marks the passing threshold of 14.5 mock 
points. The instructor awarded mock points in increments of 0.5. Both distributions have 
missing mass at 14 points and excess mass at 14.5 points. This is a sign that the instructor 
looked extra hard for additional points to give to students who would otherwise have 
earned 14 points and thereby would have failed the mock exam by a tiny margin. In 
 
50  Abitur is the degree students attain by finishing the highest of the three tiers of the German  secondary 
schooling system. Abitur is the requirement for enrollment in regular German 
universities. 
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section 4.5.3 I discuss in how far this generous grading threatens the RDD identification 
strategy. 
In addition to the data on the “Introductory Economics” exam, the business and 
economics faculty of the university provided the data about all exams the BA students 
take at that faculty in their first study semester. Those are “Business Studies I”, “Business 
Studies II” and “Business Mathematics”. The BE students only take “Business Studies I” 
and “Business Mathematics” in their first semester. “Business Studies II”, like 
“Introductory Economics” is scheduled in their third study semester. I only have data 
about the final grade for these additional subjects. They can be linked individually with 
the data about the “Introductory Economics” exam. 
4.5 Hypotheses, empirical strategy and threats to identification 
4.5.1 Hypotheses 
As already mentioned in section 4.4.1, I make the following assumption: 
Students who pass a pretest remain more overconfident than students who failed a 
pretest. 
The reasoning behind this assumption is that overconfident students interpret the 
feedback from a pretest as an outcome at the lower end of what they could have expected, 
given their effort level. If they pass the pretest, they assume the effort level they invested 
to study for the pretest will also be enough to pass the final exam. A lot of bad luck would 
have to be involved for them to perform even worse than they did on the pretest. If the 
same overconfident student fails the pretest, she has a harder time to ignore the fact that 
failing is a real possibility at her previously chosen effort level. 
Figure 4.5 depicted what happens if an overconfident risk avoider passed a pretest. 
Figure 4.9 depicts the same risk avoider, if she failed the pretest. The dashed lines 
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represent her risk interval, her budget constraint and her indifference curve, if she were 
not overconfident. The full lines represent her expectations given that she is 
overconfident. Because she adjusted her overconfidence downward, her assumed budget 
constraint is only a little bit steeper than what rational expectations would predict. The 
gap between rational and overconfident production function is a lot bigger in Figure 4.5, 
which depicts the situation where the student passed the pretest. This student, who failed 
the pretest, chooses an effort level well above what she chose to prepare for the pretest, 
but still less than what she would choose under rational expectations. 
 The reasoning above can be applied to the students writing the mock exam at the 
German university. Since their effort choices should convert into real final exam points, 
I expect the following hypothesis to hold. (Preliminary) Hypothesis 1:  
Risk avoiders who pass the mock exam have less raw final exam points than risk 
avoiders who fail the mock exam. 
The fact that students who pass the mock exam are awarded two bonus points complicates 
testing this hypothesis and this is the reason I call the hypothesis above “preliminary”. 
Having the two bonus points sets the students who passed the mock exam apart from 
those who failed it. The bonus points are an incentive that can lead to a decrease in effort 
for risk avoiders, because they provide a small safety margin against failing the final 
exam. The bonus points could lead to a decrease in effort that converts into up to two raw 
final exam points. This leads to my next hypothesis. Hypothesis 2: 
Risk avoiders who pass the mock exam have up to two raw final exam points less 
than risk avoiders who fail the mock exam. 
Since there are two separate causes, that can cause higher raw final exam points for 
students who failed the mock exam, I label them, to simplify talking about them. 
Henceforth, I will call the expected decrease in overconfidence from failing the mock 
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exam the information treatment and the disincentive from the bonus points the reward 
treatment. Any difference in raw final points I find between students who passed the mock 
exam and those who failed it, could be caused by a combination of information and 
reward treatment. Still, if I find a reduction in raw final points by more than two, this 
would be evidence for the effect from the information treatment. This leads me to 
reformulate the preliminary hypothesis to the revised Hypothesis 1: 
Risk avoiders who pass the mock exam have more than two raw final exam points 
less than risk avoiders who fail the mock exam. 
Still, if I found a reduction of more than two raw final points, it would not necessarily 
imply that the risk avoiders who passed the mock exam acted irrational. They might 
reduce their effort, get less raw final points and still achieve their aim of passing the final 
exam. In this case, they would have chosen the utility maximizing effort level. Therefore, 
I also test Hypothesis 3: 
Risk avoiders who passed the mock exam are more likely to fail the final exam than 
risk avoiders who failed the mock exam. 
4.5.2 Empirical strategy 
I expect the students who passed the mock exam to invest less effort into preparing the 
final exam than students who did not pass the mock exam. If this is the case I should see 
a fall of more than two raw final points on average and possibly a reduction in the passing 
rate for those students who just passed the mock exam in contrast to those who just missed 
passing the mock exam. To test the hypotheses, I employ a regression discontinuity design 
(RDD). I estimate the following model with ordinary least squares: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾2 𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖 ⋅ 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑚𝑒𝑖 +
               𝛾3(𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖)
2 + 𝛾4(𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖 ⋅ 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑚𝑒)
2 + 𝑋𝑖𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖  
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The dependent variable 𝑦 is raw final points in the estimations testing Hypotheses 1 and 
2. In the estimations testing Hypothesis 3 the dependent variable is a dummy representing 
if the respective student passed the final exam. 𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 stands for the mock score a 
student achieved. 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑚𝑒 is a dummy indicating if a student passed the mock exam. 
The vector 𝑋 contains the following covariates: high school GPA, age, the time between 
finishing high school and starting to study, a set of dummy variables indicating foreign 
citizenship, gender and semester fixed effects. 
4.5.3 Identification issues 
There are four separate challenges to the identification strategy, which could bias the 
results and thereby limit the possibilities to interpret the effect of passing the mock exam 
on student effort I want to identify. The first challenge is an insufficient number of risk 
avoiders among the sample. The second challenge is covariate imbalance around the 
mock exam passing threshold. The third challenge is a counteracting effect of motivation 
due to having passed the mock exam. The fourth challenge comes from heaping of 
observations on either side of the mock exam passing threshold. 
If the first challenge, an insufficient number of risk avoiders among the sample, 
would apply, this would lead to attenuation bias. The risk avoiders would react in the 
hypothesized ways, but I would not be able to isolate the effect. The effect would be 
covered up by white noise. I defined risk avoiders, as students for whom the risk to fail 
an exam is a relatively more important motivator to invest effort than the desire to achieve 
a good grade. I expect to find a sufficient number of risk avoiders around the mock exam 
passing threshold, because the first semester GPA51 of students in the range two mock 
points above and below the mock exam passing threshold is 3.65 for BA students and 
 
51  First semester GPA is a simplified expression. This GPA omits some of the exams students 
take in the first semester. I only have data about four subjects. The BE students take two of 
these subjects in their third semester. 
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3.24 for BE students. The worst possible GPA is 4.0. It is reasonable to assume, that these 
students are more motivated to prepare for an exam to try and just pass it, than to 
maximize their grade. These students fail 27% (BA) and 20% (BE) of the exams they 
take. I assume they put their priority on passing, since their average performance is barely 
to pass or to fail. Their incentive for passing is very high, because failing leads to the 
second attempt in the next semester. A second attempt does not only incur the cost of 
repeating the preparation effort. It also causes fear and stress, since the second attempt 
puts a student at high risk of exmatriculation. 
The second challenge to the identification strategy consists in the possibility that 
passing the mock exam might have a motivational effect on students, which counteracts 
the presumed negative structural break in final exam performance from the reward and 
the information treatment. This would bias the results towards zero or could even turn 
them positive. Such a positive motivation effect could be conjectured in light of the 
findings of Bandiera et al. (2015), who show that feedback can motivate students. This 
motivation effect is unlikely to apply for the students I look at to identify the effect of 
feedback on overconfidence, though. The findings of Bandiera et al. (2015) indicate the 
positive motivation effect is attributable to the students who received feedback that they 
performed at the 80th quantile of their group or better. They subsequently performed even 
better. Bad students did not react. The students I look at to identify the feedback effect on 
overconfidence barely failed or barely passed the mock exam. They get the rather 
negative feedback that their performance in the mock exam is below average for both BA 
and BE students. 
 The third potential challenge to the identification strategy, covariate imbalance 
around the mock exam passing threshold, would indicate that something else except 
passing the mock exam or not systematically distinguishes the students around the cutoff 
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value from one another. If this were the case, it could bias the effect estimate. In the quasi-
experiment such covariate differences could plausibly originate from sample selection. 
Passing the mock exam gives students the real advantage of two bonus points in the final 
exam. Therefore, students below the cutoff might be more likely to feign sickness or just 
not show up on the exam day. I test this in the robustness section. 
 The fourth challenge to the identification strategy, heaping of observations around 
the cutoff, does apply. In the quasi-experiment it does not invalidate the identification 
strategy, though. The main concern connected to heaping around the cutoff is that it 
creates sample selection: The units of observation themselves or some other agent 
selected units of observation, based on observable or unobservable characteristics, to be 
on a side of the cutoff of their choosing with a higher than random probability. This means 
that the difference of units of observation possessing the selection characteristics or not, 
might be all or part of the reason I see a difference in the outcome variable around the 
cutoff (cf. McCrary 2008).  
In the quasi-experiment the heaping just above the cutoff is caused by a simple rule 
the instructor followed during grading: If someone achieved 14 mock points, find a half-
mock point you can give them so that they pass. There are only six observations (5 BA 
students and 1 BE student) where this rule did not lead to a passing score. Apart from the 
values 14 and 14.5, the mock scores of BA and BE students combined are roughly 
normally distributed. Knowing the general mock point distribution allows me to 
extrapolate that the rule was applied to about 90 observations (cf. Figure 4.8 c) ). These 
are heaped mostly at the mock score of 14.5 and to a smaller degree at 15. The explanation 
for the slight heaping at the value 15 is that the instructor found more than a half-mock 
point in some cases. Since the heaping applies to almost all students who otherwise would 
have had 14 points and to no other students, it does not defeat the identification strategy. 
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Rather than selecting students to pass the mock exam, the application of this rule 
informally shifts the passing score to 14 points.  
The mixing of observations of students who would have had 14 mock points and 
effectively scored 14.5 is a minor problem for the estimations, nonetheless. The graphical 
analysis of the relationship between mock score and final score suggests that it is linear 
and positive. To assign an additional half-mock point to students who otherwise would 
have scored 14 mock points biases the average final score of students with the nominal 
mock score of 14.5 downwards. To mitigate this problem, I assign a hypothetical mock 
score of 14.25 to those students. The students who remained at a mock sore of 14 points 
might be a negative selection. To report a more conservative estimate I omit them from 
the base line estimations. 
4.6 Results 
I present the results separately for BA and for BE students. I expect to find a stronger 
effect for BE students, because they have a lower incentive to achieve a good grade in the 
final exam. Therefore, there should be more risk avoiders among them than among the 
BA students. For both, BA and BE students, I present the results pooled by study program 
and split up by gender and by academic performance. I analyze the reaction to passing 
the mock exam along these lines, because previous literature has found that male students 
tend to be more overconfident than female students (Nowell & Alston 2007, Jacobsson 
2012) and that weaker students tend to be more overconfident (Murstein 1965, Nowell & 
Alston 2007, Feld et al. 2017). Their higher initial level of overconfidence could mean 
that male students and weaker students have more leeway to adjust their level of 
overconfidence differentially than female students and stronger students, which would 
translate into bigger effects for these groups. 
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To divide the samples of BA and BE students by academic performance, I split 
them at the median of high school GPA of their study program. For ease of reading, I 
label the students with a high school GPA below the median of their study program good 
students and the ones above the median bad students.52 The high school GPA is highly 
positively correlated with academic performance53 during university and exogenous to 
passing the mock exam. 
4.6.1 Business administration students 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the baseline specification with raw final points as the 
dependent variable, first for all BA students combined, then split by gender and then split 
by their group high school GPA.54 The upper row shows the results of estimations without 
controlling for additional covariates, the lower row the results with additional control 
variables. I only report the coefficients for the dummy that indicates if a student passed 
the mock exam or not. The coefficients can be interpreted as the number of raw final 
points the students achieved more or less, because they passed the mock exam. Below the 
coefficients and their standard errors, I display the lower bound of the 90% confidence 
interval of the point estimate. Figure 4.10 shows scatter plots of raw final points by mock 
exam score corresponding to the groups in the estimations. Figure 4.11 shows the average 
 
52  In Germany, the grading scale for a high school degree reaches from 1.0 to 4.0, where 1.0 is 
the best possible GPA and 4.0 the worst. I define the students with a high school GPA below 
the group median as good students, because their GPA is closer to 1. I define the students with 
a high school GPA above the group median as the bad students, because their high school 
GPA is closer to 4. 
53  The pearson correlation coefficient between high school GPA and first semester GPA in the 
data is 0.42 and statistically significant at the 1% level. Graphical analysis shows that the 
relationship is almost perfectly linear. A univariate regression of first semester GPA on high 
school GPA yields a coefficient of 0.89 – a one grade better high school GPA is associated 
with a 0.89 grades better first semester GPA. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
54  The median high school GPA of the BA students is 2.7. I grouped the students directly at the 
median with the students above the median, because it creates more equal group sizes than 
grouping them with the students below the median. 
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raw final point score by mock score. In both figures the red lines show the trend lines 
predicted by the estimations without controlling for covariates. 
 The coefficient of the dummy for passing the mock exam is positive and statistically 
insignificant for the pooled sample and all its subgroups. Controlling for covariates in the 
estimations does not change the results. The coefficient estimates range from 0.045 to 
2.189 with standard errors almost as large as or larger than the point estimate. The results 
indicate that I should reject all three hypotheses for the BA students. To support 
Hypothesis 2, the point estimates would have to be negative. To support Hypothesis 1, 
the results would have to be below negative two. Yet, all but two of the ten reported lower 
bounds of the 90% confidence interval are above negative two. Overall, the estimation 
results and the corresponding figures indicate that the BA students did not adjust their 
learning effort as a reaction to passing the mock exam. 
 Since I found no effect of passing the mock exam on raw final points, it is not 
necessary to discuss the effects on passing the final exam within this section in detail. I 
report the results for the estimations on the probability to pass the final exam in Table 
A.4.1 and Figure A.4.1 in the appendix. The results indicate no evidence to support 
Hypothesis 3 for the sample of BA students. 
4.6.2 Business engineering students 
Table 4.3 and Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show the results of estimating the effect of passing 
the mock exam on final raw points for BE students. They are structured analogously to 
Table 4.2 and Figures 4.10 and 4.11. The results for the BE students suggest that they 
reduced their effort as a reaction to passing the mock exam, translating into 6.2 less raw 
final points in the pooled sample of BE students. The result is statistically insignificant, 
though. Splitting the sample by gender yields little interesting information because the 
already relatively small BE student sample is 80% male. Thus, the estimate for the male 
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students is very similar to the pooled sample and the estimate for the female students is 
unreliable. Overall, there are only 12 observations of women below the cutoff. This makes 
the estimates for this subgroup very sensitive to the specification of the functional form 
and the bandwidth. The huge, statistically significant positive effect of 20.7 raw final 
points shrinks to highly statistically insignificant values close to zero once estimated 
without an interaction term, without a quadratic term or with a lower bandwidth.55 
 The subgroup who drives the negative effect for BE students are those with an 
above median high school GPA, 56 whom I labeled the bad students. For them the effect 
of passing the mock exam is a reduction of 11.8 raw final points and it is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The effect for the good students is slightly positive, with a 
relatively large standard error. A plausible explanation for this discrepancy between the 
effects for the two groups is that their motivations differ. The good students are grade 
maximizers. They are more motivated to get a good grade, while the bad students have a 
higher inclination to be content with just passing exams. They are risk avoiders. 
For the bad BE students, I find a negative structural break in raw final points that 
far exceeds two raw final points. This is evidence that Hypothesis 1 holds for the bad BE 
students. Hypothesis 1 does not hold for the other subgroups. The negative effects I find 
for the full sample and the sample of men are driven by the bad students in these other 
groups.  
Unfortunately, the estimations about the effect of passing the mock exam on passing 
the final exam for BE students turned out to be unreliable. The dichotomous nature of the 
dependent variable, coupled with little variation57 and small bin sizes of the values below 
 
55  The results for robustness checks for female BE students are available on request. 
56  The median high school GPA for the BE students is 2.2. I grouped the students directly at the 
median with the students above the median, because it creates more equal group sizes than 
grouping them with the students below the median. 
57  The passing rate of BE students in final exam is 96%. The vast majority of observations for 
the dependent variable is 1. 
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the cutoff rendered RDD an inadequate identification strategy for this setting. I display 
the results for the sake of completeness in Table A.4.2 and Figure A.4.2 in the appendix. 
The results are statistically insignificant with low precision but suggest a negative 
difference in the probability to pass the exam at the mock exam passing threshold by 7.7 
percentage points for bad BE students. I interpret this finding as suggestive evidence that 
supports Hypothesis 3.  
4.7 Robustness 
4.7.1 Business administration students 
In this section I discuss the results for the robustness checks of the results for the 
regressions with raw final points as the dependent variable.58 Table 4.4 presents the 
results of a number of robustness checks along the lines suggested by Imbens and 
Lemieux (2008) and a donut hole estimation (cf. Barreca et al. 2011). Table 4.4  
Panel A shows the results if I estimate altered functional forms from the baseline 
specification without additional control variables for the whole sample of BA students. 
In Columns 1-3 I show the results for adding different polynomials of the trend and trend 
interaction terms to the model. Column 2 displays the baseline result with quadratic terms. 
Columns 1 and 3 display the coefficients with linear and cubic terms, respectively. In the 
estimation in Column 4 I omitted the trend interaction terms from the quadratic baseline 
specification. In Column 5 I added the five students who scored 14 mock points to the 
estimation sample. All different functional forms and the added observations yield 
positive, statistically insignificant results with point estimates relatively close to zero. The 
 
58  I do not discuss or display robustness checks for the regressions regarding the probability to 
pass the final exam. Since the regressions in the baseline estimation give no interesting insight, 
presenting robustness checks about them would be redundant. I did conduct them, though, and 
found nothing noteworthy. These robustness checks are available on request. 
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finding of no effect of passing the mock exam on raw final points is not due to functional 
form misspecification. 
Table 4.4 Panel B shows the results of a donut wole estimation and a bandwidth 
test. I estimate donut whole specifications, because the sample suffers from heaping 
directly above the cutoff. The instructor lifted the mock scores of students who performed 
at the level of 14 mock points in the mock exam by 0.5-1 mock points. This could bias 
the baseline effect estimate downwards, because c.p. the students with originally 14 mock 
points, nominally have 14.5 or 15 mock points. If their worse performance in the mock 
exam is a significant predictor of their subsequent worse performance in the final exam, 
they might drag the average raw final score at these mock point values down. The donut 
hole estimations exclude the possibly biased bins. Columns 1 contains the result for the 
donut hole estimation, which excludes observations one mock points away from the 
cutoff on either side. Column 2 expands the donut hole to 1.5 mock points on both sides 
of the cutoff. The coefficients in both columns are positive and slightly bigger than the 
baseline result. The result in Column 1 is statistically significant at the 10% level. The 
bigger point estimates could mean that heaping biased the baseline results downwards, 
but only slightly. 
Columns 3 to 5 of Table 4.4 Panel B show the coefficients from estimating with 
samples at different bandwidths of the running variable around the cutoff. In the baseline 
I include all available observations. For the bandwidth tests I limited the range around the 
cutoff consecutively to 20, 10 and 5 half-mock point bins to either side of the cutoff. The 
effect is positive and statistically insignificant for all bandwidths. Limiting the bandwidth 
makes the results less and less precise. At the bandwidth of 5 half-mock points around 
the cutoff the effect estimate rises to the relatively high value of 7.2, but with a very large 
standard error. None of the bandwidth choices contradicts the baseline finding. 
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Table 4.4 Panel C lists the coefficients for placebo tests. I programmed the 
estimations as if the cutoff for passing the mock exam would lie 2.5 and 5 mock points to 
the left or the right of the actual cutoff. If I would find that the coefficients for the placebo 
cutoffs all had values close to zero, this would be suggestive evidence that the positive 
coefficient for the real cutoff might be caused by an actual positive effect. Though the 
value for the actual cutoff in Column 3 is the biggest point estimate, two of the four 
placebo cutoffs have almost equally big absolute values. 
I also test for structural breaks in the covariates at the cutoff. If I would find any 
structural breaks in the covariates, this could be a source of bias in the results. Table 4.5 
Panel A reports the results and Figure 4.14 shows the corresponding scatter plots of 
covariate mean values by mock score. All estimates are statistically insignificant and the 
scatter plots show no signs of a structural break in any of the covariates. The only estimate 
with a reasonably high coefficient is “female”. This does not seem to influence the 
baseline result, since I estimated separately by gender in the main results section and the 
coefficients for men and women were very similar.  
I furthermore looked for structural breaks in exam attendance. Students might have 
reacted to failing the mock exam by not attending the final exam. I have no raw final point 
score for the students who did not write the final exam and therefore they are not part of 
the main estimation sample. If I found a structural break in exam attendance at the cutoff, 
this would indicate sample selection. Table 4.5 Panel B Columns 1 to 3 respectively 
show the results for non-attendance, non-attendance because of sickness and non-
attendance without an excuse. All coefficients are small and statistically insignificant. 
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Figure 4.15 shows the corresponding scatter plots of non-attendance rates by achieved 
mock points, which corroborate the insignificant results.59 
4.7.2 Bad business engineering students 
Since I only find a statistically significant effect of passing the mock exam on raw final 
points for bad BE students, I show the tests for the robustness of this negative effect 
instead of the robustness checks for the entire sample of BE students.60 It is more 
interesting to know if the effect for the subgroup is robust than knowing how much the 
insignificant estimates change in different specifications. 
I conducted the same set of robustness checks as for the BA students analogously 
with the sample of bad BE students. I report the results for altering the functional form 
and including the one observation of a student who scored 14 nominal mock points in 
Table 4.6 Panel A. The coefficient size is much smaller than the baseline estimate for all 
other functional forms. It ranges between negative 3.7 and negative 6.3. In the baseline it 
is negative 11.8. Only one of the alternative functional forms yields an effect estimate 
that is statistically significant at the 5% level. The high sensitivity to specification and to 
adding a single observation is most probably due to the small number of observations 
below the cutoff. Only 38 bad BE students failed the mock exam. This leads to a relatively 
jumpy course of mean values for raw final points by mock points below the cutoff (cf. 
Figure 4.13, bottom right panel), which different functional forms approximate 
differently. The lack of robustness toward functional form specification means that I can 
only take the results for the bad BE students as suggestive evidence for a negative effect 
 
59  Interestingly, the bottom left graph in Figure 4.15 shows an almost linear relationship between 
sickness on the day of the final exam and mock points. This suggests that students are willing 
and able to obtain doctor sick notes when they want to avoid taking an exam. 
60  I also conducted all robustness checks for the effect on the entire sample of BE students. The 
effect is negative for almost all functional forms and bandwidths but varies in size between 
specifications. The effect is more negative than the baseline result in the donut hole 
regressions. In the placebo tests the effect estimate is by far the biggest at the actual cutoff. 
The regression tables are available on request. 
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of passing the mock exam on preparation effort for the final exam. It is noteworthy, 
though, that all point estimates are below negative two, the threshold that supports 
Hypothesis 1, if it is undercut. 
Table 4.6 Panel B contains the results for the donut hole estimations and the 
bandwidth test. Excluding observations 1 and 1.5 mock points to either side of the cutoff 
produces one slightly less negative and one much more negative coefficient than the 
baseline, suggesting that these results do not suffer from a downward bias from heaping. 
The bandwidth tests show that the more I reduce the bandwidth, the more the precision 
of the estimation decreases. This is no evidence against the robustness of the negative 
effect, since it is caused by the strongly reduced sample size. In Columns 4 and 5 only 
122 and 65 observations remain in the sample. The point estimate stays within a 
reasonable range around the baseline estimate. The result is relatively robust to the 
bandwidth choice. The placebo tests displayed in Table 4.6 Panel C show that the 
coefficient representing the actual cutoff is bigger than those at the placebo cutoffs and it 
is by far the most statistically significant.  
The results for the checks of structural breaks in the covariates and exam attendance 
are displayed in Table 4.7 Panels A and B respectively. The corresponding graphs are 
depicted in Figure 4.16 and 4.17. Neither the regression results nor the graphs hint at 
structural breaks of covariates around the cutoff mock score. 
4.8 Discussion of findings 
The RDD regressions tested if students who passed the mock exam by a narrow margin 
performed significantly worse in the final exam than students who failed the mock exam 
by a narrow margin. I expect them to perform worse, because of the information and the 
reward treatment. The information treatment is feedback that a fully rational student who 
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achieved a mock score slightly above or slightly below the passing threshold would 
interpret to mean that she is at high risk to fail the final exam, if she keeps her preparation 
level constant. Regardless if she barely passed or barely failed the mock exam, the fully 
rational student would increase her study effort if she wants some degree of certainty to 
pass the final exam.  
I assume that the students who scored around the passing threshold in the mock 
exam react differently to barely passing the mock exam than to barely failing it, because 
they have three properties. First, they are overconfident. Second, a significant portion of 
them are risk avoiders, which means the desire to avoid failing the exam influences their 
effort choice. Their effort choice is not solely driven by the desire to achieve a good grade. 
Third, failing the mock exam reduces their overconfidence, because it is hard to ignore 
the possibility to score equally bad if they keep their effort level constant. If these students 
have these properties, I expect those who barely failed the mock exam to increase their 
effort level more than those who barely passed the mock exam. This effect from the 
information treatment could be exacerbated by the reward treatment, which gives the 
students who passed the mock exam an extra safety margin of two points. 
The RDD results indicate no negative effect of passing the mock exam on final 
exam performance for most groups of students. The only students for whom I do find a 
significant difference in exam performance at the mock exam passing threshold, are the 
bad BE students. It does not contradict the hypotheses or the model developed in section 
4.3 that I find a big effect for this group of students, but no other group. I expect the effect 
only for students who are risk avoiders. It makes sense that the portion of risk avoiders 
among bad BE students is higher than in other groups. BA students have a higher extrinsic 
motivation to achieve a good grade in the final exam, because “Introductory Economics” 
has twice as much weight in their GPA. Good BE most likely have more intrinsic 
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motivation to achieve a good grade. The definition of a good student is a below average 
high school GPA. Their higher level of intrinsic motivation is probably the reason most 
of them are in the group of good students.  
Thus, there are good reasons to assume BA students and good BE students have a 
higher preference for good grades in this final exam than the bad BE students. A higher 
preference for good grades means a student has a lower 𝛼𝑢, which means she is a grade 
maximizer, rather than a risk avoider. Thus, it makes sense to find the reduction in raw 
final exam points at the mock exam passing threshold, caused by less effort, only for bad 
BE students since the bad BE students are most likely to be risk avoiders. 
4.9 Conclusion 
This study explores the effect of feedback from pretests on overconfident students. To 
this purpose, I develop a model of student effort choice that divides students into three 
types: Grade maximizers, risk avoiders and quitters, whom I categorize by the relative 
importance they assign to good grades, passing the exam and using the time they need to 
achieve the two former goals doing something else. I introduce feedback from a pretest 
and overconfidence into the model. I conclude that feedback from a pretest should lead 
to differences in effort choices between overconfident risk avoiders who pass a pretest 
and overconfident risk avoiders who fail a pretest. The ones who passed a pretest should 
keep their preparation effort constant, because their overconfidence lets them assume the 
previous effort level was sufficient to also pass the final exam with some degree of 
certainty. The ones who failed a pretest reduce their overconfidence, because they have a 
harder time to ignore the possibility that their effort was not sufficient to reach their goal. 
They subsequently increase their effort. 
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I test the conclusion about a difference in preparation effort empirically using data 
about pretests taken at a German university. I find evidence that a certain group of 
students reacted in the hypothesized way, but most students did not show any effect. The 
students who did react are those for whom the probability to be a risk avoider is highest, 
because they have little intrinsic and little extrinsic motivation to achieve a good grade in 
the exam in question. For these students the RDD I employ yields a reduction of about 
20% of total achievable exam points at the cutoff. I attribute this difference in 
performance to the difference in effort from having passed the pretest or not. 
Unfortunately, the empirical analysis is sensitive to functional form specification, 
probably due to the small size of the subsample that shows a reaction. Further research 
would be warranted to corroborate the results. 
The implication educators can draw from the analysis is that overconfident 
interpretation of feedback from a pretest matters most when students have little incentive 
to care about the grade in the final exam. An example in which this would apply are exams 
that are graded on a pass or fail basis. If educators want to avoid the negative effect of 
overconfident interpretation of feedback from pretests, they should take measures to 
counteract students’ overconfidence. Simply telling students that they should not be 
overconfident is not likely to be effective in this regard. If students remain overconfident 
after receiving worse grade than expected 13 times in a row (cf. Foster et al. 2017), they 
will probably also disregard warnings about overconfidence. One possible solution is to 
show the students empirical evidence that students fail exams because of their 
overconfidence. 
The model of students’ effort choices developed in section 4.3 can be valuable for 
education research independently of the case I applied it to here. There is an increasing 
academic interest in analyzing student’s learning process, spurred by the desire to 
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improve it (cf. Siemens 2013). This strand of literature is called “Learning Analytics”. It 
employs data from electronic learning platforms to analyze students’ learning behavior 
and its effectiveness. The proposed model offers opportunities to augment it for different 
circumstances and model the functions that determine the involved parameters. An 
augmented form of the model could be implemented in the context of “Learning 
Analytics” to help understand students’ learning behavior. A better understanding of 
students’ learning behavior makes it easier to develop and evaluate measures aimed at 
improving students’ success.  
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Figures and tables 
Figure 4.1  A student’s expected production function for exam points 
 
Notes: The blue curve represents the percentage of total exam points, P (y-axis), the student 
expects to achieve at each effort level (x-axis). Thus, it is the production function for exam 
points with effort as the input. The black horizontal line marks z, the passing threshold of 
the exam, in this case at 50%. The gray shaded area is the student’s assumed 99% 
confidence interval around the production function. 
Source: Own presentation. 
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Figure 4.2  Determinants of a student’s effort choice 
 
Notes: The blue curve represents the student’s assumed budget constraint, assuming the 
production function from Figure 4.1. The gray shaded area marks the assumed 99% 
confidence interval. The budget constraint maps the percentage of exam points P (left y-
axis) the student can expect if she spends a certain amount of time not studying for the 
exam (atu ≡ alternative time use, x-axis). The red curve maps the expected probability to 
fail the exam (right y-axis) at each atu level. The purple curve is an indifference curve for 
a student with 𝛼𝑢 = 0 and 𝜔 = 0.47. The green curve is an indifference curve with 𝛼𝑢 =
0.5 and 𝜔 = 0.47. The red vertical lines mark the risk interval, the interval of atu choices 
for which the assumed chance to fail the exam is greater than 0.5% and smaller than 99.5%. 
Source: Own presentation. 
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Figure 4.3  Indifference curves for different types of students 
 
Notes: For explanations about the blue curve, the axes, the black line and the red 
vertical lines see Figure 4.2. The orange curve is the indifference curve for a student 
with 𝜶𝒖 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓 and 𝝎 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟕, which, at her assumed productivity, makes her a 
grade maximizer. The green curve is the indifference curve for a student with 𝜶𝒖 =
𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝝎 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟕, which, at her assumed productivity, makes her a risk avoider. 
The orange curve is the indifference curve for a student with 𝜶𝒖 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟓 and 𝝎 =
𝟎. 𝟒𝟕, which, at her assumed productivity, makes her a quitter. 
Source: Own presentation. 
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Figure 4.4  A rational risk avoider’s adjusted effort choice after 
receiving feedback 
 
Notes: The dashed curves and dashed lines depict the effort choice situation of the risk 
avoider from Figure 4.3. She received feedback from a pretest in which she scored at 52%. 
The blue dot (𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑃𝑇 , 𝑃𝑃𝑇) marks her realized combination of effort (which is 1-atu) 
and exam points. The full blue curve is her budget constraint, in which she adjusted her 
expected productivity to the feedback. The full green curve is her feedback adjusted 
indifference curve. The full red vertical lines mark her adjusted risk interval. 
Source: Own presentation. 
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Figure 4.5  An overconfident risk avoider’s adjusted effort choice after 
receiving feedback (if she passed the pretest) 
 
Notes: The dashed curves and lines represent the rational student’s feedback adjusted effort 
choice from Figure 4.4. The full blue curve is the overconfident student’s assumed budget 
constraint. The red curve is the overconfident student’s indifference curve. The full red 
lines mark her risk interval. 
Source: Own presentation. 
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Figure 4.6  An overconfident grade maximizer’s adjusted effort 
choice after receiving feedback 
 
Notes: See notes Figure 4.5. The only difference is that this is a grade maximizer’s 
adjustment to feedback, rather than a risk avoider’s. The dashed lines represent the rational 
adjustment to feedback for the grade maximizer represented by the orange curve in Figure 
4.3. The full lines represent her adjustment to feedback from a pretest in case she is 
overconfident. 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
 
Figure 4.7  Winter semester timeline 
 
Source: Own presentation. 
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Figure 4.8  Mock point distribution 
a) Business administration students 
 
 
 
b) Business engineering students 
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c) All students 
 
Notes: The vertical red line in Figures 4.9 a), b) and c) marks the passing threshold 
for the mock exam. In Figure 4.9 c) we overlaid the normal distribution as a black 
line. The horizontal red line in the same figure marks the frequency of 96, which 
we extrapolate as the mass the mock point value of 14 would have, if the instructor 
had not applied the lifting rule. 
Source: Data set provided by the “Introductory Economics” instructor. 
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Figure 4.9  An overconfident risk avoider’s adjusted effort choice after 
receiving feedback (if she failed the pretest) 
 
Notes: All lines and curves in this figure correspond to those in Figure 4.5 (i.e. the dashed 
lines represent the rational choice, the full lines represent the overconfident choice), with 
the only difference that this risk avoider failed the pretest and therefore is less 
overconfident. 
Source: Own presentation. 
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Figure 4.10 Scatterplots of raw final points by mock point score 
Sample: Business administration students 
 
Notes: The panel at the top shows the scatterplot for the entire sample of BA students. Underneath 
this sample is first divided by gender and then by educational performance during high school. 
The good students have a high school GPA below the median of BA students and the bad students 
a high school GPA above this median. The red lines are the trend predictions from the baseline 
estimations. The vertical black line marks the mock point passing score, 14.5. The dashed 
horizontal line marks the passing score of the final exam, 29.5. This line has a kink at the cutoff, 
because students who passed the mock exam need two raw final points less to pass the final exam. 
Source: Exam data provided by the “Introductory Economics” instructor and data from the 
university administration. 
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Figure 4.11 Average raw final points by mock point score 
Sample: Business administration students 
 
Notes: See Figure 4.10. 
Source: See Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.12 Scatterplots of raw final points by mock point score 
Sample: Business engineering students 
 
Notes: The panel at the top shows the scatterplot for the entire sample of BE students. Underneath 
this sample is first divided by gender and then by educational performance during high school. 
The good students have a high school GPA below the median of BE students and the bad students 
a high school GPA above this median. The red lines are the trend predictions from the baseline 
estimations. The vertical black line marks the mock point passing score, 14.5. The dashed 
horizontal line marks the passing score of the final exam, 29.5. This line has a kink at the cutoff, 
because students who passed the mock exam need two raw final points less to pass the final exam. 
Source: See Figure 4.10.  
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Figure 4.13 Average raw final points by mock point score 
Sample: Business engineering students 
 
Notes: See Figure 4.12. 
Source: See Figure 4.10. 
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Table 4.14  Covariate mean values by mock point score 
Sample: Business administration students 
 
Notes: The red lines are the trend predictions from estimating the baseline model with the 
respective covariate as the dependent variable. The vertical black line marks the mock point score 
necessary for passing. 
Source: See Figure 4.10. 
  
198 
 
Table 4.15  Share of students who did not attend the final by mock score 
Sample: Business administration students 
 
Notes: The red lines are the trend predictions from estimating the baseline model with a different 
dependent variable. This dependent variable differs between the panels. It is a dummy that marks 
non-attendance of the final exam in general (top panel), final because of sickness (bottom left 
panel) and without excuse (bottom right panel). The vertical black line marks the mock point 
score necessary for passing. 
Source: See Figure 4.10. 
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Table 4.16  Covariate mean values by mock point score 
Sample: Bad business engineering students 
 
Notes: See Figure 4.14 
Source: See Figure 4.10. 
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Table 4.17  Share of students who did not attend the final by mock score 
Sample: Bad business engineering students 
 
Notes: The red lines are the trend predictions from estimating the baseline model with a different 
dependent variable. This dependent variable differs between the panels. It is a dummy that marks 
non-attendance of the final exam in general (top panel), final because of sickness (bottom left 
panel) and without excuse (bottom right panel). The vertical black line marks the mock point 
score necessary for passing. 
Source: See Figure 4.10. 
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Table 4.1  Desciptive statistics 
 
Source: Exam data from the “Introductory Economics” instructor and data from the university 
administration. + Grade point average of four courses, which the BA students take in the first 
semester. Slightly different for BE students.  
Mean SD Mean SD Diff.
Mock exam participation 0.81 0.39 0.83 0.38
Mock exam participants
Mock points 15.52 5.24 19.38 4.91 ***
Mock grade 3.82 1.10 2.99 1.13 ***
Passed mock exam 0.63 0.48 0.87 0.33 ***
Final exam participants
Final raw points 34.96 11.33 44.98 8.95 ***
Final points (incl. bonus) 36.92 12.01 47.38 9.37 ***
Final grade 3.48 1.24 2.27 1.13 ***
Passed final exam 0.76 0.43 0.96 0.20 ***
All students
Sick on exam day 0.11 0.31 0.05 0.23 ***
Absent without excuse 0.08 0.28 0.04 0.20 ***
Second attempt 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.08 ***
Age 20.97 2.38 21.29 1.62 ***
Female 0.41 0.49 0.20 0.40 ***
Non-German citizen 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
Regular abitur 0.80 0.40 0.88 0.33 ***
High school GPA 2.65 0.48 2.19 0.45 ***
Years btw. HS-degree 
        and start of studies
2.06 1.70 1.71 1.25 ***
First semester uni GPA
+
3.51 1.19 2.74 1.09 ***
1 0.95 0.21 0.04 0.21 ***
3 0.05 0.21 0.95 0.21 ***
5 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.10 ***
Winter semester…
2008/2009
2010/2011
2011/2012
2012/2013
2013/2014
Sum
Business administration
students
Business-engineering
students
N N
Takes exam in study semester…
2,872 574
364
391
744
802
571
172
70
94
103
135
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Table 4.2 Baseline estimation results 
Sample: Business administration students 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is raw final points. The additional controls added in the lower are high school GPA, 
age, the gap between finishing high school and starting university, dummies for foreign 
citizenship and gender and semester fixed effects. Good and bad students (Columns 4 and 5) are 
those with a high school GPA below (good) and above (bad) the median high school GPA of our 
sample of business administration students. 
Source: See Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.3 Baseline estimation results 
Sample: Business engineering students 
 
Notes: See Table 4.1. The only difference is that we split good and bad students by the high 
school GPA of the business engineering students in this sample. 
Source: See Table 4.1.  
Full sample Men Women
Good 
students
Bad 
students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimations without covariates
Passed mock exam 1.523 1.252 2.087 0.712 1.685
(1.181) (1.495) (1.852) (1.938) (1.473)
Lower bound of 90% CI -0.420 -1.208 -0.962 -2.479 -0.740
Estimations with covariates
Passed mock exam 0.880 0.045 2.189 1.232 0.679
(1.066) (1.336) (1.597) (1.764) (1.363)
Lower bound of 90% CI -0.874 -2.155 -0.441 -1.673 -1.565
N 2,061 1,197 864 988 1,073
Full sample Men Women
Good 
students
Bad 
students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimations without covariates
Passed mock exam -6.210 -6.626 20.686** 1.454 -11.757**
(4.466) (4.470) (9.899) (6.949) (5.245)
Lower bound of 90% CI -14.986 -15.416 1.007 -12.241 -22.091
Estimations with covariates
Passed mock exam -5.714 -6.502 14.770* 1.580 -10.301**
(3.732) (3.974) (8.088) (7.084) (4.195)
Lower bound of 90% CI -13.048 -14.317 -1.339 -12.384 -18.568
N 464 372 92 226 238
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Table 4.4 Robustness checks I 
Sample: Business administration students 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is raw final points. The abbreviation MP in Panel A Column 5 stands for mock points. 
Source: See Table 4.1.  
Panel A - Functional form and inclusion of observations with 14 mock points
Linear Quadratic Cubic
No incter-
action term
Include obs. 
with 14 MP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Passed mock exam 0.047 1.523 0.623 0.564 1.134
(0.781) (1.181) (1.771) (0.678) (0.996)
N 2,061 2,061 2,061 2,061 2,066
Panel B - Donut hole and bandwidth tests
Exclude
mock points 
13.5-15.5
Exclude
mock points 
13-15
Bandwidth:
4.5-24
mock points
Bandwidth:
9.5-19
mock points
Bandwidth:
12-16.5
mock points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Passed mock exam
2.890* 2.407 0.519 1.358 7.171
(1.699) (2.120) (1.289) (2.165) (4.982)
N 1,700 1,551 1,926 1,267 702
Panel C - Placebo tests
Placebo cutoff:
9.5 mock 
points
12 mock 
points
14.5 mock 
points
17 mock 
points
19.5 mock 
points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Passed mock exam
0.870 1.387 1.523 0.465 -1.342
(1.521) (1.248) (1.181) (0.928) (0.959)
N 2,061 2,061 2,061 2,061 2,061
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Table 4.5 Robustness checks II 
Sample: Business administration students 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable is 
different in every column it is always the variable named in the respective columns name. The 
abbreviation HS in Panel A Column 1 stands for high school. 
Source: See Table 4.1. 
  
Panel A - Covariates
HS GPA
Non-
German
citizens Females Age
Years btw.
HS and Uni
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Passed mock exam -0.009 3.091 7.063 -0.375 -0.316
(0.057) (3.189) (6.175) (0.297) (0.209)
N 2,061 2,061 2,061 2,061 2,061
Panel B - Final exam attendance
Missed final 
exam
Sick on the 
day of the 
final exam
Missed final 
exam 
w/o excuse
- -
(1) (2) (3)
Passed mock exam 0.925 1.048 -0.123 - -
(4.193) (3.611) (2.517)
N 2,331 2,331 2,331 - -
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Table 4.6 Robustness checks I 
Sample: Bad business engineering students 
 
Notes: See Table 4.4. 
Sources: See Table 4.1.  
Panel A - Functional form and inclusion of observations with 14 mock points
Linear Quadratic Cubic
No incter-
action term
Include obs. 
with 14 MP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Passed mock exam -4.635 -11.757** -3.708 -4.519** -6.290
(3.017) (5.245) (8.189) (2.192) (4.319)
N 238 238 238 238 239
Panel B - Donut hole and bandwidth tests
Exclude
mock points 
13.5-15.5
Exclude
mock points 
13-15
Bandwidth:
4.5-24
mock points
Bandwidth:
9.5-19
mock points
Bandwidth:
12-16.5
mock points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Passed mock exam
-10.401 -21.131*** -12.392** -7.864 -12.030
(6.656) (7.985) (5.334) (9.690) (19.517)
N 208 195 210 122 65
Panel C - Placebo tests
Placebo cutoff:
9.5 mock 
points
12 mock 
points
14.5 mock 
points
17 mock 
points
19.5 mock 
points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Passed mock exam
-6.547 -3.707 -11.757** 1.488 0.928
(5.138) (7.220) (5.245) (2.109) (2.137)
N 238 238 238 238 238
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Table 4.7 Robustness checks II 
Sample: Bad business engineering students 
 
Notes: See Table 4.5. 
Source: See Table 4.1. 
  
Panel A - Covariates
HS GPA
Non-
German
citizens Females Age
Years btw.
HS and Uni
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Passed mock exam -0.057 10.886 10.222 1.222 0.033
(0.172) (8.981) (18.815) (0.781) (0.427)
N 238 238 238 238 238
Panel B - Final exam attendance and grade in other subject
Missed final 
exam
Sick on the 
day of the 
final exam
Missed final 
exam 
w/o excuse
- -
(1) (2) (3)
Passed mock exam 13.517 3.097 10.420 - -
(10.111) (8.137) (7.435)
N 246 246 246 - -
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Appendix 4.A 
Figure A.4.1 Pass rate by mock point score 
  Sample: Business administration students 
 
Notes: See Figure 4.4. 
Source: See Figure 4.4.  
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Figure A.4.2 Pass rate by mock point score 
  Sample: Business engineering students 
 
Notes: See Figure 4.4. For the BE students the trend predictions are relatively far off the course 
of actual outcomes. This imprecision comes from small sample sizes, especially below the cutoff, 
coupled with little variation in the outcome variable – 96% of BE students passed the final exam.  
Source: See Figure 4.4. 
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Table A.4.1 Influence on the probability to pass the final exam 
Sample: Business administration students 
 
Notes: Robust S.E. in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The dependent variable in 
all models is a dummy for passing the final exam. The additional controls added in the lower are 
high school GPA, age, the gap between finishing high school and starting university, dummies 
for foreign citizenship and gender and semester fixed effects. Good and bad students (Columns 4 
and 5) are those with a high school GPA below (good) and above (bad) the median high school 
GPA of our sample of business administration students. I show the p-value of a t-test against the 
effect coefficient being different from 6.8, because without an effort reduction from information 
and reward treatment, passing the mock exam automatically raises the probability to pass the 
final exam by 6.8%. If a student who passed the mock exam does not adjust her effort level she 
has two more final points, which is 6.8% of the passing score of 29.5 
Source: See Table 4.1. 
  
Full sample Men Women
Good 
students
Bad 
students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimations without covariates
Passed mock exam (β) 5.463 4.288 9.311 13.860 2.015
(5.765) (7.184) (9.390) (9.274) (7.443)
p-value t-test β = 6.8 0.819 0.729 0.788 0.445 0.522
Estimations with covariates
Passed mock exam (β) 3.740 -0.236 10.985 14.668* -1.209
(5.464) (6.875) (8.686) (8.787) (7.035)
p-value t-test β = 6.8 0.578 0.308 0.628 0.370 0.256
N 2,061 1,197 864 988 1,073
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Table A.4.2 Influence on the probability to pass the final exam 
Sample: Business engineering students 
 
Notes: See Table A.4.1. The only difference is that I split good and bad students by the high 
school GPA of the business engineering students in this sample. 
Source: See Table 4.1. 
  
Full sample Men Women
Good 
students
Bad 
students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimations without covariates
Passed mock exam (β) -0.297 4.091 31.142** -1.505 -7.734
(13.160) (14.819) (13.359) (1.536) (18.223)
p-value t-test β = 6.8 0.591 0.856 0.072* 0.000*** 0.427
Estimations with covariates
Passed mock exam (β) -1.353 1.205 27.613** -2.399 -8.988
(10.307) (11.830) (12.114) (2.558) (12.379)
p-value t-test β = 6.8 0.431 0.638 0.090* 0.000*** 0.204
N 464 372 92 226 238
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5 Conclusion 
 
In the introduction, I laid out my understanding of economics and my motivation to 
conduct economic research. In the conclusion, I first elaborate my views on how 
economic research can contribute to the stated aim of understanding human behavior for 
the purpose of improving the production and allocation of resources. Then I outline in 
which ways my research contributed to this aim. 
Since it is social science, economics is less exact than the natural sciences. A 
physicist who wants to calculate the force of gravity can isolate the force she is interested 
in and conduct repeated experiments. If she creates a vacuum and drops 100 different 
objects and all accelerate at the same rate, she can deduce that the 101st object she drops 
will accelerate at the same rate. Knowing the exact force of gravity enables her to make 
predictions, e.g. where and when a certain object would land if it were dropped from a 
plane. The prediction would be more or less accurate, depending on the height the object 
was dropped from, the weather conditions, especially the wind, and the nature of the 
object. It is easier to gauge where and when a bowling ball would land than trying the 
same for a feather. 
An economist who wants to determine what force pulls in which direction and how 
strongly is faced with challenges the physicist is not. It is hard to isolate a force related to 
social interaction. A potentially infinite number of forces pulls the actions of people in 
different directions. Economists can conduct experiments, but for many interesting and 
important relationships, there is no equivalent to a vacuum. If economists want to predict 
the impact of these forces, they have to gather evidence where they can find it. 
If the physicist had to deduce from 100 feathers dropped from a plane, where a 
bowling ball would land, her prediction would probably be less accurate than if she had 
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a laboratory to conduct experiments. She could improve the accuracy of her prediction, 
if she observed the drop of a tennis ball. She could improve it further if she had weather 
reports that tell her the direction the wind was blowing at each observed drop. Economists 
gather evidence to determine as many of the forces involved in the production and 
efficient allocation of resources as possible, to make their predictions about the 
consequences of changes in the system regulating these forces more accurate. 
The article in chapter 2 presents evidence about the fertility effect of child benefits. 
It analyzes if a German reform that increased child benefits caused an increase in fertility 
for people for whom it decreased the price of an additional child the most. My coauthor 
and I use a difference-in-difference strategy and find no fertility effect of the reform for 
first births of low income couples and some evidence for an increase between 9.6% and 
22.6% for second births of high income couples. The article contributes to the economic 
literature by presenting evidence from two separate datasets. The SOEP, a survey that 
offers detailed panel data about the observed individuals and the German Mikrozensus, 
which offers less detailed data, but much bigger sample sizes. Previous studies already 
found evidence for a fertility effect of child related financial benefits e.g. in Israel (Cohen 
et al. 2013), Spain (Gonzalez 2013) and Canada (Milligan 2005). The exact nature of the 
child related financial benefits varies between countries. The countries have different 
social and legal settings. Before this background, the evidence presented in chapter 2 is 
important additional evidence about the fertility effect of child benefits. 
The article in chapter 3 presents evidence about the fertility effect of cutting child 
related welfare benefits. It analyzes a German reform that made parental leave benefits 
deductible from welfare benefits. This meant a decrease of 18% of household income for 
welfare recipients who have a young child. I use a linear probability model and detect a 
fertility decrease of 6.8% as a reaction to the reform. This article contributes to the 
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economic literature by presenting robust evidence for a fertility effect of changing the 
level of child related welfare payments. The evidence in this study is more robust than 
that from previous studies, first, because the reform had a bigger impact on welfare 
recipients’ household income than any previously studied reforms. Second, I have access 
to an exceptionally large and detailed dataset containing fertility data about welfare 
recipients. The previous literature was plagued by insufficient data availability, as fertility 
research requires large samples and fertility data about large numbers of welfare 
recipients is scarce. The evidence I present suggests that welfare recipients’ fertility reacts 
weaker to financial incentives than the fertility of general populations. This is important 
information before the background of the controversial political debate about the fertility 
effect of child related welfare payments. 
The article in chapter 4 develops a model of student effort choice, considering 
feedback and student overconfidence. The student in the model chooses the effort she 
invests to prepare for an exam relying on judgements about the rate at which efforts 
convert into exam points. She derives utility from time uses alternative to studying and 
from exam points, by way of achieving a better grade. She assigns disutility to failing the 
exam. The model divides students into three types, regarding their preferences about the 
explicit exam; grade maximizers, risk avoiders and quitters. Introducing feedback from 
a pretest and overconfidence into the model, yields that risk avoiders are likely to choose 
their effort less efficiently if they pass the pretest than if they fail it. They prepare less 
than they should, considering they want to avoid failing the final exam. I test this 
prediction empirically using data about pretests and subsequent final exams written at a 
German university. Employing a regression discontinuity design, I find no effect of 
passing the pretest for most students. I do find an effect for a group of students who has 
least reason to care about the grade of the exam and therefore likely has the highest share 
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of risk avoiders. They perform 27% of the average final exam score worse, if they pass 
the pretest. The most important contribution of this article is the proposed model. It is the 
first attempt in the literature to model student’s effort choice for an exam. It yields insights 
about the effects of feedback and student overconfidence. Future research has to test 
empirically if the model is accurate. If the model proves robust to empirical testing, it can 
be a valuable tool to improve the education system and thereby help facilitate human 
capital. 
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